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i 
ABSTRACT 
 
It is well understood that innovation drives productivity growth in agriculture. 
Innovation, however, is a process that involves activities distributed throughout the 
supply chain.  In this dissertation I investigate three topics that are at the core of the 
distribution and diffusion of innovation: optimal licensing of university-based inventions, 
new variety adoption among farmers, and consumers’ choice of new products within a 
social network environment.   
University researchers assume an important role in innovation, particularly as a 
result of the Bayh-Dole Act, which allowed universities to license inventions funded by 
federal research dollars, to private industry.  Aligning the incentives to innovate at the 
university level with the incentives to adopt downstream, I show that non-exclusive 
licensing is preferred under both fixed fee and royalty licensing.  Finding support for 
non-exclusive licensing is important as it provides evidence that the concept underlying 
the Bayh-Dole Act has economic merit, namely that the goals of university-based 
researchers are consistent with those of society, and taxpayers, in general.    
After licensing, new products enter the diffusion process. Using a case study of 
small holders in Mozambique, I observe substantial geographic clustering of new-variety 
adoption decisions. Controlling for the other potential factors, I find that information 
diffusion through space is largely responsible for variation in adoption.   As predicted by 
a social learning model, spatial effects are not based on geographic distance, but rather on 
neighbor-relationships that follow from information exchange. My findings are consistent 
with others who find information to be the primary barrier to adoption, and means that 
adoption can be accelerated by improving information exchange among farmers.  
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Ultimately, innovation is only useful when adopted by end consumers.  
Consumers’ choices of new products are determined by many factors such as personal 
preferences, the attributes of the products, and more importantly, peer recommendations. 
My experimental data shows that peers are indeed important, but “weak ties” or 
information from friends-of-friends is more important than close friends. Further, others 
regarded as experts in the subject matter exert the strongest influence on peer choices.  
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“And I tell you, ask, and it will be given to you; seek, and you will find; knock, and it 
will be opened to you. For everyone who asks receives, and the one who seeks finds, and 
to the one who knocks it will be opened.” 
-- Luke 11:9-10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. ix 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................ x 
CHAPTER  
1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 
2. ESSAY 1: FEES VERSUS ROYALTIES IN AGRICULTRAL PATENTS ............... 13 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 13 
2.2 Model ...................................................................................................................... 16 
2.3 Propositions Regarding the Innovator’s Profit ....................................................... 19 
2.4 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 36 
2.5 Discussion. .............................................................................................................. 40 
3. ESSAY 2:VARIETY ADOPTION AMONG FARMERS IN A SOCIAL NETWOR 42 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 42 
3.2 Theoretical Model ................................................................................................... 48 
3.3 Hypotheses .............................................................................................................. 57 
3.4 Empirical Study: New Maize Variety Adoption in Mozambique .......................... 64 
3.4.1 Data .................................................................................................................. 65 
3.4.2 Model ............................................................................................................... 68 
3.4.3 Estimation ........................................................................................................ 77 
3.4.4 Results .............................................................................................................. 80 
 
 
  
 
viii 
CHAPTER                                                                                                                      Page 
3.5 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 85 
4. ESSAY 3: MODELING PRODUCT CHOICES IN A PEER NETWORK ................. 89 
4.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 89 
4.2 Background ............................................................................................................. 92 
4.3 Conceptual Model of Endogenous Peer Effects ..................................................... 99 
4.4. Experimental Procedure ....................................................................................... 103 
4.5 Econometric Model of Preference Revision ......................................................... 115 
4.5.1 Choice modeling ............................................................................................ 116 
4.5.2. Spatial Models .............................................................................................. 122 
4.5.3 Estimation ...................................................................................................... 129 
4.6 Results ................................................................................................................... 133 
4.6.1 Multinomial Logit Results ............................................................................. 134 
4.6.2 RPL Results ................................................................................................... 136 
4.6.3 Results of Spatial Models .............................................................................. 141 
4.7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 147 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS .................................................................. 150 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 160 
APPENDIX 
A CALCULATING INNOVATOR'S PROFIT .......................................................... 167 
B BAYESIAN UPDATING ....................................................................................... 173 
C EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS .......................................................................... 176 
 
 
  
 
ix 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table                                                                                                                               Page 
2.1: Comparison of Innovator Profits and the Extent of Innovation ................................. 39 
2.2: Comparison of Profits and Horizontal Differentiation .............................................. 40 
3.1: The Number of Adopters in the Sampled Provinces ................................................. 67 
3.2 Selected Variables and Descriptive Statistics. ............................................................ 74 
3.3 Diagnostics for Spatial Dependence Test Against a Classic Probit ............................ 82 
3.4 Spatial Models Using Different Weights. ................................................................... 83 
4.1 Attributes and Levels. ............................................................................................... 107 
4.2 Example Choice Set .................................................................................................. 108 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics for the Sample ........................................................................ 114 
4.4 List of Variables ........................................................................................................ 118 
4.5 Variables Included in the Model ............................................................................... 127 
4.6 Estimated Parameters for MNL And RPL. ............................................................... 134 
4.7 Subject-Specific Marginal WTP by Attribute........................................................... 140 
4.8 Results of Spatial Models. ........................................................................................ 146 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
x 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure                                                                                                                             Page 
2.1 Innovator Profit Under Exclusive Fixed-Fee Licensing ............................................. 23 
2.2 Innovator Profit Under Non-Exclusive Fixed-Fee Licensing ..................................... 25 
2.3 Innovator Profit Under Exclusive Royalty Licensing ................................................. 28 
2.4 Innovator Profit Under Non-Exclusive Royalty Licensing ........................................ 30 
2.5 Innovator Profit Under Exclusive Two-Part Tariff Licensing .................................... 34 
2.6 Innovator Profit Under Non-Exclusive Two-Part Tariff Licensing ............................ 36 
3.1 Sampled Household in Sofala and Manica with Adopters (Red) and Non-Adopters 
(Black)....................................................................................................................... 43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
1 
CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Innovation is key to not only agricultural but all economic progress. Productivity 
improvement from high yield varieties and more efficient machinery freed farmers from 
the land, which, in turn, enabled the modern consumer economy. For example, the Green 
Revolution of the 1940s to the 1960s benefited not only developing countries, but also 
the world, through lower prices, high yields, and enhanced productivity due largely to 
improved crop varieties (Evenson and Gollin 2003).  Although many innovations arise 
from serendipity, truly transformative technologies emerge from an innovation process, a 
process that mirrors the agricultural value chain from the supply of innovation at research 
universities, through adoption by producers, and acceptance by consumers.  In this 
dissertation, I study issues at the core of each stage of the innovation process: Licensing 
patents from research universities, adoption of new varieties through learning process, 
and how social networks affect the adoption of new consumer products.     
Every year, universities license creates approximately $30 billion profit through 
patents to industry.  Enabled by the Bayh-Dole Act (1980), which granted universities the 
right to profit from patents on federally-funded research, and incentivized through the 
reduction in public funding for university budgets, universities actively market 
innovations that emerge from their labs through licenses managed by university-based 
technology transfer offices (TTOs).  However, despite the rising importance of licensing 
revenue to university funding, patent licenses are not marketed optimally by TTOs. 
Pricing innovations correctly not only aligns the incentives facing researchers and their 
university employers but helps ensure that a more sustainable stream of innovations 
enters the agricultural supply chain. In this dissertation, I resolve the seeming paradox 
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that arises through the current system of patent licensing – a process with the ability and 
need to be self-supporting appears to be neither, in spite of the wealth of research on 
patent licensing schemes.1   
Recognizing university-based intellectual property (IP) is necessary to protect the 
rights of the innovators and to motivate further breakthroughs. While the Bayh-Dole Act 
seemingly entrenched the right of universities to freely market their IP, this right has 
recently been challenged in court. Notably, the University of Minnesota licensed its 
SweeTango™ apple to a single group of apple growers -- 45 of them, mainly in the states 
of Washington, Michigan, and New York -- the Next Big Thing cooperative. 
SweeTango™ apples can only be grown by members of this cooperative. At issue is 
whether a group of growers should monopolize the right to utilize a university-based 
research, and whether the university, and by extension society, benefits from such 
exclusive licensing.  To examine this matter, I compare different licensing scenarios to 
compare the welfare of both the patent holder and the patented growers (firms). 
Ultimately, my goal is to determine the licensing strategy that is in the best interests of 
university administrators.  Robust licensing strategies help protect the profit of the 
innovator and regulate the market, therefore, finding the optimal licensing strategy is 
crucial.  
                                                        
1 Optimality is defined, as in the literature, as the difference between license revenues and the cost of 
innovation. Although our analysis concerns university research activities, and universities are expected to 
conduct basic research in the public interest, our profit-maximization assumption reflects the observed 
activities of university TTO offices. Namely, as Bulut and Moschini (2009) note, “Quite clearly, when it 
comes to patenting and licensing, universities are likely to behave based on their self-interest rather than the 
public interest” (p. 124). Resolving the debate as to whether universities should maximize the returns to 
their research investment is left for either political or legal discussion. 
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Licensors generally pay for the rights to use a patent in one of three ways:  
through fixed fees, royalties, or a combination of fees and royalties in a two-part tariff 
scheme, each marketed through either exclusive or non-exclusive contracts.  Optimal 
contracts, or those that maximize university revenue, depend critically on the nature of 
competition among downstream producers, or the firms that buy and use the new 
technology. While license design for cost-reducing innovations is relatively well 
understood (Sen and Tauman 2007), there is relatively little research on quality-
improving innovations (Bousquet et al. 1998; Sen and Tauman 2007; Stamatopoulos and 
Tauman 2008; Li and Wang 2010).  
In agriculture, in general, and in the fruit and vegetable sector more specifically, 
however, a growing number of innovations seek to improve either nutritional, taste, 
ethical, or other demand-side attributes.  Unlike cost-reducing innovations, which do not 
alter downstream demands, quality improving innovations are important in that they 
vertically differentiate old and new products, leading to greater willingness to pay for 
consumers. In the case of the SweeTango™ apple described above, the eating qualities of 
the apple were thought to be a substantial improvement over existing varieties. Because 
there are many potential downstream competitors willing to license a patent on a new 
farm product, I consider an oligopolistic market where downstream firms compete in 
price and the upstream innovator holds a quality-improving technology that may 
vertically-differentiate old and new products. In other words, I study the optimal design 
of patent-licensing contracts in the context of a demand-side agricultural product 
innovation. 
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The innovator is assumed to be an outsider, or an entity that does not also produce 
the commodity itself, that sells licenses to its innovations through either exclusive or non-
exclusive licensing. Exclusive licensing assumes sole ownership of the patent and creates 
asymmetrical demands for new and traditional products. Non-exclusive licensing, on the 
other hand, allows sharing of the patent and creates a market of only new products.  
My findings differ from previous research in a fundamental way. First, I find that 
non-exclusive licensing is preferred under both a fixed fee and a royalty. This is 
important, because the SweeTango case, as just one example, revolved around whether 
the innovator should use exclusive or non-exclusive contracts. By showing that university 
benefits more with non-exclusive licensing, my findings are consistent with arguments 
made by the growers who were excluded from growing the SweeTango who argue that a 
group of growers should not be able to monopolize production. Indeed, this result also 
supports the broader mission of land grant universities in general as I show that publicly 
funded research is most efficient when made available to the largest number of growers 
possible.    
Optimal licensing contracts are driven primarily by strategic considerations 
between the licensor and licensee in that, by offering a royalty-based contract, the 
innovator’s profit is linked to the output of the licensing firms. On the other hand, 
offering a fixed-fee strategy allows the innovator to soften competition between the two 
downstream firms. Therefore, the innovator has some control over the market by 
choosing a licensing strategy: Licensing through a royalty will create more intense 
competition between downstream competitors while licensing by fixed fee will relax 
competition, and raise prices downstream.  
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 Of course, the nature of the innovation is critical as well. I find that the 
innovator’s license revenue depends on the magnitude of the innovation – defined as the 
difference between the new and existing products -- and the degree of substitutability 
between the products. Generally speaking, the more drastic the innovation, the greater the 
license revenue to the innovator. Because innovations create value when they sharpen the 
extent of differentiation between old and new products, there is a greater reward to the 
innovator’s institution if the innovation is substantial, and firms can still differentiate 
downstream. For TTO managers, this finding suggests that research offices should foster 
an environment of risk taking if they want to maximize returns from their portfolio of 
research.  
When all strategic aspects of downstream innovations are properly considered, the 
fundamental conflict between university and social objectives engendered by Bayh-Dole 
suggested by previous research (Folli-Oller and Sandonis 2005) disappears and instead 
suggests that the players’ goals are aligned at a very basic level. The Next Best Thing 
case revolved around the exclusivity of access to the University of Minnesota’s new 
apple. While the prior literature on patent licensing supported the case made by the 
University, my results suggest that the plaintiffs had a strong case: The objectives of the 
University, and Minnesota taxpayers more generally, are better served through a system 
of non-exclusive licensing.  
Patent licensing is the first step of introducing an innovation; however, whether 
innovations will prove to be profitable over the long term ultimately determines whether 
they will be adopted, and lead to fundamental improvements in efficiency.   For this 
reason, learning and imitation are central to adoption (Warner 1974).  Before deciding 
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whether to adopt, farmers seek information on the costs and benefits of the innovation 
from their own and other users’ experiences.  As they gather more information, they are 
able to increase their knowledge about the overall attractiveness of the innovation and 
reduce the uncertainty associated with its potential benefits.  For this reason, any delay in 
adoption that is designed to allow for the acquisition of more information is inherently 
strategic as producers wait to learn from others' experiences (Besley and Case 1997).  
At each point in time, strategic delay is manifest in an observed geographic 
clustering of adoption in a space that consists of farmers arrayed in a scattered social-
spatial network. There is empirical evidence that the incentives to adopt depend on how 
many others have adopted, rising quickly and then falling in a quadratic pattern (Bandiera 
and Rasul, 2006), but no evidence that this is due to a social-learning mechanism.  
Information is not complete in developing countries due to constraints placed by 
public transportation, government regulations, and the lack of social media. Therefore, 
incomplete information is a major barrier in variety adoption. Particularly in the context 
of rural areas of developing countries, infrastructure such as roads and markets are under-
developed, which imposes constraints on the ability of farmers to observe their neighbors. 
Information comes from two sources: A farmer’s own experience and from observing 
others. As the number of adopters rises in a network, expansion creates larger 
information externalities, providing non-adopters with more information (Banerjee 1992; 
Caplin and Leahy 1998; and Chamley and Gale 1994). Having connections with others 
helps a farmer update his knowledge about the new variety. However, direct links are 
costly (Bala and Goyal 2000) because of the effort required to form and maintain the 
connections. 
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 Existing theoretical models of adoption, however, ignore the cost of observing 
information. Assuming away the cost of becoming informed changes the implications of 
the model in fundamental ways. For example, if information can be acquired costlessly, 
then farmers will choose to wait forever due to the positive externalities generated by 
learning (Zhao 2006). The outcomes of a costly-learning model are fundamentally 
different in that the relevant pure strategy to the adoption game with imperfect 
information will be altered due to the cost structure. More specifically, a farmer will need 
to consider both the network externalities as well as the cost of maintaining a network 
when making adoption decisions. While a model with costly information acquisition 
predicts strategic delay, costless information results in either immediate adoption or a 
bifurcated market in which some farmers adopt, and others never do. Both logic and 
observation suggest that the former is a more reasonable description of reality.  
I assume farmers learn about new varieties through a pure strategy Bayesian 
equilibrium that includes both information exchange and costly network formation. I use 
this model to generate hypotheses regarding the effect of learning, extension services, 
size of a farmer’s network, and the cost of maintaining a network on the speed of 
adoption. In each case, the hypothesis that results presents an empirical puzzle that must 
be answered by taking all effects into account at once.  
My empirical analysis describes household-level variety adoption decisions made 
by farmers in Mozambique. Framed in a spatial econometric environment, I model each 
farmer’s adoption decision in the context of his social network, using the distance to each 
other farmer as the location in network space. Specifically, the distance between one 
farmer and another forms a social “weight” that moderates the effect of social learning.  
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I find that there is significant, positive spatial correlation in adoption decisions 
among neighboring farmers, In other words, if one farmer adopts, a neighbor is more likely 
to adopt as well. Clearly, social learning is not only important to my sample farmers, but a 
dominant source of information. Education, on the other hand, is an important catalyst for 
adoption. Training is found to be an important parameter improved maize adoption, 
indicating that hands-on demonstration should be encouraged.  Moreover, when farmers 
produce for sale instead of own consumption, they are more likely to form larger networks 
for cost sharing.  
In this model, I compare three types of social proximity defined using a “nearest 
neighbor” metric, an arc-distance matrix, and a contiguity matrix. Contiguity matrices 
capture relationships among farms that share common boundaries, while an arc-distance 
matrix measures the geographical distance between two households. Finally, a nearest 
neighbor matrix measures immediate neighbors. Allowing for heterogeneity among 
sample observations, I find that although immediate neighbors have a positive influence 
on the probability of adopting a new variety, social learning is not constrained by 
distance.  Furthermore, farmers extend their network to include more households for the 
purpose of information sharing.  
In the Mozambique example, I implicitly assume consumer preferences for new 
varieties are exogenously determined. It is more likely, though, that consumer 
preferences and grower adoption are simultaneously determined in real-world 
environments. As a way of thinking about innovation creation, adoption, and diffusion as 
a process, my third essay examines how new products are accepted by consumers in the 
downstream-market.   
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An emerging literature, both in economics and marketing, shows that consumer 
choices are influenced not only by their own tastes, but the choices made by others.   
People who identify with a group often adopt similar tastes as the group (Case 1991; 
Yang and Allenby, 2003; Zimmerman 2003; De Giorgi, Pellizzari, and Redadelli 2010; 
Kuhn et. al. 2010; Richards, Hamilton and Allender 2014). Although the mechanisms 
differ among studies in this literature, the common element points to the conclusion that, 
when studying consumer choices, it is impossible to ignore the interdependence of 
preferences in a social network. In the third essay, I focus on a certain social 
interdependence—peer effects. Peer effects refer to that part of behavior among 
individuals that arises purely from the influence of others, whether through imitation, 
learning, or aversion.  
Identifying peer effects empirically is problematic because observational data do 
not allow us to easily separate the influence of peer behavior on the behavior of others 
from that of observed and unobserved factors. Empirically, individuals in groups tend to 
behave in similar ways for three primary reasons:  endogenous effects, contextual effects, 
and correlated effects (Manski, 1993; Brock and Durlauf, 2001; Mofitt, 2001; Soetevent, 
2006).  Endogenous effects refer to the true peer effect in that a consumer’s choices are 
influence by others, while contextual effects refer to the fact that people who come from 
the same background (such as education, income, etc.) tend to make similar decisions 
regarding product choices, independent of the peer influence, and unobserved, correlated 
effects are those who cause people to choose similarly but unseen by the obvious 
mechanisms. In this study, I focus on identifying endogenous peer effects by controlling 
for the other factors that can otherwise confound identification.  
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Identification relies on either clear randomization or clever econometric 
modeling, but preferably a combination of the two (Narayan, Rao and Sanders 2011; 
Yang and Allenby 2007; Richards, Hamilton and Allender 2014). Ideally, membership in 
the social network is completely random – as in the job assignments of Duflo and Saez 
(2002) – so that any peer effects that emerge can be due only to learning from others.  
However, purely random samples are rare, even in lab situations, so econometric 
modeling can help.  
I use a two-stage lab experiment to gather data that describes subjects’ adoption 
decisions as a function of peer choices. As in other peer-influence studies (Narayan, Rao, 
and Saunders 2011), the experiment consists of two stages:  The first stage measures 
initial preferences while the second stage measures peer-based preference revisions.  
Substantial preference revision is evident from simple examination of the data, while 
econometric estimates reveal statistically significant peer effects.  
I estimate the extent of preference revision using a spatial econometric model, 
where space is defined in terms of subjects’ social relationships with other subjects. In 
this model, I have more flexibility to measure social network structures, and influence, 
relative to the secondary analysis in the previous chapter. Peer influences can be 
measured in many ways, but I focus on source credibility and tie strength. Tie strength 
represents the closeness between individuals regarding while source credibility represents 
the perceived expertise on the subject. I measure source credibility by collecting data on 
how subjects regard the apparent expertise of others, while I measure tie strength by 
asking how well each subject knows the others.  
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By populating social weight matrices with each measure, I then estimate the 
importance of each in shaping endogenous peer effects. The relative effectiveness of each 
of these mechanisms is critical to the conduct of modern marketing mechanisms. While 
traditional word-of-mouth (WOM) marketing relies on suasion from proximal consumers 
such as family and friends, internet-based marketing tools rely more on the credibility of 
third-party opinions voiced by “expert” sources.  
I find that perceived source credibility is more important in influencing 
preferences than the closeness of social relationships. This finding is consistent with 
Freeman (1957) and Pornpitakpan (2004) who maintain that sources having more 
credibility are more influential than are those with less credibility.  Moreover, in contrast 
to the findings of Richards, Hamilton and Allender (2014), people who are close in social 
space are not likely to have a significant influence on each other because they already 
share similar information. My findings, therefore, echo the “strength of weak ties” effect 
documented by Granovetter (1973) in that “weak ties” convey more influential product 
information that “strong ties”.  
In particular, because subjects who are perceived as credible are not necessarily 
close friends, marketers should target individuals who have perceived credibility on the 
product of interest when promoting innovative products. Traditional marketing focuses 
on word-of- mouth between acquaintances. However, my results show that consumers do 
not necessarily take advice from people they are close to.  Whether explicitly or not, 
marketers leverage social media to this effect already, because viral marketing practices 
such as Yelp and TripAdivsor gather recommendations from strangers who have 
experience with a particular product or service.  Strangers, by definition, do not have 
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social ties with the decision maker, so are perceived as credible sources. More 
fundamentally, my findings support the underlying logic of the weak-ties model in a 
modern marketing context:  Consumers are sufficiently rational in that they implicitly 
understand that social proximity does not necessarily imply similar tastes, so that expert 
opinion can do more to reveal true congruence between product attributes and individual 
tastes than the opinions of “friends.”   
My findings are important to marketing practice because marketers are always 
seeking ways to introduce new products to the market (Ferguson 2008, Bruyn and Lilien 
2008). In this regard, I highlight an essential point of the social learning literature, 
namely that how relationships are defined is essential to understanding the nature and 
power of social influence within a network.    
The rest of this dissertation is arranged in the following fashion.  In the first essay 
(chapter 2) I examine the optimal pricing of agricultural innovation. The second essay 
(chapter 3) studies the strategic behavior in variety adoption. Next, I investigate 
consumers’ choices in a peer network in the third essay (chapter 4). I reserve my 
concluding remarks, and offer more general implications of my findings, for a final 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2. ESSAY 1: FEES VERSUS ROYALTIES IN AGRICULTRAL PATENTS 
2.1 Introduction  
 
Our formal understanding of the optimal mechanism for patent licensing has 
changed considerably in recent years. Kamien and Tauman (1984, 1986), Katz and 
Shapiro (1985), and Kamien, Oren, and Tauman (1992) find that licensing via a royalty 
system generates less revenue for an external innovator than if a fixed fee or auction were 
used. However, the empirical research in non-agricultural industries tends to find that 
royalties, or combinations of fees and royalties, are far more common (Sen and Tauman, 
2007). The challenge facing researchers then became reconciling this stylized fact with 
economic theory. By including more realistic institutional attributes of industry such as 
product differentiation (Motta, 1993; Faulí-Oller and Sandonís, 2002), asymmetric 
information (Gallini and Wright, 1990; Sen, 2005), risk aversion (Bosquet et al. 1998), 
moral hazard (Choi, 2001), incumbency (Shapiro, 1985; Kamien and Tauman, 2002; 
Wang, 2002; Sen and Tauman, 2007) or strategic delegation (Saracho, 2002) researchers 
were able to explain observed licensing strategies. Faulí-Oller and Sandonís (2002), for 
example, show that regardless of the type of competition, the optimal contract always 
includes a positive royalty when products are differentiated. Our challenge, therefore, is 
to explain why fees tend to dominate in the context of horticultural innovations. 
Most of the theoretical literature on licensing patented research concerns cost-
reducing innovations. In agriculture in general, and in the fruit and vegetable sector more 
specifically, however, a significant number of innovations seek to improve eating quality, 
a demand-side innovation. Unlike a cost-reducing innovation, a quality-improving 
innovation directly affects consumers’ preferences and their willingness to purchase a 
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product. Among studies that consider demand-side or product innovations, Bosquet et al 
(1998) find that a combination of fees and royalties is optimal if demand for the new 
product is uncertain. In their model, fees and royalties are a means by which a risk neutral 
innovator can provide insurance--and be compensated for it--to a risk-averse licensee. 
Sen (2005) generates a similar combination of tools under asymmetric information. If the 
licensee has private information regarding its cost of producing the new product, then the 
licensor will benefit from using a combination of fees and royalties. Li and Wang (2010) 
consider a Cournot duopoly scenario in which the external innovator sells a quality 
improving innovation and find that exclusive licensing is preferred under fixed fees while 
non-exclusive licensing is preferred under royalties and two-part tariffs. They, however, 
do not consider R&D cost incurred by developing the innovation.   
I consider the strategic rationale for pricing a demand-side innovation into a 
downstream Bertrand duopoly market. Adopting a discrete choice-modeling framework 
(Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse, 1992) to study the behavior of oligopolies under 
product differentiation, the innovator licenses its output using a fixed fee, royalty, or 
combination of the two. When the market is covered (all consumers buy), they find that 
both firms purchase the innovation by paying a positive royalty and no fixed fee. If the 
value of the outside option is relatively high, then both firms will still license the 
innovation but pay a combination of fee and royalty. Although they show that quality-
enhancing innovations are licensed using a contract that includes both fees and royalties, 
they do not treat the degree of innovation as a continuous variable. Therefore, it is not 
clear whether their result holds regardless of whether innovations are both minor and 
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significant. This paper derives threshold values (for the degree of innovation) that define 
whether fees, royalties, or both are optimal. 
This chapter offers a theoretical model of optimal licensing schemes for quality-
improving agricultural innovations. I consider an oligopolistic market where two 
downstream firms compete in price and the upstream innovator holds a quality-improving 
technology that may create differentiation between the products.2 Since I am interested in 
university-based research specific to (but not limited to) the horticultural industry, the 
innovator is an outsider by default. I consider both exclusive and non-exclusive licensing. 
Under exclusive licensing, only one downstream firm gets the innovation, and in non-
exclusive licensing, more than one firm is allowed to produce and sell the new product. 
This framework provides a realistic yet tractable description of the market for demand-
side agricultural innovations. 
I find that the innovator maximizes licensing revenue under a non-exclusive, 
fixed-fee regime. In general, the results show that non-exclusive licensing performs better 
than exclusive licensing under both fixed fees and royalties and that a two-part tariff 
scheme will not be used because neither downstream firm can improve upon their pre-
license profit level. With a fixed fee, the innovator is able to extract the licensing firms’ 
increased profits but is not able to control industry output. Licensing through a royalty, 
the innovator is able to manipulate the cost structure of the licensing firms, which 
provides a measure of control over the final output. Two-part tariffs have the potential to 
generate the most revenue, but I find that licenses will never be obtained this way. When 
                                                        
2 Price competition is not necessary for firms that sell differentiated products, but given that most produce 
is sold through retail stores, price competition is a more natural choice. 
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the innovator has control over the market, it is in her best interest to intensify competition 
between the downstream firms by licensing to one firm and then extracting rents 
generated by the market power conferred on the higher-quality producer. When the 
innovator does not have control over the final output, it is in her best interest to license to 
both firms and collect as much additional profit as possible from the innovation through a 
fixed fee. Further, licensing through either a fixed fee or a two-part tariff moderates 
competition between two downstream firms and results in a market that produces only 
high-quality products. 
2.2 Model 
 
I consider a final market with two firms and two differentiated products: High 
quality products and low quality products, where high quality products are produced with 
the innovation and low quality products are produced through the existing technology. 
Under exclusive licensing, I assume each firm produces only one type of product. 
Competition in the final market results from the firms selling differentiated products. The 
innovation is patent-protected. Three types of licensing contract are considered in this 
chapter: (i) a fixed fee based license, where the licensee pays F to the patent holder 
regardless of the quantity he will sell in the final market, (ii) a royalty-based license 
where the licensee pays r to the patent holder for each unit he will sell, and (iii) a 
combination of both payment schemes where the licensee pays both a fixed up-front fee 
F and a per unit royalty r for the quantity sold. I assume an oligopoly that consists of two 
firms, each producing a differentiated good.  
On the consumer side, I assume a continuum of consumers of the same type with 
a utility function separable and linear in each good, which facilitates partial equilibrium 
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analysis. That is, a representative consumer maximizes a quadratic, strictly concave 
utility function, which gives rise to a linear demand structure. Consumers are willing to 
pay more for higher quality products, where the maximum willingness to pay is given by 
𝑐(𝑠𝑖). Differentiation comes from two sources: the degree of substitutability, b; and the 
quality, 𝑠𝑖. Following Sign and Vives (1984), the representative consumer maximizes: 
 
𝑈(𝑞1, 𝑞2) − ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖
2
𝑖=1
 
(2.1) 
U is assumed to be quadratic and strictly concave where:  
 
𝑈(𝑞1, 𝑞2) = 𝑐(𝑠1)𝑞1 + 𝑐(𝑠2)𝑞2 −
1
2
(𝑞1
2 + 2
𝑏
𝑠𝑖
𝑞1𝑞2 + 𝑞2
2) 
(2.2) 
Therefore, inverse demand for each product on the downstream market is 
 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑐(𝑠𝑖) − 𝑞𝑖 − (𝑏/𝑠𝑖)𝑞𝑗 
 
(2.3), 
where 𝑝𝑖 is the price set by firm i: i = 1, 2; and 𝑞𝑖represents the quantity sold by firm i. 
Without loss of generality I assume that firm 1 produces low quality products and firm 2 
produces high quality products under exclusive licensing and that both firms produce 
high quality products under non-exclusive licensing.  
The variable 𝑠𝑖 measures quality, with 𝑠1 indicating low quality and 𝑠2 indicating 
high quality. The highest propensity to pay for quality 𝑠𝑖 is denoted by 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐(𝑠𝑖).  
Following Li and Wang (2010), I first normalize 𝑠1 to be 1 and then assume a 
relationship between low quality and high quality where 𝑠1 = 𝜆𝑠2( 𝜆 ∈ (0,1)), where 𝜆 
captures the degree of product innovation: A larger 𝜆 implies a smaller quality 
improvement and a smaller 𝜆 indicates a greater quality improvement. I assume that 𝜆 is 
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exogenous, which reflects the fact that TTOs are charged with marketing innovations that 
are presented to them from their faculty/innovators.  
The degree of substitutability between the products is indicated by b (b ∈ (0, 1)). 
When b = 1 and 𝜆 = 1 the two products are perfect substitutes. Including both is 
necessary to isolate the quality-enhancing nature of innovations. Namely, the parameter b 
captures the fact that the products are horizontally differentiated, or that there is at least 
part of the market that would prefer each product even if the prices were the same. On the 
other hand, 𝜆 introduces a vertical component in that the willingness-to-pay for high-
quality goods rises in 1/𝜆 for the entire market. In the absence of the b parameter, the 
Singh and Vives (1984) model has no way of separating an innovation that is truly better, 
from one that is merely different. By introducing both parameters, I separate the two 
effects, and base our licensing model on a more general demand framework. Further, I 
assume a quadratic structure for the highest propensity to pay (𝑐(𝑠𝑖) = 𝑠𝑖
2) in order to 
ensure an interior solution (Sen and Tauman 2007).  
Under non-exclusive licensing, both firms face similar demand functions and 
produce either low or high products exclusively in the final market. Under exclusive 
licensing, the demand functions facing low and high quality firms are, respectively: 
 
𝑞1 =
1 − p1 + 𝑏𝑝2 −
𝑏
𝜆2
1 − 𝑏2𝜆
 
 
(2.4) 
 
 
𝑞2 =
−𝑝2 +
1
𝜆2
− 𝑏𝜆 + 𝑏𝑝1𝜆
1 − 𝑏2𝜆
 
 
(2.5), 
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where the own price response for low quality products is 
−1
1−𝑏2𝜆
 and the cross price 
response for low quality products is 
−𝑏
1−𝑏2𝜆
. The own price response for high quality 
products is 
−1
1−𝑏2𝜆
 and the cross price response for high quality products is 
𝑏𝜆
1−𝑏2𝜆
. Both 
intrinsic characteristics 𝑏 and quality 𝜆 play roles in differentiating low and high 
products.  I focus on the impact of quality on price differentiation.  
2.3 Propositions Regarding the Innovator’s Profit 
In this section, I study optimal licensing strategies for the innovator.3 To do so, I 
first consider the profitability of each downstream firm and analyze their incentive to 
license the innovation. When the patent is licensed exclusively to one firm we refer to the 
licensee as firm 2. Throughout this paper, pijk, q
ij
k and πkij denote firm k’s price, quantity, 
and profit by means of contract i, where k = 1 is firm 1 (low quality), k = 2 is firm 2 (high 
quality), and k = 3 is the innovator; j = E indicates an exclusive contract; j = N is a non-
exclusive contract; and i = NL,FE,FN,RE,RN,TE,TN, which represent, respectively, no 
licensing, exclusive fixed-fee licensing, non-exclusive fixed-fee licensing, exclusive 
royalty licensing, non-exclusive royalty licensing, exclusive two-part tariff licensing, and 
non-exclusive two-part tariff licensing. For example, pFN is the market price when the 
innovation is licensed to both firms through fixed fee. The innovator’s profit is the sum of 
                                                        
3 Optimality is defined, as in the literature, as the difference between license revenues and the cost of 
innovation. Although our analysis concerns university research activities, and universities are expected to 
conduct basic research in the public interest, our profit-maximization assumption reflects the observed 
activities of university TTO offices. Namely, as Bulut and Moschini (2009) note, “Quite clearly, when it 
comes to patenting and licensing, universities are likely to behave based on their self-interest rather than the 
public interest” (p. 124). Resolving the debate as to whether universities should maximize the returns to their 
research investment is left for either political or legal discussion. 
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any royalty or fee less the cost of innovation. I assume the cost of innovation is convex in 
the extent of the quality improvement and assumes the same form as the propensity to 
pay, or 𝑐(𝑠𝑖) = 𝑠𝑖
2 
The licensing game consists of three stages. In the first stage, the innovator 
simultaneously offers either non-exclusive contracts, or an exclusive contract, consisting 
of royalties, fees, or a combination of the two. In the second stage, the downstream firms 
either accept or reject the license contracts. In the third stage, the firms compete in the 
downstream market. I first consider the case where no license is purchased in order to 
calculate the benchmark profit for both firms under an exclusive licensing scenario. 
When licensing is non-exclusive, I first solve for the optimal solution to the sub-game 
played between downstream firms in order to establish the benchmark profit. The 
benchmark profit becomes the profit of the licensing firm under exclusive licensing. Then 
I consider each of the other licensing strategies in the following order: Fixed fee 
licensing, royalty licensing, and two-part tariff licensing. I compare profits under each 
licensing strategy with the benchmark profit, and suggest the optimal licensing strategy 
for the patent holder. I also study the sub games among the downstream firms and 
compare their profit under both price competition and quantity competition and suggest 
optimal strategies played by the downstream firms.  
No Licensing 
I establish benchmark profits where no innovation is introduced. In this case, 
firms produce only low-quality products. Following Motta (1993), I assume constant 
marginal costs and normalize them to be 0. Therefore, the duopoly profits when no 
license is purchased are 
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𝜋1
𝑁𝐿 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑝1𝑞1 = 𝑝1[
1
1 − 𝑏2
(−𝑝1 + 𝑏𝑝2 − 𝑏 + 1)] 
(2.6) 
 
𝜋2
𝑁𝐿 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑝2𝑞2 = 𝑝2[
1
1 − 𝑏2
(−𝑝2 + 𝑏𝑝1 − 𝑏 + 1)] 
(2.7) 
Solving the first order conditions of this problem results in the optimal prices: 
 
𝑝𝑁𝐿 = 𝑝1
𝑁𝐿 = 𝑝2
𝑁𝐿 = −
1 − 𝑏
−2 + 𝑏
 
 
(2.8) 
In this expression, pNL > 0 because 1 − b must be positive and −2 + b must be 
negative as b is between 0 and 1. Price competition under no licensing results in positive 
market prices. Profit is symmetric and depends solely on the degree of substitutability 
between the products. The expression for the profit earned by both firms becomes: 
 
𝜋𝑁𝐿 = 𝜋1
𝑁𝐿 = 𝜋2
𝑁𝐿 =
1 − 𝑏
(−2 + 𝑏)2(1 + 𝑏)
 
(2.9) 
This is also positive because b is between 0 and 1. Both firms make positive 
profits under the no licensing scenario and when they both produce the low-quality 
products. I refer to such a profit as the benchmark profit. When the innovation is 
introduced into the market through licensing, the demands for high- and low-quality 
products will change and so will firms’ profits. Firms compare their potential profits with 
the benchmark profit and decide whether it is in their best interests to license the 
innovation. 
Fixed-Fee Licensing 
When licensing using fixed fees, the patent holder extracts the entire profit due to 
the innovation by setting the fixed fee equal to the difference between the licensee’s 
profit with the innovation and the benchmark profit. If the fee were any larger, the 
licensees would be better off without the patent as the new profit will be smaller than the 
 
  
 
22 
benchmark profit. If the fixed fee is smaller than the incremental profit, the innovator will 
not extract all the profit and can always benefit more by increasing the fixed fee until it is 
exactly equal to the difference. 
PROPOSITION 1. Under exclusive fixed fee licensing, the innovator makes a positive 
profit when λ is smaller than 0.40. 
Proof. Under exclusive fixed-fee licensing, only one firm purchases the patent. I 
assume that firm 2 purchases the innovation and produces high-quality products. The 
profit is given by 
 
𝜋2
𝐹𝐸 = 𝑝2 [
1
1 − 𝑏2𝜆
(−𝑏𝜆𝑝1 − 𝑝2 +
1
𝜆2
− 𝑏𝜆)] − 𝐹𝐹𝐸 
(2.10) 
   
Since firm 1 doesn’t purchase the patent, it does not yield any revenue directly to 
the innovator, but its optimal price conditions the profit from firm 2, the firm purchasing 
the patent. In this case, firm 1 produces low-quality products with a profit of: 
 
𝜋1
𝐹𝐸 = 𝑝1 [
1
1 − 𝑏2𝜆
(−𝑝1 + 𝑏𝑝2 −
𝑏
𝜆2
+ 1)] 
(2.11) 
 
Solving for the optimal fee and subtracting the benchmark profit leaves a fixed fee of 
 
𝐹𝐹𝐸 =
1 − 𝑏
(−2 + 𝑏)2(1 + 𝑏)
−
(−2 + 𝑏2𝜆 + 𝑏𝜆3)2
𝜆4(−4 + 𝑏2𝜆)2(−1 + 𝑏2𝜆)
 
(2.12) 
 
Therefore profit for the innovator becomes: 
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 𝜋3
𝐹𝐸 = 𝐹𝐹𝐸 − 𝑐2
=
1 − 𝑏
(−2 + 𝑏)2(1 + 𝑏)
−
(−2 + 𝑏2𝜆 + 𝑏𝜆3)2
𝜆4(−4 + 𝑏2𝜆)2(−1 + 𝑏2𝜆)
−
1
𝜆2
> 0 
(2.13), 
 
where c2= c(s2)= 1/λ2 is the cost of innovation. This expression is only positive when λ < 
0.40 (at b = 0.50), so the innovator makes a positive profit under exclusive fixed-fee 
licensing when the innovation is substantial (see figure 2.1) at a moderate level of 
substitutability. By using the fixed-fee strategy, the innovator is able to extract all the 
profit above benchmark profit, leaving the profit of licensee exactly equal to the 
benchmark profit. 
 
Figure 2.1 Innovator Profit under Exclusive Fixed-Fee Licensing 
 
PROPOSITION 2. Under a non-exclusive fixed-fee strategy, the innovator makes a 
positive profit when λ < 0.50. 
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Proof. Under non-exclusive licensing, both firms purchase the patent and produce 
high-quality products. In this case, however, the benchmark profit for both firms is the 
profit of the low-quality firm under exclusive licensing, which is the same as the profit 
under no licensing. Since the innovator licenses through a fixed fee to both, she is able to 
extract the extra profit of both firms and leave them with benchmark profits. The profits 
for both firms are written as 
 
𝜋1
𝐹𝑁 = 𝑝1
𝐹𝑁 [
1
1 − 𝑏2𝜆2
(−𝑝1 + 𝑏𝜆𝑝2 +
1
𝜆2
−
𝑏
𝜆
)] − 𝐹𝐹𝑁 
(2.14) 
for firm 1 and: 
 
𝜋2
𝐹𝑁 = 𝑝2
𝐹𝑁 [
1
1 − 𝑏2𝜆2
(−𝑝2 + 𝑏𝜆𝑝1 +
1
𝜆2
−
𝑏
𝜆
)] − 𝐹𝐹𝑁 
(2.15) 
for firm 2. Solving both maximization problems results in a fixed fee of: 
 𝐹𝐹𝑁
=
4 − 4𝜆4 + 4𝑏𝜆(𝜆3 − 1) + 3𝑏2(𝜆6 − 1) − 𝑏3(𝜆7 + 3𝜆6 − 3𝜆 − 1)
(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏𝜆 − 2)2(𝑏𝜆 + 1)
 
(2.16) 
 
So the level of profit for the innovator becomes 
 𝜋3
𝐹𝑁 = 2𝐹𝐹𝑁 − 𝑐2
=
2(4 − 4𝜆4 + 4𝑏𝜆(𝜆3 − 1) + 3𝑏2(𝜆6 − 1) − 𝑏3(𝜆7 + 3𝜆6 − 3𝜆 − 1))
(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏𝜆 − 2)2(𝑏𝜆 + 1)
−
1
𝜆2
 
(2.17) 
 
The innovator licenses through a fixed fee to both firms, so she is able to extract 
the extra profit from each, which leaves them with profits equal to the benchmark. 
Because innovation is costly, however, I again observe a threshold level of quality above 
which innovation will not make sense from the upstream firm’s perspective. Again, 
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fixing the level of b = 0.5 for comparison purposes, I calculate profit under a range of λ 
values as shown in figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2: Innovator Profit under Non-Exclusive Fixed-Fee Licensing 
Under non-exclusive fixed-fee licensing, both firms produce high-quality 
products. After extracting the increased profits from both firms and compensating for the 
cost incurred by investing in the innovation, the innovator only makes a positive profit 
when λ < 0.5. Since there are incentives to license the patent under both exclusive and 
non-exclusive licensing, a comparison of the innovator’s profits under both scenarios will 
yield a better understanding of the optimal licensing under a fixed-fee strategy.  
PROPOSITION 3. Under a fixed-fee strategy, the patent-holding firm prefers non-
exclusive licensing. 
Proof. To understand which licensing strategy is better under a fixed fee, I take the 
difference between profits under non-exclusive and exclusive licensing arrangements: 
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𝜋3
𝐹𝑁 − 𝜋3
𝐹𝐸 =
−1 + 𝑏
(−2 + 𝑏)2(1 + 𝑏)
+
(−2 + 𝑏2𝜆 + 𝑏𝜆3)2
𝜆4(−4 + 𝑏2𝜆)2(−1 + 𝑏2𝜆)
−
2(4 − 4𝜆4 + 4𝑏𝜆(𝜆3 − 1) + 3𝑏2(𝜆6 − 1))
(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏𝜆 − 2)2(𝑏𝜆 + 1)
+
𝑏4𝜆(𝜆6 − 1) − 𝑏3(𝜆7 + 3𝜆6 − 3𝜆 − 1)
(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏𝜆 − 2)2(𝑏𝜆 + 1)
> 0 
(2.18) 
This result indicates that non-exclusive licensing yields larger profits for the 
innovator. Under fixed-fee licensing the patent-holding firm is willing to license her 
patent to both firms instead of just one. The intuition behind this proposition is 
straightforward. The innovator is able to extract all of the extra profit from the innovation 
by charging a fixed fee to both firms, leaving the profits of the licensees exactly equal to 
the benchmark profit. This finding is contrary to Li and Wang (2010), who find that the 
patent holder is willing to sell its patent to a single firm under a fixed-fee contract. Li and 
Wang (2010) consider a Cournot duopoly framework in which firms compete in 
quantities. In their model, a non-exclusive licensing strategy was not preferred because 
licensing to both firms generates the same quality improvement without affecting 
competition. I consider instead a Bertrand duopoly framework in which firms compete in 
prices. When firms sell differentiated products and compete in prices, the innovation 
generates higher demand at a higher price level. The innovator is better off licensing her 
patent to both firms, thus clearing low-quality products out of the market.  
Royalty Licensing 
Royalties are different from fixed fees in that the innovator cannot extract all of 
the downstream profit through a royalty scheme but can better preserve industry profit by 
changing downstream firms’ output. Because the innovator’s profit is positively related 
to output, it can generate greater license revenue by incentivizing higher industry output. 
I first consider exclusive licensing then non-exclusive licensing. 
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PROPOSITION 4. Under exclusive royalty licensing, the innovator makes a positive 
profit when the level of innovation is high (λ≤ 0.35). 
Proof. Under exclusive royalty licensing, the innovator sells her patent to only one 
firm. Without loss of generality, we assume that firm 2 purchases the patent and produces 
high-quality products. The royalty becomes part of the marginal cost, denoted by r. The 
profit function for firm 2 is revenue after accounting for the royalty payment and is 
written as 
 𝜋2
𝑅𝐸 = (𝑝2
𝑅𝐸 − 𝑟𝑅𝐸)𝑞2
𝑅𝐸
= (𝑝2 − 𝑟)[
1
1 − 𝑏2𝜆
(−𝑝2 + 𝑏𝜆𝑝1 +
1
𝜆2
− 𝑏𝜆)] 
(2.19) 
Firm 1 then produces low-quality products. Because this firm does not purchase 
the patent, its profit is irrelevant to the income earned by the innovator, but its optimal 
price conditions the profit earned by firm 2. Firm 1’s profit derives from selling only low-
quality products, so its optimal choice of price is found as the solution to 
 
𝜋1
𝑅𝐸 = 𝑝1
𝑅𝐸𝑞2
𝑅𝐸 = 𝑝1[
1
1 − 𝑏2𝜆
(−𝑝1 + 𝑏𝑝2 −
𝑏
𝜆2
+)] 
(2.20) 
The innovator earns a per unit royalty for every unit sold by firm 2, so by deducting 
the cost of innovation from the revenue earned from firm 2, I obtain the innovator’s profit 
as 
 
𝜋3
𝑅𝐸 = 𝑟𝑅𝐸𝑞2
𝑅𝐸 −
1
𝜆2
 
(2.21) 
Solving for the optimal royalty rate gives 
 
𝑟𝑅𝐸 =
−2 + 𝑏2𝜆 + 𝑏𝜆3
4𝜆2(−2 + 𝑏2𝜆)
> 0 
(2.22) 
Substituting this expression back into the profit functions yields4 
                                                        
4 Detailed derivations are provided in the appendix A.  
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 𝜋3
𝑅𝐸 =
−4𝑏6𝜆5+𝑏4𝜆2(28𝜆2−1)−2𝑏3𝜆4−𝑏2𝜆(𝜆5+56𝜆2−4)+4𝑏𝜆3+32𝜆2−4
4𝜆2(−2+𝑏2𝜆)(𝑏2𝜆−4)(𝑏2𝜆−1)
  
(2.23) 
To sign this expression, I again fix b = 0.5 and calculate the relationship between 
λ and innovator profit (see figure 2.3). The innovator thus earns a positive profit when 
degree of innovation is relatively high (0 <λ≤ 0.35) and a negative profit when degree of 
innovation is relatively low (0.35 < λ < 1). 
  
Figure 2.3: Innovator Profit under Exclusive Royalty Licensing 
Our results with respect to royalty contracts are intuitive because only a 
significant innovation should generate positive returns to the innovator. To see this, 
consider that the introduction of royalties has two effects. First, the royalty becomes part 
of marginal cost, which increases the price of the high-quality product. Second, the 
royalty can influence output in the downstream market. Under exclusive licensing, the 
innovator’s profit is closely related to the profit of the high-quality firm. The innovator 
wants to set a royalty that is low enough to induce higher output yet not too low, as 
royalties are earned on a per unit basis. When the innovation is sufficiently large (0 <λ≤ 
0.35), the innovator benefits due to higher output, but when the innovation is relatively 
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small (0.35 <λ < 1), the innovator earns less because the loss of demand dominates the 
higher profit incurred by greater differentiation. 
PROPOSITION 5. Under non-exclusive royalty licensing, the innovator makes a 
positive profit when the level of innovation is high (λ < 0.50). 
Proof. Under non-exclusive licensing, the innovator sells the patent to both firms and 
controls the entire output through royalty licensing. The profit functions are given by: 
 𝜋2
𝑅𝑁 = (𝑝2
𝑅𝐸 − 𝑟𝑅𝐸)𝑞2
𝑅𝐸
= (𝑝2 − 𝑟)[
1
1 − 𝑏2𝜆2
(−𝑝2 + 𝑏𝜆𝑝1 +
1
𝜆2
−
𝑏
𝜆
) 
(2.24) 
 
for firm 2 and: 
 
𝜋1
𝑅𝑁 = (𝑝1
𝑅𝐸 − 𝑟𝑅𝐸)𝑞1
𝑅𝐸 = (𝑝1 − 𝑟)[
1
1 − 𝑏2𝜆2
(−𝑝1 + 𝑏𝜆𝑝2 +
1
𝜆2
−
𝑏
𝜆
) 
(2.25) 
 
for firm 1. Profit to the innovator is given by: 
 
𝜋3
𝑅𝑁 = 𝑟𝑅𝑁(𝑞1
𝑅𝑁 + 𝑞2
𝑅𝑁) −
1
𝜆2
 
(2.26) 
 
Again, solving for the optimal royalty gives 
 
𝑟𝑅𝑁 =
1
2𝜆2
> 0 
(2.27) 
 
Substituting the result back into the innovator’s profit function and solving leave 
 
𝜋3
𝑅𝑁 =
1 − 4𝜆2 − 2𝑏𝜆3 + 2𝑏2𝜆4
4𝜆4 + 2𝑏𝜆5 − 2𝑏2𝜆6
 
(2.28) 
 
 
  
 
30 
Signing this expression is again difficult analytically, so I calculate innovator 
profit at b = 0.5 and show how profit varies with λ (see figure 2.4).  
 
Figure 2.4: Innovator Profit under Non-Exclusive Royalty Licensing 
Figure 4 shows that the innovator has an incentive to license when λ < 0.50. Even 
though both firms produce the high-quality product and face similar demand functions, 
their profit differs from the benchmark profit (unlike in the case of non-exclusive fixed-
fee licensing) because the royalty alters the structure of demand as it increases marginal 
cost. The overall profit from the high-quality market under non-exclusive licensing 
depends not only on inherent product differentiation (b) but also on the differentiation 
brought by innovation (λ). When the magnitude of the innovation is larger, the 
innovator’s profit rises, and when the magnitude of innovation is smaller, the innovator’s 
profit falls. In the next proposition, I compare the profits earned under both strategies to 
get a better understanding of how royalty alters the innovator’s profit. 
PROPOSITION 6. Under a royalty contract, the patent holder favors non-exclusive 
licensing. 
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Proof. The difference in profits between exclusive licensing and non-exclusive licensing 
is5 
 𝜋3
𝑅𝑁 − 𝜋3
𝑅𝐸 > 0 (2.29), 
which is greater than zero. This result indicates that non-exclusive royalty licensing 
yields greater profit for the innovator relative to exclusive licensing. Compared with the 
situation of licensing to one firm, licensing to both firms generates higher aggregate 
output, which leads to higher licensing profit. As a consequence, the patent holder is 
willing to transfer its technology to both. This finding differs qualitatively from the 
outcome expected by Li and Wang (2010) under quantity competition, as they favor 
exclusive licensing. In their case, quality enhancement creates asymmetric demands 
between the two firms, softening market competition and generating higher incremental 
profit for the high-quality firm. With royalty licensing, the innovator’s profit is directly 
related to that earned by the high-quality firm. Price competition, on the other hand, 
favors increasing output from both firms.  
Two-Part Tariff Licensing 
When comparing a fixed fee with a royalty, I see that with a fixed fee the 
innovator is able to extract a lump sum of profit above the benchmark profit without 
changing the nature of competition between the firms. By licensing to both firms with a 
fixed fee, the innovator can set the licensees’ profits back to the benchmark level and 
they will still have an incentive to purchase the license. With a royalty, however, the 
structure of competition is changed because higher royalties raise marginal cost. 
                                                        
5 Detailed derivations are provided in the appendix A.  
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Therefore, even when the innovator licenses to both firms, their profits differ from the 
benchmark level. In the following section, I show how a combination of both fixed fees 
and royalties affect the innovator’s profit. 
Licensing by a two-part tariff is more complicated because the patent holder must 
trade off two effects: On one hand, the patent holder has an incentive to lower the royalty 
in order to moderate competition between the downstream firms and preserve industry 
profit, then extract it with fixed fees. On the other hand, the patent holder has an incentive 
to keep the royalty higher in order to extract as much profit as possible from the 
licensees. The more profound the innovation, the lower the net profit of the licensee and 
the better off the licensor. 
PROPOSITION 7. Under exclusive two-part tariff licensing, firm 1 makes more profit 
than the benchmark level, while firm 2 makes less profit than the benchmark, so licensing 
will not occur. 
Proof. By using a two-part tariff, the innovator sets a royalty to control output in the 
final market and a fixed fee to extract any excess profits. Under exclusive licensing, I 
assume the innovator sells her patent to only firm 2, therefore firm 2 produces high-
quality products and firm 1 produces low-quality products. Recall from the nature of the 
game that the innovator’s optimal decision is conditional on the solution to the subgame 
played among the downstream firms. Profitable licensing depends on the willingness of at 
least one firm to purchase the license. To see why neither will, consider the profit earned 
by firm 26: 
                                                        
6 Detailed calculations are in Appendix A. 
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 𝜋2
𝑇𝐸 = (𝑝2
𝑇𝐸 − 𝑟𝑇𝐸)𝑞2
𝑇𝐸 < 𝜋𝑁𝐿 (2.30) 
 
and 
 𝜋1
𝑇𝐸 = 𝑝1
𝑇𝐸𝑞1
𝑇𝐸 > 𝜋𝑁𝐿 (2.31) 
 
by firm 1. Solving for the optimal royalty gives a value of 
 
𝑟𝑇𝐸 = −
𝑏2𝜆 + 𝑏𝜆3 − 2
𝜆2(𝑏2𝜆 − 6)(𝑏2𝜆 − 2)
> 0 
(2.32) 
 
Combining royalty and fee, the maximum innovator profit becomes7 
 𝜋3
𝑇𝐸 = 𝑟2
𝑇𝐸𝑞2
𝑇𝐸 + 𝐹𝑇𝐸 
 
(2.33) 
which we find to be positive when λ < 0.4 for a fixed value of b = 0.5 (see figure 2.5). 
Even though the innovator makes a positive profit when λ < 0.4, the profit will not be 
realized because firm 2 makes less profit than the benchmark and, therefore, will not 
purchase the patent.  
                                                        
7 Detailed calculations are in Appendix A. 
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Figure 2.5: Innovator Profit under Exclusive Two-Part Tariff Licensing 
PROPOSITION 8. Under non-exclusive two-part tariff licensing, both firm 1 and firm 
2 make less profit than the benchmark level, so licensing will not occur. 
Proof. Under non-exclusive licensing, the innovator sells the patent to both firms. 
Both firms produce high-quality products, and low-quality products are cleared out of the 
market. The licensing firms benefit from producing high-quality products but are required 
to pay a per unit royalty and an up-front fixed fee. The profit functions for the two firms 
are now written as 
 𝜋𝑗
𝑇𝑁 = (𝑝𝑗
𝑇𝑁 − 𝑟𝑇𝑁)𝑞𝑗
𝑇𝑁 − 𝐹𝑇𝑁 (2.34) 
 
for firm j = 1,2. The fixed fee is set to equal the difference between new profit and the 
benchmark profit. Since both firms buy licenses and the returns are symmetrical, the 
fixed fee is the same for both firms: 
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 𝐹𝑇𝑁 = 𝜋2
𝑇𝑁 − 𝜋𝑁𝐿 (2.35) 
 
Solving for the optimal royalty gives: 
 
𝑟𝑇𝑁 =
1
6𝜆2 − 2𝑏𝜆3
> 0 
(2.36) 
 
Substituting the optimal royalty and fee expressions back into the symmetric profit 
functions, I find8 
 𝜋1
𝑇𝑁 = 𝜋2
𝑇𝑁 < 𝜋𝑁𝐿 (2.37), 
therefore neither firm is willing to purchase a license. 
Hypothetically, the innovator thus earns equal up-front fixed fees from both firms 
and per unit royalty payments for every unit produced. Profit for the innovator is given by 
the solution to9 
 
𝜋3
𝑇𝑁 = 2𝐹𝑇𝑁 + 𝑟
𝑇𝑁(𝑞1
𝑇𝑁 + 𝑞2
𝑇𝑁) −
1
𝜆2
 
(2.38), 
 
which would be positive if the downstream firms choose to purchase the patent in the 
second stage of the game. As in the case of non-exclusive royalty licensing, both firms 
produce high-quality products and face the same demand. Their profits differ from the 
benchmark level because the royalty alters the structure of demand. Total profit in the 
high-quality market under non-exclusive licensing depends not only on the fact that the 
                                                        
8 Detailed calculations are in Appendix A. 
9 Detailed calculations are provided in Appendix A. 
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products are differentiated from each other (b) but also the vertical differentiation due to 
the innovation (λ). When λ is smaller (larger innovation), innovator profit is higher 
because the margins earned downstream by the purchasing firms are larger. Since both 
profits under exclusive and non-exclusive licensing are positive, I take the difference 
between the two to determine the optimal licensing strategy. 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Innovator Profit under Non-Exclusive Two-Part Tariff Licensing  
Comparing innovator profit between exclusive and non-exclusive contracting with 
a two-part tariff is therefore meaningless because licensing will not occur in either case. 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
Downstream firms that license patents to new products have an incentive to 
purchase a license as long as the new profit brought by the innovation exceeds the 
benchmark profit, or the profit implied by the equilibrium to the second-stage of the 
game played downstream. After choosing whether to use a royalty, fee, or a combination 
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of the two, the innovator faces the option of either selling to one firm or to both firms. 
Whether one or two firms purchase the license changes the fundamental structure of the 
market because under non-exclusive licensing both firms produce high-quality products 
and the low-quality products will be forced from the market. Because the innovator’s 
decision is driven by the willingness-to-pay of the downstream firms, her decision 
depends upon how much downstream profit the licensing scheme can create. With the 
model developed above, I showed that non-exclusive licensing is preferred under price 
competition in almost all cases, particularly when the degree of innovation is substantial. 
Licensing through a royalty scheme tends to increase competition between firms by 
creating asymmetrical returns for high- and low-quality firms, whereas licensing through 
a fixed fee tends to moderate competition and creates a market with only high-quality 
products. I find that two-part tariffs are never optimal because it is impossible for the 
innovator to facilitate a downstream equilibrium in which either firm benefits. In general, 
which of the two effects--generating market volume or relaxing downstream competition-
--dominates depends on the specific parameterization of demand and the extent of the 
innovation. 
For each strategy, the innovator’s profit depends on the degree of innovation (λ). 
Allowing net license revenue to vary with the degree of innovation sheds some light on 
how potential licensing revenue changes if the extent of innovation they are tasked with 
marketing varies. By calculating innovator profit over a range of λ values, I find two 
critical values for λ. There are two effects involved: First, lower values of λ imply more 
vertical differentiation and higher profits for the high-quality good. This is the “quality-
improvement” effect. Second, lower values of λ also imply greater asymmetry in returns 
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and a lower volume-enhancing effect. When the degree of innovation is relatively small 
(0.25 <λ < 1), the quality-improvement effect is dominated by the volume-increasing 
effect, and the innovator does not make as much profit. When the innovation is relatively 
large (0.15 <λ < 0.25), higher quality begins to dominate the volume effect, and the 
outcome for the innovator improves. When the innovation is very large (0 <λ < 0.15) the 
innovator is almost certain to make a large profit. Therefore, when developing and 
licensing a new technology, university TTO administrators should be aware of the 
existence of this “threshold effect” when determining an optimal licensing strategy. More 
specifically, I show that for our specific parameterization, there are two such thresholds: 
The first, at λ = 0.25, guarantees a positive profit, and the second, at λ = 0.15, offers the 
promise an even larger profit. The exact values of these thresholds will clearly depend on 
the nature of the product and the existing competitive structure, but I provide at least 
theoretical evidence that they are likely to exist. 
In order to demonstrate which of the two effects shown above dominates over a 
reasonable parameterization of the model, I provide a numerical simulation of the net 
license revenue attainable by the innovator under a range of possible λ values. In table 2.1 
below, I illustrate the relationship between innovator profit and the magnitude of the 
innovation under each strategy. To keep the simulation as “clean” an experiment as 
possible, I fix b at a moderate level of b = 0.50 and consider the following levels of λ: λ = 
0.50, λ = 0.25, λ = 0.15, and λ = 0.05. The results in table 1 show that, under each 
licensing strategy, the patent holder’s profit increases as the extent of innovation becomes 
larger. When innovation is sufficiently large (λ = 0.15, λ = 0.05), profit is substantially 
higher than when the innovation is relatively small (λ = 0.25, λ = 0.50). Overall, however, 
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this experiment shows that the preferred strategy is a non-exclusive fixed fee. The 
potential profit under this preferred strategy is followed closely by a non-exclusive 
royalty. At least for the range of parameters that are reasonable for our problem, 
therefore, it appears as though the competitive exclusion of low-quality products is a 
desirable outcome from the perspective of the innovator. 
Table 2.1: Comparison of Innovator Profits and the Extent of Innovation 
  Fixed Fee Royalty Two-Part 
b=0.50,  
λ=0.50 
Exclusive −0.14  −1.93 N.A. 
 Non-Exclusive 1.97  −0.34 N.A. 
b=0.50,  
λ=0.25 
Exclusive 49   17 N.A. 
 Non-Exclusive 97   45 N.A. 
b=0.50,  
λ=0.15 
Exclusive 458   209 N.A. 
 Non-Exclusive 873   433 N.A. 
b=0.50,  
λ=0.05 
Exclusive 39,850  19,788 N.A. 
 Non-Exclusive 77,636  39,118 N.A. 
Note: N.A. indicates that licensing will not occur as doing so is in neither downstream 
firm’s interest. 
The extent of innovation is clearly important to the potential for innovator profits. 
However, I also maintain throughout that horizontal differentiation is also likely to 
influence the amount of revenue innovators can earn from licenses. I examine the 
horizontal differentiation effect by allowing the b parameter to vary and calculate a range 
of innovator profits over a range of λ values. These results are shown in table 2.2. When 
selling an exclusive license, I find that the more innovator profits rise the more 
substitutable are the products downstream. This is because firm 2 is able to draw 
consumers more easily from the low-quality market and the innovator benefits 
accordingly, both when royalties and fixed fees are used. On the other hand, innovator 
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profit falls in the degree of substitutability when licenses are sold on a non-exclusive 
basis. When products from the two firms are not substitutable, I have the usual horizontal 
differentiation effect: Each enjoys a measure of local monopoly power and earns higher 
margins as a result. Because both purchase a license, the innovator is able to extract more 
profit from them, whether through a fixed fee or through a royalty scheme. 
Table 2.2: Comparison of Profits and Horizontal Differentiation 
  Fixed Fee Royalty Two-Part 
b=0.90,  
λ=0.10 
Exclusive 2,506  1,230 N.A. 
 Non-Exclusive 4,477  2,301 N.A. 
b=0.60,  
λ=0.10 
Exclusive 2,444  1,104 N.A. 
 Non-Exclusive 4,612  2,331 N.A. 
b=0.30,  
λ=0.10 
Exclusive 2,410  1,158 N.A. 
 Non-Exclusive 4,752  2,364 N.A. 
b=0.10,  
λ=0.10 
Exclusive 2,400  1,150 N.A. 
 Non-Exclusive 4,850  2,387 N.A. 
Note: N.A. indicates that licensing will not occur as doing so is in neither downstream 
firm’s interest. 
2.5 Discussion.  
 
In this chapter I study the optimal licensing strategies under price competition in a 
duopoly scenario. The results suggest different marketing implications with various 
strategies. That is, licensing through a fixed fee (the innovator) is able to extract the 
licensing firms' increased profits, but is not able to control industry output; where as 
licensing through a royalty, the innovator is able to manipulate the cost structure of the 
licensing firms, which provides a measure of control over the final output. Two-part 
tariffs have the potential to generate the most revenue, but licenses will never be 
purchased this way due to the lack of profitability to the licensed firm(s). Moreover, there 
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are "innovation thresholds” beyond which potential license revenue is likely to be 
significantly greater than if the innovation were less drastic. Because there is a greater 
reward to the innovator's institution if the innovation is large, and firms can still 
differentiate downstream, research officers should encourage “bold” innovations if they 
want to maximize returns from their portfolio of research.  
This research has some limitations. In the model I consider two downstream firms 
with an outside innovator, which may not always be the case in the horticultural industry. 
Future research should extend our framework to study the optimal licensing strategies 
when the innovator is an incumbent and when there are more than two players in the 
downstream market. 
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CHAPTER 3. ESSAY 2: VARIETY ADOPTION AMONG FARMERS IN A SOCIAL 
NETWORK 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Variety adoption has long been of interest to agricultural economists. Griliches’ (1957, 
1960) research on hybrid corn in the USA was not only one of the first economic studies 
of adoption of rural innovations by economists, but helped establish agricultural 
economics as an important, independent field of study (Griliches, 1957, 1960).  Since 
then, many theoretical and empirical studies have focused on adoption and diffusion of 
new technologies and new plant varieties (Feder, Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; Conley 
and Udry 2001; Sunding and Zilberman 2001). Because technology adoption is a 
necessary precondition for broader productivity improvement and economic 
development, this line of research seeks to examine, and perhaps to suggest remedies for, 
the barriers to adoption. I am interested in one specific barrier of new variety adoption, 
namely the lack of information, in the context of maize farming in Mozambique.    
Mozambique is a country with excellent agricultural conditions, enabling the 
cultivation of a great variety of crops such as maize, sorghum, and many types of fruits 
(Mission Report 2007). Yes, despite the many advantages to doing so, the rate of 
adopting new, improved maize varieties remains relatively low (11% in 2011).  Although 
farmers who have adopted improved maize varieties are distributed throughout all 
regions and provinces of the country, adopters and non-adopters appear to cluster 
geographically (Figure 3.1).  This pattern raises questions as to the nature of the 
relationships among farmers that may either aid adoption, in the case of adopting clusters, 
or hinder adoption where non-adoption appears to be the norm. Theories for non-
adoption range from technological barriers to policy limitations, but patterns of clustering 
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among neighbors seem to suggest a strong informational component. In fact, information 
is found to be the most important factor in rural development (Bajeree 1973, 
Bikhchandani et al. 1992, Case 1993) so this pattern would be consistent with previous 
research on adoption. In this chapter, I explain how the spatial patterns of households 
influence adoption through information transition.  
Figure 3.1. Sampled Household in Sofala and Manica with Adopters (red) and Non-
adopters (black).  
Information can be acquired in any one of a number of ways: through formal 
education, social media, trade organizations, or simply by agents imitating others.  
Perhaps most important in developing countries, where information sources are largely 
informal, is the acquisition of information from neighbors and other farmers. The process 
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of acquiring information in this way is often referred to as “social learning” where a 
small number of “leaders” adopt, and the rest observe before taking action10. Social 
learning is endogenous as it describes the process through which farmers learn from each 
other, where non-social learning is, to some degree, constrained by availability of 
resources such as household income, policy and government subsidies. In this chapter I 
study both types of learning and their influences on new variety adoption as a means of 
explaining the clustering phenomenon observed in Figure 3.1.   
Relying mostly on micro-level data, studies consistently find both social learning 
and non-social learning to be significant (Bikhchandani et al. 1992, Foster & 
Rosenzweig, 1995, Abdulai and Huffman 2005, Bandiera and Rasul 2006). Foster and 
Rosenzweig (1995) study the adoption of high yielding seed varieties (HYVs) in India 
and identify the barrier to adoption to be imperfect knowledge about the management of 
the new seeds. They find that learning by a farmer’s own experience, and by observing 
neighbors, could increase adoption. Moreover, individuals don’t consider the welfare of 
the community as part of the return. Similarly, Abdulai and Huffman (2005) examine 
farmer’s adoption of crossbred technology of cows in Tanzania and finds that adoption 
depended positively on the proximity of his farm to other users, education, and on his 
access to credit and contact with extension agents. With a focus on social learning, 
Bandiera and Rasul (2006) consider a farmer’s network of family and friends in the 
adoption of sunflower in Northern Mozambique and find that there is a quadratic 
                                                        
10 To make a clear distinction between social learning and the other sources of information, I define 
information acquired from sources other than social learning (such as education, social media, extension 
service and organizations) as non-social learning.   
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relationship between positive information externalities and the number of adopters in 
one’s network. However, they use a purely temporal adoption model where the 
mechanism is one-dimensional. That is, they assume that social influence operates as a 
function of the number of adopters in the farmer’s network. This assumption is unrealistic 
because social learning works through interactions within network, so is inherently 
spatial in nature.   
Spatial econometric analysis is a viable tool to assess the adoption decision in a 
multi-dimensional way. Spatial relationships between agents are captured through 
“spatial weight matrices” which measure the distances between each agent and each other 
agent in the network. In my example, spatial weight matrices capture the relational 
proximity between two farmers and reflect such inter-relational characteristics. I measure 
the spatial relationship between farmers with three types of matrices: immediate 
neighbor, geographical distance, and, extended neighbors (rook contiguity). As expected, 
immediate neighbors play an important role in adoption decisions. Moreover, I find that 
distance does not measure the relationship between farmers as those who live in close 
geographical proximity do not influence each other significantly. Instead, farmers 
exchange information with extended neighbors, regardless of the distance.  
Prior studies in this area also ignore the cost of learning. The cost of learning is 
critical because, in reality, information cannot be acquired for free. Assuming 
information is costless is not benign as the outcomes of a costly-learning model are 
fundamentally different in that the relevant pure strategy to the adoption game with 
imperfect information differs solely due to the structure of costs.  For example, by 
imposing a cost of waiting and assuming a difference in the quality of information 
 
  
 
46 
possessed by different farmers, Zhang (1997) shows theoretically that there is an initial 
delay before the first adopter uses the technology. Moreover, farmers are subject to 
unique benefits and costs due to the quality of information they receive.  
I contribute to the literature on the adoption of new agricultural technologies in a 
number of ways. First, I include the cost of learning in a theoretical model of adoption, 
and show that, by doing so, the conclusions regarding the nature of strategic delay are 
fundamentally altered. Namely, I show that a delay is optimal, or strategic, if farmers do 
not have accurate information regarding the new variety, and cost works against delay 
because the more a farmer waits the more costly it will be. Initial information comes from 
non-social learning such as education, extension services, social media and organizations. 
Non-social learning is positively related to the accuracy of information, therefore, when 
abundant, non-social learning is available to a farmer, he will adopt early in order to 
grasp the “first-mover advantage.” However, when non-social learning is unavailable, 
farmers will depend on social learning instead, which results in a strategic delay. In 
addition, I show that strategic delay is a trade off between the costs and benefits of 
learning. On one hand, being connected to other farmers will generate information 
externalities that benefit the decision making process. On the other hand, forming links in 
a network is costly (Acemoglu, Bimpikis, Ozdaglar 2009). Therefore, the adoption 
decision is complicated by a farmer’s network, through which he engages in social 
learning.  
Second, I test the implications of my model using empirical data that describes the 
adoption of new maize varieties by farmers in Mozambique. My model is inherently 
spatial, drawing on the isomorphic relationship between geographic and social space 
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noted by others (Anselin, 2002, Kalnis 2003, Lesage 2009), so information flows 
throughout the network in a multi-dimensional way. I detect social learning in the model. 
Social learning is tested through a “spatial lag parameter,” which measures the extent of 
spatial relationships among proximal agents.  I find significant social learning among 
farmers. More specifically, a farmer observes from his nearest neighbors and bases his 
adoption decision on theirs. Moreover, geographic proximity does not contribute 
significantly to learning as immediate and extended households do, independent of how 
close they are. When geographical distance is critical, then the policy implication is clear 
-- improve the infrastructure such as roads and public transportation. In this case where 
geographical distance is not crucial, government should explore alternative venues of 
information distribution such as increasing cell phone and Internet use. 
 Besides learning from others, learning from experience is negatively related to 
adoption, as I find that farmers who have planted the new variety before are not likely to 
plant again. This is counter-intuitive, as farmers who have adopted should stay with the 
variety because the new variety is an improvement from the traditional variety. 
Combined with the fact that most adopters produce for sale instead of own consumption, 
this notion may suggest a significant difference in tastes between the old and new 
varieties. From the policy standpoint, the government should focus on retaining existing 
adopters as well as recruiting new adopters. A number of suggestions include improving 
the traits of the new variety such as taste, distributing agriculture credits to lower the cost 
(risk) of switching, and build an efficient demand-supply market for maize to encourage 
economies of scale.  
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Non-social learning plays an important role in strategic delay too. Initial 
knowledge acquired from education and extension helps the farmer to evaluate the new 
variety. A more informed farmer is more likely to adopt than a less informed farmer.  
Training tailored specific to the new variety is extremely helpful in promoting adoption 
because it provides direct information on the new variety. Extension is also found to be 
significant and positively related to adoption despite the limited accessibility to farmers. 
For example, only 2.2% of the farmers received training on planting the new variety. 
Even so, the training turns out to be significant and positively related to adoption. Given 
that network is an important tool of information exchange, the policy implication here is 
to educate influencers in the local networks and let them pass along the knowledge.  
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section I propose a theoretical 
model that describes the adoption game between farmers, the primary output of which is 
a rationalization of strategic delay that is unique to the literature. In the third section, I 
test the implications of my theoretical model using farm-level data from maize-variety 
adoption in Mozambique. A fourth section summarizes the empirical results, and 
provides a discussion of the policy implications of my findings. The final section 
concludes, and offers some broader implications for the effect of social learning on 
strategic delay in contexts other than my specific empirical example.  
3.2 Theoretical Model 
 
Social learning assumes that rational, profit-maximizing agents respond to information 
generated by other adopters (Banerjee 1992, Caplin and Leahy 1998, and Chamley and 
Gale 1994). With social learning, farmers decide whether or not to adopt, or when to 
adopt a new variety, by balancing the marginal benefits and costs of using a new 
 
  
 
49 
technology or variety. I this section, I first introduce a general model to illustrate how 
adoption is achieved through a pure Bayesian equilibrium, followed by a more specific 
theoretical model that frames the empirical example in the next section.    
Assume there is a set of farmers I, with a set of actions (pure strategies) for each 
player i: 𝑠𝑖. Farmers are hetergenous in that each farmer is of a type 𝜃𝑖 ∈ Θ𝑖. The payoff 
function for each player i is 𝑢𝑖(𝑠1, . . . , 𝑠𝐼 , 𝜃1, . . . , 𝜃𝐼). There exists a (joint) probability 
distribution p (𝜃1, . . . , 𝜃𝐼) over types(𝜃1, . . . , 𝜃𝐼) of inputs.   Farmers do not observe the 
types of others but instead make inferences based on signals. Importantly, the strategy 
spaces, payoff functions, possible types, and the prior probability distribution are 
assumed to be common knowledge. A (pure) strategy for player i is a map 𝑠𝑖: Θ𝑖 → S𝑖, 
that prescribes an action for each possible type of player i.  Assuming layer types are 
drawn from some prior probability distribution p(𝜃1, . . . , 𝜃𝐼),  Given p(𝜃1, . . . , 𝜃𝐼) I  
compute the conditional distribution p(𝜃−𝑖∣ 𝜃𝑖) using Bayes rule
11. Player i knows her 
own type and evaluates her expected payoffs according to the conditional (posterior) 
distribution p(𝜃−𝑖∣ 𝜃𝑖), where 𝜃−𝑖 = (𝜃1,, . . . 𝜃𝑖−1,𝜃𝑖+1,, . . . , 𝜃𝐼). A farmers’ welfare is 
measured by the expected payoff from adopting the new variety. Assuming the payoff 
functions, possible types, and the prior probability distribution are known, the expected 
payoffs of player i of type 𝜃𝑖 is: 
 𝑈(𝑠𝑖
′, 𝑠−1(∙), 𝜃𝑖) = ∑ p(𝜃−𝑖 ∣  𝜃𝑖)𝑢𝑖(𝑠𝑖
′, 𝑠−𝑖(𝜃−𝑖), 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜃−𝑖).
𝜃𝑖
 
(3.1), 
which is a function of expected payoff after observing others.  
                                                        
11 An illustration of Bayesian updating is provided in appendix B. 
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The strategy profile s(⋅ ) is a (pure strategy) Bayesian Nash equilibrium if for all i 
∈ I and for all 𝜃𝑖∈Θ𝑖 , and is written  as: 
 𝑠𝑖(𝜃𝑖) ∈ arg 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∑ p(𝜃−𝑖 ∣  𝜃𝑖)𝑢𝑖(𝑠𝑖
′, 𝑠−𝑖(𝜃−𝑖), 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜃−𝑖).
𝜃𝑖
 
(3.2), 
where the strategy profile is a set of strategies that maximizes individual’s expected 
payoff.  
Consider a Bayesian game with continuous strategy spaces and continuous types. 
If strategy sets and type sets are compact, payoff functions are continuous and concave 
in own strategies, then a pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists (Acemoglu, 
Bimpikis and Ozdaglar 2014). Hence, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a Nash 
equilibrium of the expanded game in which each player i’s space of pure strategies is the 
set of maps from Θ𝑖 → S𝑖. 
Now consider a sequence of farmers (i = 1, 2, ...I) making decisions 𝑥𝑖 ∈ {0, 1} 
where 𝑥𝑖 = 1 means farmer i decided to adopt; and 𝑥𝑖 = 0 means farmer i decides to 
wait. Farmer i has a neighborhood B(i) ⊆ {1, 2, ..., I − 1} and observes the decisions 𝑥𝐼 
for all i ∈ B(I). The set B(I) is private information but each farmer has an iid private 
signal 𝜎𝑖. The signal is generated according to distribution 𝔽  . Farmer i’s information set 
is 𝐾𝑖  = {𝜎𝑖, B(I), 𝑥𝑖  for all k ∈ B(I)}.  A strategy profile is a sequence of strategies 
𝑠𝑖∈{𝑆}𝑖∈𝐼, with a probability distribution Ρ𝑠 over {𝑥𝑖}𝑖∈𝐼.  A strategy profile 𝑆 is a pure-
strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium if for all i: 
 𝑆𝑖
∗(𝐾𝑖) ∈ arg 𝑚𝑎𝑥 Ρ𝑠(𝑥 = 𝑠|𝐾) (3.3),  
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which means that best strategy depends on the probability of taking an action given 
available information.  
The adoption decision of farmer i is then: 
 
𝑥𝑖 {
1, 𝑖𝑓 Ρ𝑠(𝑠 = 1|𝜎𝑖) + Ρ𝑠(𝑠 = 1|B(I)) > 1
0, 𝑖𝑓 Ρ𝑠(𝑠 = 1|𝜎𝑖) + Ρ𝑠(𝑠 = 1|B(I)) < 1
 
(3.4), 
where Ρ𝑠(𝑠 = 1|𝜎𝑖) is the private belief about the new variety and Ρ𝑠(𝑠 = 1|B(I)) is the 
social belief about the variety. This means that when the probability of getting positive 
payoff (if adopting the variety) is confirmed by both private information (non-social 
learning) and social learning, the farmer will choose to adopt. Otherwise the farmer will 
choose to wait.  
Following Acemoglu, Bimpikis, Ozdaglar (2009), forming links in a network is 
costly, so let 𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝐼  denote the cost incurred to maintain the link between farmer i and j over 
a communication network of 𝐺𝑖. Each farmer receives a private signal 𝜎𝑖~ 𝔽 from direct 
neighbors, and makes a decision of whether to adopt (1) or wait (0) at time t. Assuming δ 
(δ < 1) is the discount factor for waiting, π is the payoff from adoption, and τ is the time 
taken up to the action; the payoff function is: 
 
𝑢𝑖(𝑥𝑖
𝐼 , 𝑠𝑖) = {
δτπ − ∑ 𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝐼
𝑖
, 𝑖𝑓𝑥𝑖,τ
𝐼 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝐼 = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 < τ 
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
(3.5), 
where the utility from adopting or not adopting depends on the profit of adopting 
(discounted by time) and cost of learning. When the profit trumps cost of learning, a 
farmer will adopt. When the profit is not sufficient to cover the cost of learning, a farmer 
will choose to wait.  
A strategy profile 𝑠𝑖
𝐼∗ is a Perfect-Bayesian Equilibrium if for all i and t 
 𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝐼∗ ∈ arg
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑦 ∈ {0,1} 𝐸(𝑦,𝑠−𝑖,𝑡𝐼∗) 𝑢𝑖((𝑥𝑖
𝐼 , 𝑠𝑖)|𝐾𝑖) 
(3.6)  
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Where the optimal strategy is now derived from the maximized expected payoff under 
private and public information.    
Intuitively, the equilibrium point of adoption can be found by maximizing the 
expected utility function that considers the payoff and cost of information exchange in a 
network, given that farmers are subject to both private observational information and 
public network information. In this model, information comes from social networks, 
typically neighboring farmers, as well as non-social sources such as extension services, or 
traditional media.    
In order to add specificity to the model above, I impose a number of assumptions 
that reflect the reality of adoption in developing countries. Within this general Bayesian 
framework, I consider a more specific mechanism akin to the target input model of 
Rosenzweig (1995) and Bandiera and Rasul (2006), while introducing costly network 
relationships. A target input model assumes that an optimal input is stochastic and 
unknown. This model is appropriate because optimal input use appears empirically to be 
central to farmers' concerns regarding adoption, and that its implications are easily tested 
using appropriate econometric methods.   
Others use a similar framework to study adoption (see Foster and Rosenzweig 
1995, Conley and Udry1994, Bandiera and Rasul 2006), but none consider the cost of 
obtaining information. Including costly information is critical, because the optimal 
strategy alters based on the cost structure.   
At the core of the Rosenzweig (1995) model is a Bayesian learning process. A 
Bayesian updating process implies that the farmer updates his previous knowledge (prior 
belief) of his optimal input employment based on his own trials and signals about inputs 
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from others’ trials. He reaches a new optimal input target, a posterior belief, based on 
these signals. Bayesian models are relatively common in an adoption context (Feder and 
O’Mara 1982; Leathers and Smale 1991; Rosenzweig 1995; Ghadim and Pannell 1999; 
Bandiera and Rasul 2006), and for good reason. Namely, farmers adopt because the 
expected profit is positive.  Absent from existing models, however, is the notion that 
adoption is costly. Allowing for a cost of adoption, I show that the model can produce 
substantially different results compared to when cost is ignored. Therefore, I add a cost 
structure to the Bayesian framework in order to derive a set of implications that are more 
descriptive of the context of variety adoption in developing countries.  
The basic features of this model are as follows. First, individuals decide on the 
input amount, which is a random variable with a known mean and variance. Second, 
payoffs are decreasing in the square of the distance between actual input use and the 
target, so the closer is the farmer’s actual input to his target input, the higher his payoff. 
Third, each individual can observe others’ inputs in a previous period, and thereby update 
their input in the following period in a Bayesian fashion (Rosenzweig 1995).  
I follow this framework in that I consider a new maize variety as a target input in 
which farmers update their knowledge regarding its performance attributes in a Bayesian 
fashion.  I assume each farmer has private information about his12 idiosyncratic target 
input value (fertilizer usage, irrigation, sowing techniques, pest control, etc.)—through 
non-social learning such as training and extension services, but shares public information 
that is generated by early adopters. However, public information is not the same to all 
                                                        
12 I use the male pronoun to represent farmers because a majority of farmers are male. 
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farmers because each farmer’s network is different. I then incorporate unique networks 
into an expected profit function.  
For farmer 𝑖 in period 𝑡, output 𝑞𝑖𝑡 declines in the square of the distance between 
the actual input used 𝑘𝑖𝑡, and the optimal input target in time t, 𝜅𝑖𝑡, while 𝜂0 is the 
maximum output given the underlying technology. The production function is written as: 
 𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝜂0 − (𝑘𝑖𝑡 − 𝜅𝑖𝑡)
2          (3.7), 
where farmers have prior beliefs about the optimal input 𝜅𝑖𝑡, and update their belief about 
the optimal input according to the actual input 𝑘𝑖𝑡. The target input level is not known at 
the time the input is chosen and has a mean of 𝜅∗: 
 𝜅𝑖𝑡 = 𝜅
∗ + 𝜇𝑖𝑡                              (3.8). 
In period t farmer i has beliefs about 𝜅∗ which are distributed as 𝑁(𝜅𝑖𝑡
∗, 𝜎𝜅𝑖𝑡
2 ).  
Define 𝜇𝑖𝑡 as a idiosyncratic shock that is i.i.d with a mean of 0 and a known variance 𝜎𝜇
2. 
As 𝐸(𝜇𝑖𝑡) = 0, to maximize expected output farmer 𝑖 uses the expected optimal target 
level as his input, so 𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡(𝜅𝑖𝑡) = 𝜅𝑖𝑡
∗.  Therefore the expected output is: 
 𝐸𝑡(𝑞𝑖𝑡) = 𝜂0 − 𝐸𝑡(𝑘𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡(𝜅𝑖𝑡))
2
= 𝜂0 − 𝜎𝑘𝑖𝑡
2 − 𝜎𝜇
213 (3.8) 
Which is a function of the optimal input, variation from initial knowledge and variation 
from learning.       
The expected output is a function of maximum output possible given a farmer’s 
capacity less the deviation caused by his inaccurate input estimate.  Repeating the process 
N (N=t-1) times, the farmer updates his knowledge regarding the optimal target input 
                                                        
13 These derivations follow Rosenzweig (1995). 
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from his initial belief in period 1 to period t based on the signals generated by other 
people’s inputs. Applying Bayes's rule, the posterior belief 14 is: 
 𝜎𝑘,𝑖𝑡
2 =
1
1
𝜎𝑘𝑖,0
2 +𝑁
1
𝜎𝜇
2
                                       (3.9), 
where ρ0 =
1
σki0
2  is the precision of the information generated by i's own experiences prior 
to the updating process, and ρL = 
1
σμ
2  is the precision of the information obtained each 
time the process is used, and N is the cumulative number of times prior to time t that the 
process has been employed. 
 
𝜎𝑘,𝑖𝑡
2 =
1
ρ0 + NρL
 
(3.10). 
 
This means that the posterior belief about the new variety is a function of the initial 
knowledge of the variety, number of trials a farmer experienced, and the precision of 
knowledge a farmer learns from his network. Substituting this expression back into the 
expected output yields an expression that includes the optimal input, precision of initial 
knowledge, number of trial, precision of knowledge learned, and is written as:  
 
𝐸𝑡(𝑞𝑖𝑡) = 𝜂0 −
1
ρ0 + NρL
−
1
ρL
 
(3.11) 
Costs come from two sources: input costs and the cost of obtaining information. I 
assume there is costant unit cost, 𝜃0,  to each unit of 𝑞𝑖𝑡 invested. That is, for an 
investment of 𝑞𝑖𝑡, the cost is 𝜃0𝑞𝑖𝑡. More importantly, there are two ways in which 
precision may influence the cost of obtaining information:  First, the precision of 
knowledge about the new variety prior to adoption, and, second, the precision of 
                                                        
14 An illustration of Bayesian updating can be found in Appendix B.  
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knowledge after N repeated observations. Therefore, cost is a function of the number of 
times observed N, the precision of initial knowledge and the precision of knowledge after 
observation: C = C (N, ρL, ρ0), where 𝐶𝑁
′ > 0, 𝐶ρ0
′ < 0, and 𝐶ρL
′ > 0.  That is, cost 
increases with the number of times observed, decreases with the precision of knowledge 
and increase with learning.  
More precisely, I assume there is cost involved with waiting so that: 𝐶𝑁
′ > 0.  As 
the number of trials a farmer experiences before he adopts, the opportunity cost increases. 
The notion that 𝐶ρ0
′ < 0 suggests that the more knowledge a farmer has about the new 
variety prior to adoption, the less costly it will be to make a prior judgment about the 
optimal input value. Such prior knowledge can be obtained through non-social learning 
such as education as to the importance of new varieties, receiving extension services, and 
collecting information from non-social learning such as radio, TV and literacy meetings 
organized by trade associations. I represent this idea by allowing the initial precision of 
knowledge to be a function of non-social learning or: ρ0 =
ρ0(𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎), where Education indicates the years of schooling a 
farmer has received, Extension indicates the efforts to attend extension services, and 
Media indicates the receipt of information from social media. Obtaining information from 
any of these sources causes the farmer to incur a positive cost. Optimality requires that 
the farmer equate the marginal cost of new information with the marginal benefits. 
Because farmers can make more precise prior judgments about the new variety (ρ0
′ > 0) 
the marginal benefits increase accordingly.  
The cost of acquiring information plays a critical role in my model. Social 
networks are formed as the result of individual decisions that trade off the costs of 
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forming and maintaining links against the potential rewards from doing so (Scott 2010). 
Having connections with others helps a farmer update his knowledge about the new 
variety. However, direct links are costly (Bala and Goyal 2000) because of the effort 
required to form and maintain the connections. Particularly in the context of rural areas of 
developing countries, infrastructure such as roads and markets are under-developed, 
which imposes additional constraints on farmers’ abilities to observe their neighbors. 
Therefore, the spillover effects from observing previous adopters might be limited. More 
specifically, a farmer will need to consider both the benefits of belonging to a network as 
well as the cost of maintain such a network when making the adoption decision.   
Denote the number of a farmer’s direct connections at time t to be  𝑛𝑖
𝑑(𝑖)𝑡−1, and 
the precision of learning is a functions of direct connections: ρL( 𝑛
𝑑(𝑖)𝑡−1), and assume 
that ρL is concave and twice differentiable with ρL
′( ) > 0 in  𝑛𝑑(𝑖)𝑡−1 and ρL
′′( ) <
0 in  𝑛𝑑(𝑖)𝑡−1.  This is consistent with the findings of Bandiera and Rasul (2006) in that 
as the number of adopters increases, adoption increases initially but falls at the margin 
due to “information overload”.  
Profit is defined in terms of expected returns, input costs and the cost of 
information. Assuming a constant return to output p, the profit function is then: 
 𝜋𝑡[𝑝, 𝑞𝑖𝑡, 𝐶]
= (𝑝 − 𝜃0)(𝜂0 −
1
ρ0 + NρL
−
1
ρL
)
− 𝐶(N, ρL( 𝑛
𝑑(𝑖)𝑡−1), ρ0(𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎) ) 
(3.12), 
Where profit is a function of non-social learning, social learning and cost of learning. I 
derive specific hypothesis in the next section based on this profit function.  
3.3 Hypotheses 
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To shed light on the effect of learning on variety adoption, I derive a number of 
hypotheses regarding the propensity to adopt based on the profit (3.12) that is a function 
of network, social and non-social learning, and cost of learning. While intuition suggests 
that adoption choices should be positively related within networks, theories of social 
learning indicate that the sign of the relationship is actually ambiguous. On the one hand,  
the benefit of adopting in the current period is higher when there are many adopters in the 
network because of the information they provide. On the other hand, having many 
adopters in the network increases incentives to delay adoption strategically and free ride 
on the knowledge accumulated by others. If strategic delay considerations prevail, a 
farmers' propensity to adopt decreases as the number of adopters among his network 
increase.  
HYPOTHESIS 1. Experienced farmers with precise knowledge of the new variety tend to 
be “first movers” with greater output, while less experienced farmers will strategically 
delay adoption until the marginal benefit of learning externalities is equal to the 
marginal cost of waiting.  
PROOF: When farmers choose to wait for others to adopt, postponing their own 
adoption, the time lag is known as a strategic delay. The delay is strategic as it is not 
driven by a failure on the farmer’s part, or even a rational response to the real option 
value embedded in a new technology (Richards and Green 2003), but rather an optimal 
response to information acquisition in an uncertain world. Several factors can justify a 
farmer’s delaying adoption. When farmers can observe each other’s signals for free, 
delays in decision-making can indeed be rational (Banerjee 1992). Moreover, the length 
of the delay is sensitive to the reaction speed of each player and the number of players 
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(Chamley and Gale 1994) because when farmers react quickly to other people’s adoption 
the delay will be shortened. By the same token, when there are many farmers in a 
network, they produce more information externalities, which will help accelerate the 
decision process.   
In general, first-movers have an advantage but delay occurs due to the risk of 
making what turns out to be an ex-post poor adoption decision (Farrell and Saloner 1985, 
Farrell 1987, Farrell and Saloner 1988, Bolton and Farrell 1990, Farrell 1993).  
Information from others is critical as it changes the precision of the information available. 
To determine how the precision of information influences expected output, I derive the 
marginal effect of precision on the expectation of output, where precision is acquired 
from the farmer’s own experience with the variety and the precision of the farmer’s initial 
knowledge of the variety. The marginal effect of information on output is.  
 ∂Et(qit, )
∂ρ0
=
1
(ρi0 + NρL)2
> 0 
(3.13) 
While the marginal effect of learning from others is: 
 ∂Et(qit)
∂ρL
=
N
(ρ0 + NρL)2
> 0 
(3.14) 
 
Therefore, both the marginal effect of precision on the farmer’s own experience 
and learning from others are positive. This shows that if a farmer has precise initial 
judgments about the optimal input, then the expected payoff will increase accordingly. 
The advantage of such initial judgments diminishes as the number of periods increase, 
that is, more experienced farmers tends to be the “first movers” because the longer the 
farmer waits, the lower the profit from adoption. For the farmer who does not possess 
such precise initial judgments, his expected output will increase as he observes from 
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others though the learning process. In other words, positive externalities derive from 
repeatedly observing others.  
Moreover, farmers learn by their own experiences and observing their neighbors, 
and actively respond to future information from other adopters (Besley and Case 1997). 
Munchi (2003) considers the adoption of rice varieties in India and finds that 
heterogeneity across rice-growing regions, besides farm characteristics, contributes to 
adoption. Heterogeneity in his context includes accessibility to extension service, 
formation of local network and education.  Abdulai and Huffman (2005), meanwhile, 
show that farmers’ adoption of crossbred cattle in Tanzania depends positively on the 
proximity of his farm to other users, education, and on his access to credit and contact 
with extension agents. Therefore, education, extension services and social media are also 
likely to be important factors in explaining expected payoff.  
HYPOTHESIS 2. Non-social learning is positively related to adoption.  
PROOF: The proof of Hypothesis 2 depends on the comparative statics of the equilibrium 
above with respect to education. Non-social learning such as education increases 
expected profit two ways. First, it increases expected output by helping farmers better 
estimate optimal input levels. By increasing returns through precision, output rises. 
Second, education reduces the learning related to make an initial decision, which causes 
profit to rise as:   
 𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
= (𝑝 − 𝜃0) (
1
ρ0 + NρL
)2
𝜕ρ0
𝜕𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
−
𝜕C
ρ0
𝜕ρ0
𝜕𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
> 0 
(3.15) 
 
 
  
 
61 
The expression is positive because 
𝜕C
ρ0
< 0 and 
𝜕ρ0
𝜕𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
> 0, and the first part is 
positive if incremental returns exceed the marginal input cost. This shows that non-social 
learning increases the expected payoff for the farmer.  
 Other than education, extension service and social media, a farmer’s network 
represents his source of private information. In particular, it is the size of the network that 
conveys the most information about the extent of social learning.  
HYPOTHESIS 3. The number of adopters in a network has an ambiguous effect on 
output.   
PROOF: The comparative static effect of a famer’s direct connections on his 
expected payoff is found by again finding the marginal effect of network size on 
equilibrium profit. Profit as a function of network size is given by:  
 
𝜋𝑡[𝑝, 𝑞𝑖𝑡, 𝐶] = (𝑝 − 𝜃0)(𝜂0 −
1
ρ0 + NρL( 𝑛𝑑(𝑖)𝑡−1)
−
1
ρL( 𝑛𝑑(𝑖)𝑡−1)
)
− 𝐶(N, ρL( 𝑛
𝑑(𝑖)𝑡−1), ρ0 ) 
(3.16) 
 
Where  𝑛𝑑(𝑖)𝑡−1 is the number of direct links in a farmer’s network. The comparative 
static with respect to network size is: 
 𝜕𝜋𝑡[𝑝, 𝑞𝑖𝑡, 𝐶]
𝜕 𝑛𝑑(𝑖)𝑡−1
= (𝑝 − 𝜃0)(
1
(ρ0 + NρL)
2
+
1
 𝑛𝑑(𝑖)𝑡−1
2)
𝜕ρL
𝜕 𝑛𝑑(𝑖)𝑡−1
−
𝜕𝐶
𝜕ρL
𝜕ρL
𝜕 𝑛𝑑(𝑖)𝑡−1
 
(3.17), 
 
where the first part represents the positive externality associated with having more 
adopters in the network. That is, the more adopters there are in the network the more the 
farmer is able benefit from the learning process. The second part is interpreted as the cost 
associated with maintaining such a network. Network costs can be associated with travel 
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expenses to the nearest adopter, tradeoff in information, necessary social norms or gift 
giving. There are mixed effects on the incentive to adopt as the number of adopters in a 
network increases.   
 𝜕𝜋𝑡[𝑝, 𝑞𝑖𝑡, 𝐶]
𝜕 𝑛𝑑(𝑖)𝑡−1𝜕𝑁
= −2(𝑝 − 𝜃0)
𝜕ρL
𝜕 𝑛𝑑(𝑖)𝑡−1
1
(ρ0 + NρL)3
< 0 
(3.18) 
 
This derivative is negative because 
𝜕ρL
𝜕 𝑛𝑑(𝑖)𝑡−1
> 0, or having direct links to 
adopters provides additional information on the new variety, which in turn will increase 
the farmer’s expected payoff.  In this sense, waiting is not a preferred strategy. On one 
hand, the number of adopters in a network increases as the farmer waits, but the marginal 
advantage from learning diminishes the longer the farmer waits. Therefore, the timing of 
adoption depends on the number of adopters, the private cost of learning, and the 
farmer’s prior knowledge regarding the new variety.  
The timing of adoption is a critical concern when market-entry is strategic. In a 
game-theoretic framework, players maximize their utilities with regard to private 
information they own and public signals released by others. In aggregate, the micro-
foundations of adoption lead to an aggregate adoption curve Zhao (2001) studies an 
infinite period game with finite number of players and incomplete information and finds 
that the adoption rate differed in different stages of diffusion. Similarly, Kapur (1995) 
studies adoption in a complete information dynamic game of identical agents and finds 
that agents randomize the timing of adoption and can end up adopting at different times. .  
HYPOTHESIS 4:Famers adopt at different times due to individual cost of obtaining 
information.  
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PROOF. In my framework, waiting cost is also important in determining the 
speed of adoption. If there is no cost of waiting, then the “followers” will wait 
indefinitely because more information is generated. However because waiting is costly, 
the follower will adopt at time period t where t |(
N
(ρ0+NρL)2
− 𝐶𝑁
′ ) = 0, that is, when the 
marginal benefit from waiting is equal to the marginal cost of waiting. Because individual 
waiting costs differ, due to heterogeneity in signal precision, farmers will adopt at 
different times.  
Clearly, the benefits generated by network externalities decrease as the number of 
adopters increases. So, the size of an efficient network, where efficiency refers to an 
optimal trade off between the benefit from network externalities and the cost of 
marinating such a network, depends on the relative marginal effects of size on cost and 
returns. That is, if the network expands by including one more connection, it will not 
generate additional learning externalities. 
HYPOTHESIS 5. The efficient network is not infinite due to the cost of network 
formation.  
 Setting the marginal profit with respect to network membership to zero and 
solving for n finds the efficient network size:   
 𝜕𝜋𝑡[𝑝,𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝐶]
𝜕 𝑛𝑑(𝑖)𝑡−1
= (𝑝 − 𝜃0)(
1
(ρ0+NρL)
2
+
1
 𝑛𝑑(𝑖)𝑡−1
2)
𝜕ρL
𝜕 𝑛𝑑(𝑖)𝑡−1
−
𝜕𝐶
𝜕ρL
𝜕ρL
𝜕 𝑛𝑑(𝑖)𝑡−1
= 0, 
(3.19) 
which implies that  an efficient network is a function of the initial knowledge of the 
variety, learning from others, number of repeated trials, the number of direct links a 
farmer has, and the cost of maintaining such direct links. In reality, the efficient network 
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size differs based on many factors such as geographical proximity, closeness of society 
and the availability of transportation and infrastructure. 
In summary, this section shows how farmers can optimally delay adopting a new 
variety – a strategic delay. More specifically, the incentive to delay adoption increases in 
the number of other adopters because use of the new variety by network members creates 
more useful knowledge.  However, the value of information a farmer receives from his 
own adoption is lower as more network members adopt. Therefore, the gain in future 
profitability from an additional trial to the farmer with the new technology is decreasing 
in the number of trials from all network members. Moreover, because it is costly to 
observe information and maintain a network, the adoption decision and timing of 
adoption is now complicated by the network structure experienced by the individual 
farmer. Intuitively, a farmer will maintain an efficient network size where he can observe 
public information from others while minimizing the cost of using the network.   
Empirically testing the hypothesis in a structural way is not possible due to data 
constraints. However, in the next section I describe an empirical example that allows me 
to test the implications of my theoretical model in a straightforward way.   
3.4 Empirical Study: New Maize Variety Adoption in Mozambique 
Agriculture plays a crucial role in the lives of Mozambicans. The agricultural sector 
provided employment to 81% of the population in 2014, and added  $4.08 billion to GDP 
in 2012 (NationMaster, 2014). Given the dominance of agriculture in the macroeconomy, 
general economic growth and poverty alleviation in Mozambique are practically 
impossible to achieve without sustainable development of the agricultural sector.  For this 
reason, improved varieties (e.g., improved maize and beans) have the potential to 
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increase production, as well as increase income and improve the standard of living for 
farm households.  
Unfortunately, the rate of new maize variety adoption in Mozambique remains 
low. Approximately 11% of agricultural households planted improved maize varieties in 
2011, largely because households question the economic profitability of cultivating 
improved varieties of maize and other staple food crops. In Mozambique, during good 
years when yields are high, households receive low prices. However, because producer 
prices are regulated, and do not respond to shortages, the price of grain does not increase 
in bad years, regardless of low production. On top of that, maize production is often 
operated off smallholders, who are vulnerable to adverse climatic conditions and natural 
disasters such as drought and flooding (Mission Report 2007). 
In order to encourage households to adopt new agricultural varieties and increase 
agricultural productivity, the government and non-government organizations have 
increased the number of extension agents and programs beginning in 2004 (Lopes 2010). 
However, only 15% of rural households had access to extension services from either the 
government or nongovernment organizations (Lopes 2010). This suggests that the 
number of households who are aware of new agricultural technologies and improved crop 
varieties is limited. As a result, local networks assume a critical role in facilitating the 
adoption of improved new varieties. Just how important local networks are, however, is 
an empirical question.  
3.4.1 Data 
 
My data consists of farm-level information gathered through an annual survey 
administered by the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG). Through this survey, the 
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Mozambique government samples crop planting at an individual- household level. The 
resulting dataset includes household-level observations on sociodemographic 
information, and descriptions of farmers’ familial and friend networks, in addition to a 
comprehensive set of production data. The National Agriculture Survey (Trabalho do 
Inquérito Agrícola, or TIA), which was first conducted in 1993 by MINAG staff from the 
Directorate of Economics in collaboration with colleagues from Michigan State 
University (MSU), employs standards from the National Statistics Institute (INE).  The 
TIAs uses a stratified, clustered sample design that is representative of rural small- and 
medium-holders at the provincial and national levels.   
Smallholders are the backbone of the agricultural sector. A smallholder is defined 
as having less than 10 hectares of cultivated area, fewer than 10 cattle, 50 goats, pigs or 
sheep, and 5,000 chickens (TIA Dissemination, 2007).  It is estimated that there are over 
3 million such smallholders in the country. Smallholders practice rain-fed agriculture, 
operate at low levels of productivity. Most smallholder production is committed to own-
consumption, but there has been considerable growth in the marketing of both basic food 
crops and cash crops by smallholders.  
The data gathered through the TIA is comprehensive. Small-and medium-scale 
farm surveys include data on household characteristics (household identification, and 
number of household members), access to services, associations, credits, and disasters 
effects, income indicators (salaried employment, self employment, and remittances and 
pension), production and sales of grains, and food security and household vulnerability. 
For my purposes, I am primarily interested in the geographic location of each 
household.   A pair of latitude and longitude coordinates was recorded for each 
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household, which makes it possible to map out all respondents, and measure the distance 
between each pair by either Euclidean distance or nearest neighbor methods using 
ArcGIS spatial modeling software. In order to identify the role of spatial proximity in 
network relationships, it is necessary to have precise information on the geographic 
locations of adopting and non-adopting households.  
I used data from the 2008-2011 Partial Panel Survey (PP2011), which is a partial 
survey of TIA 2007 and TIA 2011. My sample includes households interviewed in 2011 
and a subset of households that were initially interviewed in 2007 and re-interviewed in 
2011. The survey was conducted in the provinces of Nampula, Zambézia, Tete, Manica, 
and Sofala and includes data from 1,454 households. Table 3.1 shows number of 
households sampled in each province.  
Table 3.1: The number of adopters in the sampled provinces  
 Nampula Zambezia Tete Manica Sofala 
Number 263 330 277 244 340 
Percentage 18.1% 22.7% 19.1% 16.8% 23.4% 
 
The data set includes information on farm identification, farm household 
characteristics, production and sales, access to services, information on price and 
production, and risk factors. Table 3.2 presents the variables included to study the 
adoption of improved maize varieties. In this sample, 66.6% of the household heads are 
males at an average of 44.35 years old with 2.98 years of education. Only 1.9% of them 
have had training about the new variety and only 27.9% of the sampled household heads 
have a paid job. A large proportion (65.5%) of the households have prior experiences 
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with the new variety15. Adopters use either self-owned seeds (29.4%) or bought seeds 
(20.2%). Of all the households that used improved seeds, 29% sell their harvest and 48% 
use their harvest for own consumption. Regarding the sources of information, 15% of the 
households have received information from an extension service in the past 12 months. 
Price information comes from NGO (35.4%), radio (22.5%), extension (4.6%), and 
associations (4.5%). A small percentage (7.8%) of the sampled households are part of 
agricultural associations and 3.9% received agricultural credits from the government. 
Survey respondents reported three types of calamities that may have adversely affected 
maize production:  drought, flood and cyclones, of which drought is the number one risk 
(34.4%), followed by cyclones (15%) and flood (6.7%). 
In the next section, I discuss specific function forms for adoption, namely a 
spatial latent model with binary outcomes (or a spatial probit model). A spatial latent 
variable model is a specification where spatial correlation is introduced between the 
decision variables and/or in the error structure of the model (Anselin 2002). In terms of a 
formal model of variety adoption, a spatial regression model includes measures of others’ 
variety adoption as an additional explanation variable, moderated by others’ relationship 
with the farmer in question. Because the data are cross-section in nature, a spatial 
econometric model captures the importance of others in a single parameter.  
 3.4.2 Model 
 
My econometric model is based on the assumption that social interactions can be 
modeled as spatial phenomenon. The analogy between social relationships and space is 
                                                        
15 This sample consists of farmers who have adopted before.  
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not a new one, as Yang and Allenby (2003), Narayan, Rao, and Saunders (2011), and 
Richards, Hamilton and Allender (2014) consider explicitly spatial econometric models 
of social interaction. In my case, a spatial latent variable model is a formal representation 
of the equilibrium outcome of social and spatial interaction. Even though the actual 
dynamics of the interaction among agents (peer effects, neighborhood effects, spatial 
externalities) cannot be observed due to the single dimension of observations for a single 
point in time, the correlation structure that results in the equilibrium can be modeled 
(Brock and Durlauf 2001, Durlauf 2004).  
The standard approach to modeling such phenomena is to develop a specification 
for an unobserved underlying latent dependent variable for each farmer, defined as 𝑦𝑖
∗. 
The link between the latent variable and the observed discrete phenomenon (adoption) is 
obtained by specifying a threshold, c, such that 𝑦𝑖 is observed whenever 𝑦𝑖
∗ > 𝑐. In 
general notation, a spatial lag model is written as (Anselin 2002): 
 
𝑦𝑖
∗ = 𝜌 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑗
∗
𝑛
𝑗≠𝑖
+ 𝑥′𝑖𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖 
(3.20) 
                                
where 𝑦𝑖
∗ is a 𝑛 × 1 vector of latent dependent variables, W denotes a spatial weight 
matrix that represents the spatial distance among farmers, X denotes explanatory 
variables that may contribution to adoption decisions as discussed in the previous section. 
In this expression, the latent variables are not the same as the discrete outcomes of 
adopting or not adopting, but an unobserved measure of utility that will lead to the 
observed adoption variable. In other words, it is the latent 𝑾𝑦 ∗ that is present in the 
actors’ objective functions, but not the observed 𝑾𝑦. For example, in the context of my 
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model, it is the unobserved profitability of the neighbors’ parcels that enters in the utility 
function of a target input model, but not the observed input.  
Let the threshold 𝑐 = 0, and let 𝑦𝑖 be the binary outcome whether a farmer will 
adopt or not, taking on the value of 1 (adopt) whenever 𝑦𝑖
∗ > 0. The threshold value is 
interpreted as the utility from adopting the new variety. Whenever the unobserved utility 
is greater than zero, a farmer makes the observed action of adopting. The probability of 
adoption is then: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑦𝑖 = 1] = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝜀𝑖 < 𝜌 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑗
∗
𝑛
𝑗≠𝑖
+ 𝑥′𝑖𝛽] 
(3.20). 
 
While equation (3.20) shows the empirical adoption decision for a single farmer, 
the spatial dimension of the problem is best represented by showing all adoption 
decisions together, in matrix notation. In this way, the spatial relationships among 
farmers becomes clearer. In matrix notation, the latent spatial lag process is given by:  
 𝒀 = (1 − 𝜌𝑾)−1𝑿𝛽 + (1 − 𝜌𝑾)−1𝑢          (3.21) 
Where 𝒀 is a vector of binary outocmes of adotpion, 𝑿 is a vector of explanatory 
variables, 𝑾 is the weight matrix that indciates the distances among farmers, and 𝑢 is an 
idiosycritic shock.  
By definition, the reduced form is nonlinear in 𝜌 and 𝛽 and has a spatially 
correlated error structure (a spatial autoregressive structure). This means that that the 
value of y at any location i is not only determined by the values of x at i, but also of x at 
all other locations in the network (or in the case of neighborhood, all neighbors). As an 
illustration of the autoregressive effect, expand the inverse matrix term (for |𝜌| < 1 and 
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with a row-standardized W), and using the expected value (since the errors all have mean 
zero) to arrive at: 
 𝐸(𝒀|𝑿) = 𝑿𝛽 + 𝜌𝑊𝑿𝛽 + 𝜌2𝑊2𝑿𝛽 + ⋯ 𝜌𝑛𝑊𝑛𝑿𝛽 (3.22) 
Where the expected adopting actions of farmers given the explanatory factors are 
mediated by the influence of nearby farmers, with closer neighbors having stronger 
effects and distant neighbor’s having weaker effects.   
The powers of 𝜌 and W highlight the distance-decay effect because for higher 
orders of 𝜌, there is less influence placed on the spatial effect of others’ behavior. This 
expression also shows how spatial effects can be both local and global. Local effects are 
represented by 𝜌𝑾𝛽, which shows how the famer is influenced by his immediate 
neighbors.  On the other hand, global effects are given by 
𝛽
1−𝜌
 , which shows how a 
farmer is influenced by the entire network. These differences highlight the power of using 
a spatial approach to study informational effects in a social network.  
Clearly, the spatial weight matrix plays an important role in any spatial 
autoregressive model.  There are many ways to define the individual elements of a spatial 
weight matrix, capturing the various ways in which neighbors, or other members of a 
social network, interact. Essentially, these weights formalize the neighborhood structure 
between the observations as a 𝑛 × 𝑛 matrix W in which each element 𝑤𝑖𝑗is non-zero for 
the existence of a neighbor relation, and zero otherwise. By convention, the diagonal 
elements are set to zero, 𝑤𝑖𝑖  = 0.   
The specification of the weight matrix is a matter of some arbitrariness and 
depends on both the context, and the objectives of the researcher (Anselin 2002). A range 
of suggestions have been offered in the literature, based on contiguity, distance, as well 
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as more general metrics (Anselin 2006, Anselin and Rey 2006, Lesage 1998, Lesage 
2010). Weights based on contiguity include rook and queen (from chess terms) 
continuities where only units that are adjacent to the focal unit in the rook/queen fashion 
are considered neighbors. A contiguity matrix is normally calculated from polygon data, 
that is, geographical units with boundaries. When two units share the same boundary they 
are considered neighbors. In my data, a pair of point GPS coordinates does not indicate 
boundaries. Therefore my contiguity matrix is calculated using the method of Thiessen 
polygons. A Thiessen polygon surrounding a given household is constructed by drawing 
lines between that household and all other households. These lines are then 
perpendicularly bisected in their middle and treated as “boundaries”.  Rook contiguity is 
then calculated with four neighbors that share boundaries directly with the concerned 
household16. The advantage of a contiguity matrix is that it addresses immediate 
neighbors, who are the most accessible information sources. Intuitively, direct neighbors 
should have a significant influence on adoption decision because of the convenience of 
learning from each other.  
Distance-based weight normally refers to the Euclidean weight matrix, where the 
relationship between two units is measured by the relative distance between them. A 
Euclidean weight matrix is a truthful reflection of the geographical space, however, 
because the complexity of a relationship is not always dependent upon closeness, the 
Euclidean weight matrix may fail to represent the underlying travel expenses among the 
units of observation because it measures the direct distance from point A to point B. For 
                                                        
16 This is actually the same as calculating the four nearest neighbors, which method I mention next.  
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example, consider a mountainous farming environment. Two neighbors may be only 1 
mile distant as the crow flies (Euclidean distance), but the natural barrier may mean that a 
farmer 10 miles down the river is a much stronger influence. For this reason, I use an arc-
distance matrix, which address not only direct natural distance from each other, but also 
slopes (or valleys) that provide extra distance (and not shown on Euclidean distance). For 
example, assume there are two households, each live on one side of a mountain. The 
Euclidean distance measures the horizontal distance between two houses, whereas the arc 
distance accounts for the distance to climb over the mountain. The advantage of distance-
based matrix is that it represents the true travel distance between households. The 
significance of such a representation as the social proximity is questionable because 
nowadays, travelling does not bound farmers with respect to information exchange.  
I derive a third matrix based on the concept of the “nearest-neighbor.” A nearest-
neighbor matrix is one in which the nearest locations are considered as neighbors and 
coded as 1 to indicate they are likely to have a spatial relationship. An advantage of a 
nearest-neighbor weight is that, unlike continuity weights, a nearest neighbor matrix 
pertains to only immediate neighbors. This allows for investigation of relationships 
among households that transcends geographical limitations. Farmers can be spatially 
related by socio-economics rather than geographic distance. For example, the nearest 
neighbors of a focal farmer can be from the same geographic region, or they can be 
across regions, but possess some underlying economic similarities such as accepting 
loans from the same bank.  For example, if accepting credits/loans is a crucial for 
farmers’ adoption decisions, farmers should express similar behavior based on the mutual 
loan policy.  
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I include three categories of explanatory variables into the X matrix, namely they 
are farm identification variables that indicates the located provinces, household 
characteristics variables that describes the socio-demographic of the households, 
production and sales variables that indicates the production history logistics, non-social 
learning that describes the sources of information besides social learning, and the risk 
variables that describes the risks for Mozambique farmers. The selected variables are 
presented in Table 3.2.  
Table 3.2 Selected Variables and Descriptive Statistics. 
Variables Definition Descriptive Statistics 
Frequency 
    
Farm Identification 
Nampula 
   
The households belong to 
Nampula province 
  
Zambezia The households belong to 
Zambezia province 
  
Tete The households belong to 
Tete province 
  
Sofala The households belong to 
Sofala province 
  
Household 
Characteristics 
HH_Gender 
   
Gender of the household 1= male  
0= female  
66. 6% 
 14.6% 
HH_Age Age of the household 
head 
 44.35 
(13.856) 
HH_Education Years of education for the 
household head 
 2.98 
(2.993) 
HH_Training The household had 
agricultural training in 
the past 3 months 
1= yes 
0 =  no 
1.9% 
79.3% 
HH_Job The household head had 
salaried employment 
1= yes 
0 = no 
27.9% 
53.2% 
Production and Sales 
Improve 
   
Grew improved maize 
variety in 2011 
1=yes 
0= no 
11.3% 
65.6% 
Impr_Before Had grown improved 
maize prior to 2011 
1= yes 
0= no 
11.5% 
65.5% 
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ImprSeed_Own  Owned improved maize 
seeds 
1= yes 
0= no 
29.4% 
47.5% 
ImprSeed_Buy Bought improved maize 
seeds 
1=yes 
0=no 
20.2% 
56.7% 
Impr_Sell Sold the maize grown 
with improved seeds 
1=yes 
0=no 
29% 
48% 
Non-social learning 
Info_Extension 
   
Received information or 
advice from extension in 
the past 12 months 
1=yes 
0=no 
15% 
66.2% 
InfoPrice_Radio Price information from 
radio  
1=yes 
0=no 
22.5% 
58.7% 
InfoPrice_Extension Price information from 
extension 
1=yes 
0=no 
4.6% 
76.5% 
InfoPrice_NGO Price information from 
non-government 
organizations 
1=yes 
0=no 
35.4% 
45.7% 
InfoPrice_Assc Price information from 
agricultural association 
1=yes 
0=no 
4.5% 
76.7% 
Mem_Assc Member of agricultural 
association 
1=yes 
0=no 
7.8% 
73.4% 
Credit Received agricultural 
credits. 
1=yes 
0=no 
3.9% 
77.2% 
Training Received training in the 
past 3 months 
1= yes 
0= no 
2.2% 
97.8% 
Risk Factors 
Risk_Flood 
   
Lost crops due to flood in 
the past 12 months. 
1=yes 
0=no 
6.7% 
74.4% 
Risk_Drought Lost crops due to drought 
in the past 12 months. 
1=yes 
0=no 
34.4% 
47% 
Risk_Cyclone Lost crops due to cyclone 
in the past 12 months 
1=yes 
0=no 
15.6% 
65.5% 
  Among household identification variables, I expect the central regions to show a 
higher adoption rate as maize is more commonly grown the central regions. 
Socioeconomic attributes are variables that measure observed heterogeneity, and in that 
regard are likely to explain some of the observed variation in adoption rates. Within the 
set of socioeconomic attributes available in the TIA data, I expect education to be 
positively related to adoption because educated people have more access to information, 
and a better understanding of the market. If new varieties are indeed better, then higher 
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education should correlate with adoption. Age of the household head has an 
indeterminate effect on adoption. While experience can play a very important role in that 
more experienced individuals may have more accurate prior about the new variety, 
making them more likely to adopt, older farmers can be set in their ways and less likely 
to switch to a new variety. Other exogenous variables include the availability of 
government information sources. I expect that receiving agricultural credits and being a 
member of an agricultural association have positive effects on one’s adoption decision. 
Credits are given to farmers as an incentive to produce certain crops, and as a way to 
alleviate the damage caused by any natural disasters. Being a member of an association 
not only provides the opportunity to learn about new varieties, but also exposure to 
market information and advances in production methods.   
Other farm-related attributes may also explain some inter-farm variation in new 
variety adoption. First, I included variables that represent whether a farmer’s harvest was 
for own consumption or for sale. A farmer’s own experience, independent of age, is also 
likely to be important. In that regard, I included a variable indicating whether the farmer 
had planted the variety in question in a prior year. This effect may be positive or 
negative, depending on the farmer’s particular experience with the variety. If the 
experience was a good one, then the effect is likely to be positive, but negative if it was 
not. Risk may also slow adoption. In order to capture the influence of risk, I included the 
occurrences of drought, flood and cyclone in the past 12 months. In Mozambique, 
wildlife poses the most important risk, so I capture this effect by including a variable to 
indicate whether the crops were attacked by wildlife in the past 12 months. 
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Regardless of the definition of space, spatial econometric models cannot be 
estimated using conventional, ordinary least squares methods, due to the endogeneity 
inherent in their structure. In the next section, I describe an estimation strategy that 
exploits the unique nature of my data for identification.  
3.4.3 Estimation 
Spatial econometric models are powerful in that they are able to encapsulate a 
large amount of information in a relatively simple form, but at the cost of estimation 
complexity. For example, to including a spatially lagged dependent variable in a 
regression specification creates endogeneity because the choices made by everyone else 
in the network are correlated with unobservable factors, by definition.  There are two 
types of spatial dependences: the lag dependence, which studies the influence between an 
individual (or unit) and his (its) neighbors, or the error dependence, which focuses on 
how unobserved observations are explained by the spatial relationships. In our case, 
information exchange is analog to the lag specification because information is transmitted 
among farmers and decay in the same process. A lag specification can capture the nature 
of such decay, or in other words, how is information reserved among neighbors, and then 
translate into the network influence of neighbors as a whole.  
Modeling discrete choice in a spatial framework is challenging due to the 
violation of IID in the error distribution (because it is cofounded with a inverse matrix 
considering weight, or inverse Leontief matrix). Simulation methods are generally 
employed to get unbiased and consistent estimates asymptotically. For this study, I use 
the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) method developed by Fleming (2000) and 
follow the procedure of Pinkse and Slade (1998) in that I first test the spatial dependency 
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with my data. After rejecting the null of a traditional probit, I estimate a spatial probit (or 
a spatial latent model by Anselin (2010)).  In this section, I introduce the estimation 
method first, followed by the specification test I employ to determine spatial lag 
dependency. Results are reported in the reverse order in order to establish the preferred 
form of the model prior to interpreting the associated parameter estimates.  
MLE assumes the error term is normally distributed, or ε~N(0, Σ𝜃). Using the 
general notation for equation (3.21) above, the log-likelihood function (LLF) for the 
spatial lag model is given by: 
 𝑙𝑛𝐿 = ∑[𝑦𝑖𝑙𝑛Φ(𝑥𝑖
′𝛽) + (1 − 𝑦𝑖) ln(1 − Φ(𝑥𝑖
′𝛽))]
𝑖
 
 
(3.25) 
with 𝑦𝑖 = 0, 1. Each observation on the discrete dependent variable 𝑦𝑖 can be considered 
to be an independent draw from a binomial random variable with probability Φ(𝑥𝑖′𝛽). 
Since 1 − Φ(𝑥𝑖
′𝛽) = Φ(−𝑥𝑖
′𝛽), and using 𝑞𝑖 = 2𝑦𝑖 − 1, this can be expressed as:  
 𝑙𝑛𝐿 = ∑ 𝑙𝑛
𝑖
 Φ(𝑞𝑖𝑥𝑖
′𝛽) (3.26) 
In the spatial case, the simple summation is no longer appropriate and the full 
multivariate density must be evaluated to obtain the log-likelihood. Consider u as the n×1 
vector of multivariate normal random variables with variance- covariance matrix Σ. In 
order to generalize the censoring conditions for both values of 𝑦𝑖, set Q as a diagonal 
matrix with diagonal elements 𝑞𝑖 defined above. The multivariate censoring conditions 
are: 
 𝑢 < 𝑄(𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊)−1𝑋𝛽 
 
(3.27) 
These must be evaluated in a multivariate normal distribution with Σ respectively as 
[(𝐼 − 𝜆𝑊)′(𝐼 − 𝜆𝑊)]−1. The corresponding log-likelihood can be expressed as: 
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 𝑙𝑛𝐿 = 𝑙𝑛Φ𝑛[𝑄(𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊)
−1𝑋𝛽; 0, Σ𝜌] (3.28) 
Where Φ𝑛 denotes a n-dimensional multivariate normal cumulative distribution function 
with the upper bounds as the first term, mean 0, and variance-covariance matrix Σ.  
To test for spatial lag dependence, I employ a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test 
statistic for the spatial autoregressive process (Anselin 1988a). The LM test statistic is 
Chi-square distributed with one degree of freedom and is written: 
 
𝐿𝑀𝜌 = {
𝑒′𝑊𝑦
𝑒′𝑒
𝑛
}2/𝐷 
(3.29) 
 
While 𝑒 is the OLS residuals and the denominator D is: 
 
𝐷 = [
(𝑾𝑿?̂?)
′
[𝐼 − 𝑿(𝑿′𝑿)−𝟏𝑿′](𝑾𝑿?̂?)
?̂?2
] + 𝑡𝑟(𝑾′𝑾 + 𝑾𝑾) 
(3.30) 
 
Where the estimates for ?̂? and ?̂?2 are from OLS. The test statistic is asymptotically 
distributed as 𝜒2(1). For this test, the null hypythesis is 𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0, so the alternative is 
an OLS model. Failing to reject the null hypothesis indicates there is no significant 
spatial lag dependence, while rejecting the null hypothesis indicates the existence of a 
spatial lag.  
The selection of weight matrix is arbitrary and subjective due to the underlying 
economic/geographic reasons, therefore current practice is in need of a formal criterion to 
select the spatial weight (Wheeler and Páez 2010). There are currently three different 
approaches for exogenously estimating the specification of weights: cross-validation 
(Brunsdon et al. 1996; Farber and Páez 2007), corrected Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC, Fotheringham et al. 2002), and the specification LM test (Anselin 1988b) discussed 
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above. Cross-validation (CV) is an iterative process that searches for the weight that 
minimizes the prediction error using a subset of the data or prediction. Because CV 
depends on the predicted value, it is compromised when the model has a poor prediction 
power (such as my case). On the other hand, AIC does not base on prediction of the 
response variable. It is instead based on minimizing the estimation error of the response 
variable. Unlike a LM test, AIC does not test against a null hypothesis. Given a set of 
candidate models for the data, the preferred model is the one with the minimum AIC 
value. In the selection of weight matrix, I use both AIC and the specification LM test. 
Results are presented in the next section.   
3.4.4 Results 
I first present a set of specification tests in order to establish the validity of my 
spatial model. I considered a number of alternative models, including a non-spatial probit 
model, a spatial model using arc distance weight (Model 1), a spatial model with rook 
contiguity (Model 2), and a model using nearest-neighbor weights (Model 3).  
Comparing the LM Lag test value against the critical value suggests that the null 
is rejected with the specification of immediate neighbors and extended neighbors, but not 
in the specification of arc distance.  Intuitively, it tests the residuals from a non-spatial 
probit model against a series of spatial models that differ only in their weight 
specifications17. The null hypothesis is that there is no spatial auto-regression among 
households’ adoption decisions. Table 4 shows the results from comparing each 
specification against the non-spatial null model. A spatial model is indeed preferred in 
                                                        
17 Mathematical expressions of the tests can be found in Anselin and Rey (2010). 
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explaining the sample adoption data using nearest neighbors (LM=5.956>𝜒21) or rook 
neighbors (15.766>𝜒21) as proximity among households. However, distance doesn’t 
explain the adoption decision among households as the LM value is smaller than the 
critical value.  This finding also supports hypothesis 3 that there is likely significant 
spatial lag dependence among farmers’ adoption decisions. Intuitively, when the null 
hypothesis is rejected in favor of a spatial lag, the spatial lag parameter should be 
statistically significant. The value of the spatial lag parameter represents the nature of 
spatial influence of specific weight. In this case, spatial lag parameters for both rook 
contiguity and nearest neighbors are statically significant. Table 5 shows the estimates 
results of spatial models using arc-distance, contiguity, and nearest neighbor definitions. 
Spatial lag parameters are significant for contiguity (p value of 0.0001) and nearest 
neighbor (p value of 0.0016), but not for arc-distance (p value of 0.5389). The magnitude 
of dependency is represented by the value of 𝜌, with nearest neighbor having a lower 
dependency (0.0625) and rook contiguity having a lower dependency (0.5086).   
In term of goodness-of-fit, Model 2 posses the lowest AIC where as Model 1 has 
the highest.  AIC supports that models using nearest neighbors and rook contiguity as 
weights perform better than the model that uses arc distance. To compare the goodness-
of-fit of Model 2 and Model 3, I employ Log-likelihood Ratio (LR) to test the dominance 
among models. A LR test compares the performance of two models by taking the 
difference between the log-likelihood (LL) of two models and compares it to a chi-square 
distribution: 
𝐿𝑅 = −2(𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑁𝐿 − 𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑃𝐿)~𝜒
2 . 
 
  
 
82 
From Table 4 I conclude that Model 2 is the preferred model among the three models as 
the LR value between Model 1 and Model 2 is 6.392, which is greater than the critical 
value of 3.81, and the LR value (3.81) between Model 2 and Model 3 is also greater (or 
equal) than the critical value. Besides the LR test, I also employ the pseudo R2. Lesage 
(1998) derives an expression for the coefficient of determination (R) for a spatial model 
that is analogous to the R2 for OLS, but includes the spatial weight specification, so is 
referred to as a pseudo R2. The pseudo R2, like a traditional R2, measures the portion of 
variation in data explained by the spatial model relative to the amount of total variation, 
and provides a measure of goodness fit. The pseudo R2 indicates that rook contiguity 
model explains more of the variation (8.93%). Therefore I choose Model 2 as my 
preferred model for parameter interpretation.  
Table 3.3 Diagnostics for spatial dependence test against a classic Probit 
TEST Arc Distance 
(Model1) 
Rook Contiguity 
(Model 2) 
Nearest Neighbors 
(Model 3) 
LM Lag 0.377 15.766* 5.956* 
Log-likelihood -288.397 -282.005 -285.813 
AIC 602.782 590.011 597.627 
Pseudo R2 7.34% 8.93% 8.47% 
*significant at 0.05. 
Theories of social learning imply the sign of the relationship among adoption 
decisions is ambiguous (Bandiera and Rasul 2006). However, I find in that network is 
always positively related to learning, regardless of whether the network is formed out of 
immediate neighbors or extended members. This is because both spatial lag parameters 
are positive (shown in Table 5), indicating that farmers tend to copy their neighbors’ 
decisions (no matter what the decisions are). Therefore, having more adopters will 
encourage farmers to adopt while having more non-adopters will prevent farmers from 
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adopting. This finding explains the clusters that are presented in Figure 1, where adopters 
tend to reside in close proximity, separate of non-adopters. Moreover, my results show 
that such clusters are not caused by regional difference, as none of the province is found 
to be significant in explaining adoption. Combining the two findings, I conclude that 
local networks play an important role in new maize variety adoption in Mozambique. To 
promote new varieties, the government needs to make sure that they indeed perform 
better that the traditional varieties. Once farmers receive positive feedback from the new 
varieties, they will spread out the words among their networks and other farmers will 
follow. In the case of my data, having previous experience with the new variety is 
negatively related to adoption, as evident by the negative sign of adopted. That is, on 
average, farmers who planted the new variety in 2007 are less likely (4%) to plan it again 
in 2011. Many reasons can contribute to the negative relationship between previous 
examination in 2007 and adoption in 2011: lower regulated price, bad weather condition 
or natural disasters. My two-period data does not allow me to conclude on this notion.  
Table 3.4 Spatial models using different weights. 
Variable Arc-distance Contiguity (rook) Nearest Neighbor  
Constant 0.0211 
(0.1399) 
0.0211 
(0.6222) 
0.0910 
(0.0270) 
Education 0.0097* 
(0.0038) 
0.0075 
(0.0556) 
0.0009* 
(0.0038) 
Training 0.3551* 
(0.0778) 
0.3572* 
(0.0000) 
0.3562* 
(0.0773) 
Adopted -0.0498 
(0.0323) 
-0.0886* 
(0.0141) 
-0.0535* 
(0.0321) 
Extension 0.0682* 
(0.0299) 
0.0710* 
(0.0175) 
0.0699* 
(0.0298) 
Nampula -0.1142* 
(0.0417) 
-0.0470 
(0.2882) 
-0.1053* 
(0.0342) 
Tete 0.0001 
(0.0304) 
0.0074 
(0.8057) 
0.0010 
(0.0302) 
Zambezia -0.0314 -0.0102 -0.0305 
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(0.0307) (0.7503) (0.0303) 
Association 0.0162 
(0.0387) 
0.0084 
(0.8267) 
0.0168 
(0.0385) 
Credit 0.1102* 
(0.0561) 
0.1360* 
(0.0168) 
0.1140* 
(0.0558) 
Risk_flood 0.0383* 
(0.0436) 
0.0331 
(0.4456) 
0.0422* 
(0.0433) 
Sale 0.0432* 
(0.0236) 
0.0389 
(0.0971) 
0.0440* 
(0.0233) 
𝜌 0.5685 
(0.9709) 
0. 5086* 
(0.0163) 
0.0625* 
(0.0257) 
Lagrange 
Multiplier 
0.3774 15.7662* 5.9562* 
Prob. of LM 
(H0: 𝜌 = 0) 
0.5389 0.0001 0.0014 
Log-likelihood -288.397 -282.005 -285.813 
Pseudo R2 7.34% 8.93% 8.47% 
Note: an asterisk indicates significance at 0.05. 
Non-social learning also plays an import role in explaining variation in adoption 
rates, which provides support for hypothesis 2. Education, training and extension are all 
found to be significant and positively related to adoption. Extension is positively 
associated with the households’ adoption decision. More specifically, one year of 
education increases the adoption probability by 0.9%, having access to extension services 
increases the probability of adoption by 6%, and more importantly, having specific 
training about the new variety increases the probability of adoption by 20%. This also 
provides supports for hypothesis 1 that experienced farmers are more likely to adopt. 
That said, training about the new variety is significant, and positively related to adoption 
of new variety. Clearly, famers prefer direct, hands-on help with planting new varieties. 
Credit is found to be another factor that promotes adoption, meaning that government 
subsidies is crucial in convincing farmers to switch from a familiar variety to a new one. 
Moreover, I find the purpose of production to be important in predicting adoption. 
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Specifically, if a farmer produces for sale instead of own consumption, he is more likely 
to apply the improved variety. In Mozambique, small farms normally produce for own 
consumption where as medium and large farms produce for sale. The advantage of new 
maize variety is high yield, which provide an incentive for larger farms to adopt. On the 
other hand, larger farmers possess economy of scales, therefore are better at sharing the 
unexpected price fluctuation brought by the new variety.  
Addressing the information barrier is one of the focuses in this chapter. My results 
indicate that farmers communicate with immediate neighbors and use their adoption 
decisions as reference. They also extend their network to include more households for the 
benefit of information exchange. Distance, however, does not impose a constraint on 
learning. In fact, farmers go beyond their immediate neighbors as to seek information in 
order to maximize their benefits from information exchange.  
3.5 Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I investigate social learning among a group of farmers who are assumed to 
be passive price takers with forward –looking behaviors. In a theoretical model, I show 
that farmers have strategic incentives to delay the adoption of a new variety in order to 
wait for more information from other farmers. In reality, however, farmers’ network 
provides a positive learning effect. Having connections with other farmers provides 
positive information externalities, which encourages learning. However, because the new 
variety is different from the traditional variety that farmers are used to, training is crucial 
in convincing farmers to switch. In Mozambique, training (2.2%) and extension services 
(15%) are limited in availability, which have caused delay in adoption. Even worse, the 
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reason those who have adopted before choose to switch back to the old variety can be due 
to inadequate assistance on the new variety.   
I test some implications of my conceptual model using farm-level data from 
Mozambique. My model is explicitly spatial in that each farmer is a member of a social 
network, and is related to each other member in a social-spatial way. With this model, I 
find that non-social learning is important in adoption, especially training. Training is 
found to increase adoption by 20%. Also, educated farmers are more likely to adopt. 
Information, or the lack thereof, is critical in speeding the adoption of new varieties. 
Even though price information is broadcast through TV and radio, only about 2% of 
farmers have access to this information. Access to extension services and agricultural 
associations is also limited, which contributes to the information barrier.  
Throughout, I focus the discussion around social learning as the underlying 
mechanism connecting decisions within a network. I do this because lack of information 
is a key barrier to adoption in my setting and because previous work has shown farmers 
learn from each other about the parameters of a new variety. My primary finding is that 
local networks act as important agents for information exchange.  Farmers rely on their 
immediate neighbors for recommendations, and weigh the neighbors’ opinions heavily. 
Farmers also go beyond immediate neighbors to build their networks for the benefit of 
information. Furthermore, I find that geographic distance is not a barrier to farmers, as 
distance does not play an important role in adoption.  
My findings have a number of important policy implications. First of all, training 
has been found to be crucial in promoting the new variety. Compared to modern 
machinery and high-tech farming approaches in developed countries, direct, hands-on 
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demonstration is a more viable approach due to the limitation in education and social 
media in rural Mozambique. Moreover, government credit is another way to encourage 
Mozambique farmers to switch to improved variety. The intuition is that, credits lower 
the cost of inputs for planting the new variety, and, therefore, lower the risk. Finally, 
although a majority of farmers produce for own consumption, those who produce for sale 
are more likely to adopt because of the high yield advantage of the new variety. In this 
regard, government should aid in the supply-demand of maize market and help absorb the 
end products from farmers.  
While my analysis is tailored to the specific context of rural Mozambique, the 
findings have broader applicability. First, similar patterns of initial adoption decisions 
within and across social networks may occur in other economic environments in which a 
new technology is introduced, information is a key barrier to adoption, and individuals 
can be expected to learn about the new technology from others. In particular, the spatial 
nature of relationships between adopters should always be taken into account in contexts 
where social learning plays a key role. 
 This study is not without limitations. I focus only on maize adoption in order to 
keep the empirical exercise tractable in scope.  Maize is a staple crop in Mozambique, but 
there are other cash crops such as cotton and cassava in which the adoption decision may 
be as or more important. Second, network costs are only implicit in my empirical model. 
A fully structural empirical model would endogenize the cost of forming and maintaining 
the network. In the context of a spatial probit model, however, endogenizing costs in this 
way is similarly intractable. Finally, my spatial model is based on the assumption that 
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local networks are constituted by nearest neighbors. Other network structures are 
possible, and should be considered in future work.  
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CHAPTER 4. ESSAY3: MODELING PRODUCT CHOICES IN A PEER NETWORK 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Consumers make decisions in a world of uncertainty with imperfect information 
and only partially formed preferences for attributes they know little about.  They search 
for information as a means of reducing uncertainty and improving the likelihood that they 
will be satisfied with their purchases. Information is provided by advertising, physical 
media, online media, and, perhaps most importantly, from peers. Research in a range of 
fields has shown that peers are critical in shaping preferences and choices (Manski 2000; 
Sacerdote 2001; Zimmerman 2003; De Giorgi, Pellizzari, and Redadelli 2010; Kuhn et. 
al. 2010; Richards, Hamilton and Allender 2014). Indeed, peers have been shown to be 
important in the apparent clustering of obesity (Christakis and Fowler 2007; Cohen-Cole 
and Fletcher 2008; Trogdon, Nonnemaker, and Pais 2008), the popularity of otherwise-
unheralded movies (Reinstein and Snyder 2005; Moretti 2011), retirement plan 
participation (Duflo and Saez 2002, 2003), health-plan choice (Sorensen 2006), investing 
in the stock market (Hong, Kubik and Stein 2004), performance in college (Sacerdote 
2001; Zimmerman 2003), behavior in school (Evans, Oates and Schwab 1992; Soetevent 
and Kooreman 2006), or new product purchases (Mayzlin 2006; Godes and Mayzlin  
2004, 2009). In each case, the exact mechanism through which peers exert influence on 
others differs. In this chapter, I compare two mechanisms through which peer networks 
may operate, namely the strength of social ties and perceived peer expertise to draw 
implications regarding how consumers’ preferences are revised through peer 
recommendations.  
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My aim is to identify true peer (endogenous) effects that cause individuals to have 
similar preferences. Importantly, I disentangle endogenous effects from contextual and 
correlated effects (Manski 1993) that are often overlooked in studies of social influence. I 
do so by conducting a randomized two-stage experiment to elicit subjects’ willingness to 
pay (WTP) for activity trackers. I analyze preference changes between the first and 
second stages using a spatial econometric approach that helps identify the peer effects I 
seek. By controlling for correlated and contextual effects, my experimental approach is 
able to cleanly identify significant endogenous effects.  
Clear identification is necessary in order to isolate the precise mechanism through which 
peer effects operate. In my experiment, I collect data on source expertise, i.e., how 
subjects evaluate the apparent expertise of others, and tie strength, i.e., how well each 
subject knows the others. Afterwards, I estimate the importance of each in shaping 
endogenous peer effects. 
 I find that perceived source expertise is important in influencing preferences 
while the closeness of social relationships is not. These results are consistent with the 
findings of Freeman (1957) and Pornpitakpan (2004) in that sources having more 
credibility dimensions are more influential than those having less credibility on 
readership scores18. Moreover, in contrast to the findings of Richards, Hamilton and 
Allender (2014), people who are close in social space are not likely to have a significant 
influence on each other. This suggests that subjects who are perceived as credible are not 
                                                        
18 A source high in expertise, as compared to one low in expertise, appears to lead to positive attitudes 
toward the endorser and the advertisement (Braunsberger, 1996). Degree of perceived credibility of the 
source influenced recipients’ intention to use suggestions made by the source as to how to improve 
performance (Bannister, 1986) and the acceptance or rejection of the suggestions from the source (Suzuki, 
1978). 
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necessarily close friends, confirming that weak ties can be more important in transferring 
information than strong ties (Granovetter 1973, Levin and Cross 2004).  
I contribute to the literature on social learning and new product introduction in a 
number of ways. First, I contribute to the theoretical marketing literature in that I find 
social learning via source expertise to be a more effective form of peer recommendation 
than tie strength. Granovetter (1973) theorized that weak ties are more likely than strong 
ties to be bridges to socially distant regions of a network and, therefore, new information. 
I provide further insight into the way in which communication networks emerge. More 
specifically, the decision to seek information from a specific other is informed by 
characteristics of the relationship between the seeker and her peers based on the 
perceived credibility. Second, my findings are likely to be of interest to marketing 
practitioners because new-product introduction is a fundamental marketing task. Word-
of-mouth and viral reputations are among the most effective (Ferguson 2008, Bruyn and 
Lilien 2008). My findings suggest that face-to-face peer influences, where peers are 
regarded as experts, are significant in revising others’ preferences.  Successful practices 
such as Yelp and TripAdvisor are examples that utilize source expertise to promote 
certain restaurants and places of interests. I also contribute to the methodological 
literature on estimating social learning effects as I introduce a new method of estimating 
peer effects using spatial econometrics. While some authors have used the concept of 
space to help identify peer effects (Yang and Allenby 2003; Richards, Hamilton, and 
Allender 2014) I extend the definition of spatial relationships to consider tie strength and 
source expertise to measure peer influences. In this regard, I highlight an essential point 
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of the social learning literature, namely that how relationships are defined is essential to 
understanding the nature and power of social influence within a network.    
In the next section, I frame my contribution in terms of the existing literature on 
social networking and econometric methods of identifying peer effects. Building on 
previous studies, I then describe the experiment, and provide some summary evidence of 
the power of peers to shape behavior. In the following section I present my econometric 
model, and show how it is able to identify peer effects separately from contextual and 
correlated effects. The fourth section presents the empirical results, and discusses some of 
the implications for marketing practice. A final section concludes and offers some 
suggestions for further research in this area.  
4.2 Background  
The context for my investigation concerns the effect of peer influences on 
marketing an innovative new technology product, activity trackers in my case.  Peer 
effects in a marketing environment are commonly referred to as word-of-mouth (WOM), 
and operate through mechanisms that include source expertise (Bansal and Voyer, 
2000 and Gilly et al., 1998), tie strength (Granovetter 1973, Brown and Reingen, 
1987 and Frenzen and Nakamoto, 1993), demographic similarity (Brown and Reingen, 
1987), and perceptual affinity (Gilly et al., 1998). I focus on the first two of these 
mechanisms: source expertise and tie strength. 
Source expertise refers to the credibility or believability of a particular source of 
information. For example, recommendations provided by professionals and authorities 
are often perceived as more reliable. Tie strength refers to the closeness of the 
relationship between the individuals exchanging WOM. Logically, consumers are more 
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likely to follow recommendations from people who they know and trust. However, 
Granovetter (1973) finds that weak ties between groups provide the greatest increment in 
information. Intuitively, weak ties can have a stronger effect because individuals tend to 
have weak ties with people from backgrounds that differ from their own and are, 
therefore, more likely to provide new information. On the other hand, people with strong 
ties are likely to share a similar background, so are less likely to introduce new 
information.  
Empirically and conceptually, the mechanisms through which WOM operates are 
difficult to disentangle because of the “reflection problem” (Manski, 1993). The 
reflection problem “…is similar to an inferential problem that occurs when one observes 
the almost simultaneous movements of a person and of his image in a mirror” (Manski 
2005, p. 2). When observing only an individual’s movements, you cannot tell whether the 
mirror image is causing the person’s movements, if the mirror is reflecting the person’s 
movements, or if they are happening together. By the same token, when observing similar 
behaviors in a group, the analyst cannot always tell whether phenomena are caused by 
individual heterogeneity in preference, true peer effect, demographic similarities 
(contextual effect), or other effects.  
Peer effects arise when "an agent's preference ordering over the alternatives in a 
choice set depends on the actions chosen by other agents" (Manski 2000).  However, 
individuals tend to behave similarly to those around them for three reasons: Either 
because the individuals come from similar backgrounds (contextual effects, or 
demographic similarities), experience the same unobserved environmental influences 
(correlated effects), or are truly influenced by peer behaviors (endogenous effects) 
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(Manski 1993). Endogenous, contextual, and correlated effects represent fundamentally 
different behavioral pathways, each with different implications for changing behavior 
(Manski, 1993; Brock and Durlauf, 2001; Mofitt, 2001; Soetevent, 2006).  Consider a 
student’s college GPA as an example. There are endogenous effects if, all else being 
equal, an individual’s GPA tends to vary with the GPA of the students he or she 
associates with. Endogenous effects arise either through learning, modeling others 
behaviors, mimicry, or some way in which an individual’s behavior changes as a direct 
result of observing others. On the other hand, contextual effects arise if the student’s 
GPA tends to vary with the socioeconomic background of the reference group. For 
example, if all lower-income students in a district have lower GPAs than higher-income 
students, then the effect measured by group-association is likely due to contextual effects. 
Third, correlation effects arise if students in the same school tend to achieve similar 
GPAs because they use the same after-class tutoring system. Although the students may 
be from different socioeconomic classes, and observe different peer behaviors, if they all 
benefit from the same exogenous influence, then this is a correlated effect. Distinguishing 
between these three types of effects is important because only endogenous effects allow 
for one individual to influence the outcomes of others in a network.  Indeed, the term 
“peer effects” only properly refers to the presence of endogenous effects. 
 Attempts to separate peer effects from contextual effects and correlated effects 
usually involve experiments involving random assignment to different social groups 
(Duflo and Saez 2002, 2003; Kuhn et al 2010, 2011), econometric modeling (Yang and 
Allenby 2003; Lee 2007b; Lin 2010), or a combination of the two (Narayan, Rao and 
Saunders 2011; Richards, Hamilton and Allender 2014).  For example, Duflo and Saez 
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(2003) study the impact of peer influence on the choice of retirement plans. In their field 
experiment, staff members at a large university were randomly assigned to work in 
different departments. Because participation rates in different retirement plans tended to 
cluster by department, their hypothesis was that discussion among staff members was 
primarily responsible for the observed clustering effect. The random assignment of staff 
members allowed the authors to identify peer effects, given that the participation rates of 
those in treated groups were twice as high as the participation rates of subjects in non-
treated groups. In a similar randomization exercise, Kuhn et al (2011) randomized only 
the treatment group in a Dutch income-shock experiment and were also able to 
effectively identify peer effects. Randomization avoids the reflection problem by 
ensuring that common unobserved factors that could have caused similar behavioral 
outcomes were indeed random, meaning that the observed changes in behavior could 
only be due to the treatment effect. Randomized field experiments are one way to ensure 
peer effects are identified, but what appears to be random may instead be caused by an 
unobserved, endogenous factor.  
Lab experiments provide researchers with more control over attributes of the 
sample and the environment in which decisions are made. For example, in a context 
similar to the one that frames our analysis, Narayan, Rao and Saunders (2011) use a two-
stage conjoint choice experiment in which they measure subjects’ willingness to pay for 
electronic book reader attributes. They collected subjects’ initial preferences in the first 
stage, then asked subjects to identify their influencers. In the second stage, which took 
place two weeks later, subjects were shown the choices of their self-reported influencers 
and asked to choose from the same choice sets again bearing in mind the choices of 
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influencers. They found that peer influence caused subjects to significantly revise their 
valuation of several attributes, and that this influence grew with the number of peers. One 
limitation to their experiment is that the waiting period between first and second stage 
was weeks, during which subjects’ preferences could have changed for other reasons than 
the peer effect, or they could have forgotten why their preferences were initially formed 
as they were. Such lab experiments are advantageous because they allow researchers to 
select a sample that ensures that peer effects are identified.  However, there is a limit to 
the ability of randomized experiments to eliminate confounding factors that appear as 
peer effects. Often, a common environment (that causes contextual effect) or unobserved 
factors – factors that can be subjective – can confound identification.   
In order to address the problem of unobserved confounding factors, appropriate 
econometric models can help identify peer effects within experimental environments in 
which random assignment may be questionable.  In general, econometric models of social 
interaction are of two classes:  Bayesian updating (Yang and Allenby 2003; Narayan, Rao 
and Saunders 2011) and spatial techniques (Anselin 2002; Lee 2004; Lee 2007; Lin 
2010). Bayesian updating assumes that agents observe signals from others before making 
their decisions. In other words, even when an individual has a prior, personal preference, 
she is very likely to update her preference based on the observations of her peers. 
Therefore, a Bayesian mechanism is an intuitive way to study how referent individuals in 
the social network assume leadership in promoting new products and measuring how 
followers copy their choices.  In reality, however, assuming there is an order of influence 
can be problematic because peer influences often happen simultaneously and are 
reversible among members without one or even a few influential people leading the trend. 
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In this chapter, therefore, I apply a spatial model that allows for simultaneous influence 
among members of a social network.  The influence is simultaneous in the sense that 
peers impact each other’s choices.  
Spatial models are more appropriate for simultaneous interactions (Richards, 
Hamilton, and Allender 2014) because they embody the type of feedback effects that are 
typical of social systems. Spatial regression models are designed to accommodate 
interdependence between spatial units (individuals, in our case) with cross-sectional data. 
Interdependence arises when the value of the dependent variable corresponding to each 
cross-sectional unit is assumed, in part, to depend on a weighted average of that 
dependent variable corresponding to neighboring cross-sectional units (Kelejian 1998). 
This weighted average is a spatial lag of the dependent variable, analogous to a temporal 
lag in a more usual time series model. When the root of this spatial lag is allowed to be an 
unobserved, estimated parameter, the result is a spatially autoregressive (SAR) 
specification. Because of the spatial lag term, simultaneous interactions are easily 
incorporated into the model, making it appropriate to study peer effects.  
Spatial models are able to provide important insights with a minimum of 
parameterization. Slade (2004) provides an intuitive explanation of what the spatial lag 
effects are in this type of model.  A spatial lag model is a formal representation of the 
equilibrium outcome of process of social space. The inclusion of the spatial lag is similar 
to an autoregressive term in a time series context in that, similar to the way in which a 
time lag is a weighted average of previous time periods, a spatial lag is a weighted 
average of neighbor characteristics. Unlike time dependence, spatial dependence is 
multidirectional, indicating feedback effect and simultaneity (Slade 2005, Anselin 2009). 
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When a person is spatially dependent on her peers then her decision is determined by her 
own characteristics and the decisions of her peers. The magnitude of such spatial 
dependence can be measured by the spatial lag parameter, which is bound between zero 
and one (in absolute value). A spatial parameter of one means that she is completely 
dependent on her peers while a spatial parameter of zero means she is completely 
independent of her peers. A positive spatial lag parameter indicates a person is positively 
influenced by her peers’ decisions. By the same token, a negative spatial lag parameter 
means that a person tends to choose in ways that are opposite of her peers.  
The classic SAR model departs from Manski (1993) by measuring peer variables 
as the weighted averages of observed peer outcomes and characteristics instead of group 
expectations.  Group expectations create linearity in Manski’s (1993) model, which 
further exacerbate the “reflection problem.”  Including weighted averages as explanatory 
variables is important because weighted averages introduce non-linearity, and non-
linearity facilitates identification of endogenous and contextual effects (Bramoulle et al. 
2009). Lee (2007b) demonstrates that both endogenous and contextual effects are 
identifiable in this model, but only when group sizes are not constant. Non-constant 
group sizes are necessary in this model, because it assumes each member of the group is 
the same “distance,” in a social sense, from each other member. In this way, Lee’s 
(2007b) model assumes that each group member is equally influenced by her peers, 
which is not realistic in practice. On the other hand, Lin (2010) addresses this somewhat 
unrealistic assumption by considering an arbitrary network structure based on observed 
relationships -- networks that are asymmetric through non-reciprocal peer nominations. 
For example, people who you consider as close friends may not necessarily have the 
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same rating of relationship for you, which creates an asymmetrical and non-reciprocal 
social weight matrix.  Heterogeneity in such arbitrary networks provides sufficient 
variation to identify peer effects separate from contextual effects (Bramoulle et al. 2009).  
Lin’s (2010) model, however, confines interactions only within the group and ignores the 
out-of-group interaction.   
In this chapter, I use individual-specific willingness to pay values calculated from 
data gathered in a choice experiment to estimate true peer effects. I use a spatial 
autoregressive (SAR) model similar to Lee et al. (2010) and Lin (2014), which includes 
endogenous effects, contextual effects, and group fixed effects, as well as a spatial 
autoregressive error process. Because subjects in my experiment are randomly assigned, 
and interpersonal relationships vary among individual subjects, peer effects are well 
identified in my model. The group fixed effects term, along with the spatial 
autoregressive disturbances, captures possible correlated effects caused by confounding 
factors. Furthermore, I investigate possible heterogeneity among peers, which is an 
important issue related to the specification of the spatial weights matrix that summarizes 
the network structure. To account for possible heterogeneity among peers, I consider 
different specifications of the weighting matrix, namely tie strength and source expertise.  
4.3 Conceptual Model of Endogenous Peer Effects 
 
The importance of peer effects has been examined empirically in the context of 
educational behavior (Sacerdote, 2000; Kremer and Levy, 2003; Hanushek et al., 2003), 
crime (Sah, 1991; Glaeser et al., 1996), teenage pregnancy (Evans et al., 1992; Crane, 
1991; Anderson, 1991), and purchase behaviors (Narayan, Rao and Sanders 2011; 
Bollinger and Gillingham 2012; Richards, Hamilton and Allender 2014). Marketers often 
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attempt to account for peer recommendations when determining the targeting and 
intensity of marketing activities (Bollinger and Gillingham 2012). The idea is that the 
utility an individual receives from pursuing a given activity depends on the 
recommendations of the other individuals in the person's reference or peer group 
(Manski, 1993; Becker 1996; Brock and Durlauf 2001; Glaeser and Scheinkman 2001).  
Individuals are indeed strongly motivated to reduce the amount of effort they 
exert during the decision-making process in information intensive environments. 
Therefore their behavior may be directly influenced by effort-saving, easily available 
cues such as peer recommendations (Smith, Menon, and Sivakumar 2005). Prior research 
suggests that consumer choices arise from various information cues at the time of 
decision making, such as information via Web site background (Mandel and Johnson 
2002) or attributes that just happened to be included in the recommendation of an 
electronic agent (Häubl and Murray 2003). Significant preference revision in the 
treatment groups will imply that subjects indeed look for easy cues during peer 
recommendation to revise their preferences. Therefore, I propose that positive 
recommendations by members of a social network is likely to influence another 
members’ behavior in the same direction.  
H1: Peer recommendations will lead to preference revision for the recommended option if 
individuals regard the attribute in question to be salient to the choice decision.  
The decision to seek information from someone when facing a new problem or 
opportunity is likely affected by the closeness between the seeker and her peers. Research 
on homophily indicates that people are more likely to have social ties (especially strong 
ones) with those similar to themselves (Marsden 1990, Zenger and Lawrence 1989, Brass 
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1995). Social network researchers have examined the role of weak versus strong ties in 
the acquisition of novel information. Granovetter (1973) argues that weak ties are more 
likely than strong ties to be bridges to socially distant regions of a network. Subsequent 
research on the importance of weak ties has demonstrated that they can be instrumental to 
finding a job (Granovetter 1973; Lin 1982, 1988), individual advancement (Burt 1992, 
1997, 2000), and diffusion of ideas (Granovetter 1982, Rogers 1995). More recently, 
however, attention has shifted to the role of strong ties (Krackhardt 1992). Hansen 
(1999), for example, has demonstrated the importance of strong ties in transferring tacit, 
complex knowledge across departmental boundaries in an organization.  
Tie strength should have a substantial effect regarding the influence of WOM 
communications (Brown, Broderick, and Lee 2007; De Bruyn and Lilien 2008). Strong 
ties are more likely to transfer useful knowledge (Levin and Cross 2004) and thus have 
more influence on others than do weak ties (De Bruyn and Lilien 2008; Smith, Menon, 
and Sivakumar 2005). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that a strong tie between an 
individual and his or her peers is more likely to lead to preference revision than is a weak 
tie. I follow previous literature (Freeman 1987, Jackson 2008, Richards, Hamilton and 
Allender 2014) by defining tie strength in terms of the social distance (relationship) 
between two subjects. The relationship may be very close, for example, between 
relatives, or very casual, such as with acquaintances or strangers. The second hypothesis 
that follows from this theory is that:  
H2: Preference revisions will be greater for strong ties relative to weak ties.  
It is also important that the information seeker is influenced by her perception of 
another person’s credibility when making a decision about novel products. Knowledge of 
 
  
 
102 
another person’s expertise is a standard variable in the transactive memory literature, 
which identifies knowing where information is stored as a basic requirement of 
performance in distributed knowledge systems (Borgatti and Cross 2006). A consumer’s 
subjective feeling of being influenced by the recommender may depend on how she feels 
about the recommender, or the perceived source credibility (Smith, Menon, Sivakumar 
2005). Highly credible sources usually lead to more behavioral compliance than low-
credibility sources (Pornpitakpan 2004). The dimensions of source credibility consist of 
expertise, which refers to the extent to which a speaker is perceived to be capable of 
making correct assertions (Hovland, Janis, and Kelley, 1953). Besides expertise, 
trustworthiness, defined as the degree to which an audience perceives the assertions made 
by a communicator to be true, is another important antecedent of behavior that 
demonstrate credibility (McKnight, Choudhury, and Kacmar, 2002).  
I investigate how perceived credibility in the recommender impacts consumer 
preferences of activity trackers. Generally, those receiving information from opinion 
leaders associate the correctness of the information with their perceptions of the opinion 
leader’s expertise in that particular domain (Feick and Higie, 1992). Therefore, I expect 
that perceived credibility, will positively influence a subject’s preference revision, so 
that:  
H3: Perceived credibility is positively related to revisions in attribute preferences. 
To test these hypotheses, I collect social network data from individuals in 
treatment groups and in control groups. I use a two-stage randomized experiment to 
introduce peer recommendations in the treatment groups but not the control groups. 
Through variation in the nature of the ties among subjects, the level of credibility 
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perceived to be associated with each subject, and the levels of expertise and credibility in 
the recommender, I am able to analyze how social relationships influence preferences for 
product attributes.  
4.4. Experimental Procedure 
 
I conduct a social choice-based conjoint (CBC) experiment in order to examine 
the effect of peers on activity-tracker attribute valuation. A CBC experiment is ideally 
suited for my purposes because it permits an examination of tradeoffs among products 
that contain multiple attributes. Activity trackers not only contain multiple attributes, but 
are inherently complex, new to the market, and relatively little is known about them.   
I use a CBC approach for a number of reasons. First, choices are a more realistic 
representation of true preferences compared to the ratings data gathered through other 
experimental methods (Rao 2007). In reality, consumers choose among different 
combinations of attributes and levels within each attribute, while they will only rarely 
rank their preferences when making a purchase decision. Furthermore, models estimated 
with choice data allow researchers to predict choice shares, which are of more interest to 
marketers. More importantly, choice models estimated in random utility form allow the 
derivation of willingness to pay (WTP) for product attributes.  
The CBC experiment involves two-stages: The first stage is used to establish 
baseline attribute preferences for each subject, and the second measures the revision in 
these preferences based on exposure to input from others in a lab setting. A two-stage 
design is necessary, because eliciting peer effects requires an experimental mechanism 
wherein preferences expressed by a subject are allowed to be influenced by exposure to 
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the choices made by others. I follow Narayan, Rao, and Saunders (2011) and Richards, 
Hamilton, and Allender (2014) in adopting this two-stage framework.   
In the first stage, I elicit preferences for each attribute. Namely, I ask subjects to 
imagine they are in a store planning to buy an activity tracker. Each subject is presented 
with 12 choice sets, each with 4 alternatives, and an additional “no buy” option. Subjects 
are then asked to choose the preferred alternative or to choose “none of these.” After the 
first stage, I allow subjects in the treatment groups to express their preferences to others 
in the group, while subjects in the control groups are not allowed to communicate. After 
the exchange of information, subjects are asked to make the same choices again (stage 
two).   
In general, a two-stage design addresses some of the most important challenges 
presented in the elicitation of peer effects. First, I choose subjects based on their major, 
which is assumed to be unrelated to their preferences for activity trackers. In this way, I 
control for the endogeneity of group formation. Second, I collect information on subjects’ 
social background and social proximity in order to control for unobserved correlation 
effects. Background information helps to filter out the contextual effect, addressing some 
of the unobserved factors. Third, measuring respondents’ preferences in both stages 
provides an opportunity to clearly identify endogenous peer effects, independent from 
any other influence that may have caused the observed preference revisions between the 
two stages.   
Finally, I address the problem of simultaneity by estimating the extent of 
preference revision using a spatial-econometric model of choice utility. At the core of any 
spatial econometric model is a spatial weight matrix that captures the degree of 
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relationship among the units of observation. In my case, the spatial weight matrix is a 
social-weight matrix as it measures the nature of the social relationship among sample 
members. This social weight matrix accounts for the social proximity of all network 
members. This approach also accounts for the simultaneity of sample members’ 
decisions. Simultaneity arises in models of social influence because each subject 
influences, and is influenced by, all other subjects. Simultaneity is fundamentally an 
econometric problem as the choices made by others is both an explanatory variable, and 
an endogenous one (Anselin 2009). A spatial econometric approach is able to address this 
problem as it measures the degree of association between subjects, but excludes self-
influence. My data captures the type of purely spatial influences that are easily identified 
using the spatial econometric approach developed in the next section.  
In order to identify peer effects, the product in question must have attributes that 
sharply differentiate variants, its attributes must be relatively complex, and it should be 
somewhat new to the market so it is not well understood. In my experiment, subjects 
choose among activity trackers.  Activity trackers represent an ideal product for studying 
the influence of others on consumer choices because they are indeed relatively new, 
innovative, and not well understood. Moreover, they are highly differentiated, and this 
differentiation rests on a small set of important attributes. Activity trackers combine 
modern technology with consumers’ health awareness, so they are at the nexus of two 
trends – technology and healthy lifestyle – that should assure subjects’ inherent interest in 
the products themselves. Trackers work on their own, or with handheld devices to 
provide biometric feedback, such as calories burned, steps, and miles walked or run. In 
addition, they show the users’ daily activity goals so they can monitor how much activity 
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is required in order to reach their goals.  In this regard, activity trackers help users to 
become more aware of their health status.   
Based on prior research, the salient attributes of activity trackers are price, style, 
brand, and function (Oh 2014).  I chose four major brands of activity trackers on the basis 
of popularity: Nike, Fitbit, Jawbone, and Garmin. According to a report released in 2013, 
Nike, Fitbit and Jawbone accounted for 97% of all activity tracker sales 
(Mobilehealthnews.com). A Google shopping search revealed that reasonable price 
points include $49.99, $99.99, $129.99, and $199.99. Priced at $49.99, the Jawbone Up 
Clip on tracker attracts price-sensitive consumers. This type of tracker provides the basic 
function of tracking calories, but is limited by its design because the clip-on is not 
particularly well suited to intense exercise such as running. With slim wristband designs, 
Fitbit, Jawbone, Nike and Garmin all have trackers that are priced at $99.99 and $129.99. 
Newer versions are introduced every year, so older trackers are priced below the new 
models. Also, trackers that add emerging functions, such as sleep pattern tracking, are 
usually priced slightly higher. Trackers that are priced at $199.99 and above are often 
equipped with superior functions. For example, Fitbit Surge, priced from $200 to $249 on 
Google shopping, is built for multiple sports with a watch-type full OLED screen that 
will display calls, texts and notifications. Garmin Vivoactive, priced at $249.99, has GPS 
to accurately track running, cycling and swimming with live pace and distances.  
Trackers also vary in style, from watch-type, to wristband, and clip-on. Functions vary as 
the market has not yet settled on the core purpose of activity trackers.   
I include both basic and innovative functions, such as the ability to record 
calories, the ability to record sleep, track running routes via GPS, and the ability to 
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receive texts and emails. With these attributes included, my experiment spans both, the 
set of attributes that are relatively common and well-understood to those that are newer 
and likely to be not known widely. Each of these attributes, and levels, are shown in 
Table 4.1.   
Table 4.1 Attributes and levels.  
Attributes Levels 
Brand Fitbit 
Jawbone 
Nike 
Garmin 
Design 
 
 
Clip-on  
Wristband 
Watch 
Function Recording basic calories 
Recording calories and sleep patterns 
Recording calories and text/email messages 
Recording calories and GPS locations 
Price $49.99 
$99.99 
$129.99 
$199.99 
 
Clearly, the number of attributes and the levels of each imply more attribute 
combinations than can be described in a comprehensive way. In fact, a series of attribute 
profiles using a full factorial design that includes all combinations of the attribute levels 
consists of 196 (4*4*4*3) profiles to be evaluated by each respondent. A full factorial 
design is able to estimate both the main effects and interaction terms in the utility 
function, but 196 combinations is too many to present to the participants. Therefore, I use 
a fractional factorial design in which subjects were presented a subset of 48 
combinations. My design is fully orthogonal in that it allows for the estimation of all 
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main effects included in the study. The design is blocked in four blocks, so that each 
individual receives a balanced subset of profiles, namely 12 choice sets. I used SAS 
OPTEX to generate an orthogonal factional factorial design of 48 with a D-efficiency 
score of 80.64%. An example of one of the cards is presented in Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2 Example Choice Set 
 A B C D E 
Brand Garmin Jawbone Nike Fitbit None of 
These  Design Clip-on Watch Wristband Clip-on 
Function Cal+Sleep Cal+GPS Cal+Msg Cal+Msg 
Price $99.99 $199.99 $129.99 $49.99 
Choice      
 
One month before the experiment, a survey was sent out using Qualtrics to all 
students in the W.P. Carey School of Business and Ira A. Fulton School of Engineering at 
Arizona State University. The survey included a brief introduction to the experiment, 
detailed instructions, and an estimate of the time that would be required to complete the 
experiment. With the Qualtrics19 online sign up system, I collected basic information 
from respondents who were willing to participate.  
Respondents were required to be over the age of 18, ASU students, and able to 
communicate in English. The online sign-up procedure generated 80 eligible respondents. 
In order to keep the groups of a manageable size, I selected 20 people for each group. 
Before assigning groups, I asked each subject if they would be coming with someone 
they knew, and assigned people who knew each other to the same group. The group 
assignments resulted in four groups in total. I randomly selected two groups to be 
                                                        
19 See appendix C2 for the Qualtrics recruiting scripts.  
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treatment groups and the other two served as control groups. Among the 80 responses I 
received, I then randomly selected 40 to be assigned to two control groups and another 40 
to two treatment groups. 
Randomization is introduced in the selection process in order to identify pure peer 
effects, or endogenous effects in Manski’s (1993) terminology. Random assignment 
ensures that the difference in responses between the treatment and the control groups is 
due to the treatment alone, and not some pre-existing conditions that could have caused 
behaviors among group members to be similar (Duflo, Glennerster and Kremer 2007). 
For example, if I included mostly physical education majors in the treatment groups, and 
non-physical education majors in the control groups, and find significantly higher 
willingness to pay for activity trackers for the treatment groups, then this result could be 
attributed to the fact that physical education majors have more health awareness, and not 
due to pure peer effects.  Subjects in the experiment are randomly assigned because 
students in the same faculty and year are likely to know each other, but the fact that they 
are classmates is unrelated to their preference for the particular item under study. Like 
Duflo and Saez (2002, 2003), sample is chosen based on their departments and major 
choices are not made regarding consumer products. In this sense, social relationships 
among students in a particular major represent a random assignment with respect to 
consumer-product attributes.   
In the treatment groups, subjects were exposed to the attribute preferences of 
others between stages 1 and 2 of the experiment, whereas subjects in the control groups 
received no input before their stage two choices.  Hence, the treatment effect measures 
the extent of peer influence, relative to the control in which no peer influence is allowed. 
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In each treatment group, I asked the subjects to talk about their choices, and why they 
made them. In addition, I asked the subjects to discuss the factors that influenced their 
choice of attribute packages. For example: what is the first thing you look at when you 
buy a tracker, the style or a specific function? The discussion regarding attributes was 
purposefully robust, with more experienced subjects often sharing firmly-held beliefs 
regarding the superiority of trackers they preferred.  
Following the discussion, subjects were asked in stage two to again make their 
preferred choices between alternatives from the same choice sets as in stage one. Subjects 
in the control groups were not allowed to discuss their choices, but were instead asked to 
read an article on an unrelated topic. Diverting their attention from the task at hand was 
intended to take subjects’ mind off the choices from stage one. After reading the article 
subjects also made their stage two choices. Both the peer discussions for the treatment 
groups and the reading for the control groups took 10 minutes. The entire experiment 
took approximately 35-40 minutes. After the choice experiment in stage two, I collected 
socio-economic and demographic data that is used to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity in the econometric choice model described below.   
In any social experiment, characterizing relationships among the subjects forms a 
critical component of the analysis. These relationships form elements of the social 
relationship matrix. In a spatial model, these measures form the social “weights” that are 
used to filter out contextual effects, and to identify peer effects. I gathered data measuring 
closeness and source-credibility. Variation in “closeness” identifies tie strength because 
people who are closer to each other are characterized by stronger ties. More specifically, I 
measure closeness by asking subjects to report how well they know each of the other 
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subjects. I follow the relationship measure of Richards, Hamilton and Allender (2014) 
where tie strength is defined as how well the subjects know each other, rated on a 5-point 
scale ranging from “Do not Know” (tie strength = 1) to “Know Very Well” (tie strength = 
5)20. By choosing subjects that have the same major, the experiment is likely to include a 
range of relationships, from emergent “best friends” to only casual relationships. 
Variation in “perceived credibility” identifies source credibility (perceived expertise and 
trust) because people who are perceived as credible information carriers serve as opinion 
leaders, whose opinions are thought as more important. I measure source credibility by 
asking subjects to report how reliable they think each of the other subjects is. Reliability 
is measured on a 5-point scale from “Not Reliable” (reliability =1), “Somewhat reliable” 
(reliability =2), “indifferent” (reliability =3), “Somewhat reliable” (reliability =4), and 
“Very reliable” (reliability=5) (Bannister 1986, Borgatti and Cross 2006). This provides 
me with an assessment of source credibility from “most credible” to “not credible”. 
Among the 80 invitations sent out, 63 subjects completed the experiment in a 
useable way, leading to a turnout rate of 78.75%. Each subject provided 120 
observations, resulting in a total of 7,560 observations.  I follow Hensher, Rose and 
Greene (2005) in determining whether N=63 is an acceptable sample size. The minimum 
threshold for an acceptable sample size is defined as n, which is determined by the 
desired level of accuracy of the estimated probabilities ?̂?. Mathematically, the sample 
size is calculated as:  
𝑛 =
1 − 𝑝
𝑝𝑎2
[Φ−1(1 −
𝛼
2
)]2, 
                                                        
20 A copy of the survey can be found in the appendix.  
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where 𝑝 is the choice proportion of the relevant population, 𝑎 is the level of allowable 
deviation as a percentage between ?̂? and 𝑝, the parameter 𝛼 is the type I error where as an 
𝛼 value of 0.05 indicates that parameter estimates are statistically significant at 95%, and 
Φ−1(1 −
𝛼
2
) is the inverse cumulative distribution of a standard normal distribution  at 
(1 −
𝛼
2
). In my experiment, I have 4 tracker options. Assuming they are equally likely to 
be chosen, the choice proportion 𝑝 = 1/4 = 0.25. The choice of accuracy is somewhat 
subjective under the rule that the more accurate the estimates are the larger sample is 
required. If the desired level of accuracy is 30% from the mean (𝑎 = 0.3), then the 
required sample size is: 
𝑛 =
(1 − 0.25)
0.25 ∗ 0.32
[Φ−1 (1 −
0.05
2
)]
2
= 65, 
or approximately the sample I recruited.  This is a reasonable sample size in social-
networking experiments as samples are necessarily small due to the computational 
difficulty in estimating with large social weight matrices, and the practical necessity of 
ensuring that each subject can plausibly assign relational values to all others.  
The sample I used for my study was a student sample. Student samples are often 
used for laboratory experiments (Narayan, Rao and Sanders 2011, Richards, Hamilton 
and Allender 2014). Although samples from the general population may be more 
representative of the relevant market in terms of demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics, I focus on the behavioral patterns and not the actual WTP for activity 
trackers, per se. That is, even though students may not choose exactly the same trackers 
as subjects drawn from the general population, any differences in sample composition 
should not affect how the individuals respond to peers.  
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In order to provide a sense of what the sample looks like relative to the general 
population, I provide a set of summary statistics that compares the composition of my 
sample to the population in Table 4.3.  The sample consists of mostly junior and senior 
business and engineering students. Subjects average 20.59 years of age, relative to the 
state mean of 37.2. A younger sample is to be expected because it consists entirely of 
students. Further, 28.6% of my sample is female compared to the state mean of 50.6%, 
which again is to be expected given that my sample is drawn from colleges that tend to be 
overrepresented by male students. Regarding ethnicity, my sample contains 46% White, 
21% Asian, 16% Hispanic, 2% of Native American, and 7% other races. Compared to the 
state mean of 57.8% White, 3.4% Asian, 30.3% Hispanic, and 0.3% Native American, 
White and Hispanic are under-represented while Asian and Native American are over-
represented.   
Behavioral attributes may also be important determinants of purchase intent for 
activity trackers. With respect to previous purchase experience, only 17.5% of the sample 
own an activity tracker. The sample is relatively active with 25.4% working out every 
day; while the majority (52.4%) work out at least once a week, 11.1% work out once 
every other week, and the rest work out less frequently. On average, subjects spend $187 
annually on sports-related purchases with a standard deviation of $146. The frequency of 
purchases lies mostly in the category of “once every 3 months”, followed by “once every 
6 months” and “once every month”. The average BMI of my sample is 24.39, which is 
within the normal range of weight/ height ratio.  Even though I recorded information on 
income, students who still live with their parents report household income, and students 
who have jobs and don’t live with their parents report their own income.  The sample 
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shows that the majority (54.3%) has an income of less than $39,000/ year, while the rest 
has an income of more than $40,000/year. Comparing to the average income of Arizona 
(2013) at $48,510 and the average income of the nation at $52,250 (Arizona Population 
Statistics Census Data 2015, https://population.az.gov/), the sample income is below 
average but representative of a student sample.  
Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistics for the Sample 
Variable  Definition Frequency % Mean Std. dev 
Gender Gender of participant 
Female=1; Male=0 
 0.29 0.455 
Age Age in years   20.59 2.519 
Annual 
household 
income 
Total household income    
Less than $10,000 33.3 
$10,000 to $19,999 10.5 
$20,000 to $29,999 10.5 
$30,000 to $39,999 0 
$40,000 to $49,999 3.5 
$50,000 to $59,999 8.8 
$60,000 to $69,999 12.3 
$70,000 to $79,999 5.3 
$80,000 to $89,999 0 
$90,000 to $99,999 3.5 
$100,000 to $149,999 7.0 
More than $150,000 5.3 
Workout 
frequency 
How often do you work out?    
Every day=5 25.4 
At least once a week=4 52.4 
Once every other week=3 11.1 
Once a month=2 6.3 
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Once a few months or less 
often=1 
4.8 
Purchase_fr
eq 
(purchase 
frequency) 
How often do you purchase sports 
goods? 
   
At least once a week=5 4.8 
Once a month=4 17.5 
Once every three months=3 34.9 
Once every six month=2 27.0 
Once a year or less often=1 15.9 
Purchase_ex
pPurchase 
expenditure  
How much money do you spend 
sports goods? 
 
 187.30 146.179 
Tracker 
ownership 
Yes=1; No=0  0.17 0.383 
BMI   24.396 6.79 
Ethnicity  White   0.46 0.502 
 Hispanic   0.16 0.373 
 Native American  0.02 0.128 
 Asian  0.21 0.413 
 Other  0.07 0.250 
 
In the next section I estimate attribute-preferences by calibrating two models: a 
random parameter model to derive subjects’ willingness to pay, and a spatial model to 
identify peer effects. Attribute preferences can only be inferred in a CBC experiment by 
econometrically estimating their marginal value in a formal, utility-theoretic framework. 
Peer effects are derived then by studying the driving factors of willingness to pay.  
4.5 Econometric Model of Preference Revision  
 
WTP, in the sense of consumer demand, is the value a consumer places on a 
higher utility level relative to a lower utility level given a budget constraint21. Estimating 
                                                        
21 In other words, a Hicksian surplus.  
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the WTP for consumers is a common practice in evaluating novel products or changes of 
quality in existing goods (Lusk and Hudson 2004, Lusk, Roosen and Fox, 2003, Nalley et 
al., 2004). For example, Tonsor, Olynk, and Wolf (2009) assess consumer willingness to 
pay (WTP) for animal welfare attributes in meat products. Narayan, Rao and Sanders 
(2011) use WTP to reveal the preference revision of e-book readers for additional 
functions.  For the purpose of studying activity tracker choices and deriving individual 
preferences, I calculate the individual WTP and utilize a set of spatial models to analyze 
preference revision and peer effects. In the following section, I present the discrete 
models that derive WTP first, followed by the spatial models that analyze the preference 
revisions.  
4.5.1 Choice modeling 
 
The objective of the experiment is to elicit changes in preferences due to social 
interaction. Because I am interested in preference changes from stage one to stage two as 
it relates to social interaction, my econometric model estimates preferences in stage one, 
and then testis for the significant preference revision between stages one and two. I do 
this in two ways. First, I test for changes in attribute valuation from stage one to stage 
two due to the treatment effect of interacting with others in a direct way. Second, I 
calculate WTP for activity trackers, and test whether changes in WTP depend upon the 
social influence from stage one to stage two, moderated by the degree of social 
relationship between each subject.  
Consistent with the data generated by my CBC experiment, the core of the 
econometric model consists of a discrete-choice model, which is particularly adept at 
estimating marginal attribute valuations (Train 2003, Hensher, Rose and Greene 2005). 
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This point is important because discrete choice models, particularly those of the logit 
form used here, provide closed-form choice probability expressions that are useful in 
calculating choice probabilities under a range of peer-influence assumptions.  
When using discrete choice models, an individual’s utility is considered a random 
variable either because the researcher has incomplete information, or there is unobserved 
heterogeneity in individual preferences (Manski,1977). Formally, let the i th consumer’s 
utility from choosing alternative j be given by: 
 𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝑉𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
 
(4.1), 
where 𝑉𝑖𝑗 is the deterministic component of the utility function determined by the 
interested activity tracker attributes and 𝜀𝑖𝑗 is the random component. Assuming 𝑉𝑖𝑗 is 
linear in parameters, the form of the utility function for alternative j can be expressed as: 
 𝑉𝑗 = ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑗 =
𝑖
𝛽1𝑥𝑗1 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑗2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑗𝑛 
(4.2) 
 
where 𝑥𝑗𝑛 is the full vector of explanatory variables that are observed by the analyst, 
including attributes of the alternatives, , and variables that describe treatment and stage 
effects, and  𝛽𝑖 is a vector of parameter estimates associated with 𝑥𝑗𝑛 The estimated 𝛽 
values in this exercise are of particular importance because they measure the marginal 
utility of each tracker attribute. The explanatory 𝑥𝑗𝑛 variables are listed in Table 4.4. The 
variable “None” represents the “none of these” option in the consumer’s choice set, and 
serves as the “outside option” in discrete-choice modeling terminology (None = 1 if 
“none of these” option is selected, None = 0 otherwise). Garmin, Jawbone, Nike, and 
Fitbit are dummy variables that represent the four different brands, while Clip-on, 
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Wristband, and Watch are dummy variables that represent the different activity tracker 
designs.  Different functions are represented as dummy variables that capture the ability 
to record calories only (Cal), sleep patterns (Sleep), text and email messages (Msg), and 
recording workout routes with the aid of a Global Positioning Satellite (GPS). The 
variable Price captures the price of the respective alternative. Besides the attributes, I also 
included interaction variables to capture the difference between stages as well as 
treatment effects. Stage interactions variables are the product of a stage binary variable 
and all attributes, indicating whether there exist significant differences between stages. 
Three-way interactions of stage and treatment represent the attributes effect at stage 2 
among treatment groups. These interactions will help reveal whether there exist treatment 
effect in the second stage.  
Table 4.4 List of Variables 
Variable Name Meaning 
Garmin The brand is Garmin 
Nike The brand is Nike 
Fitbit The brand is Fitbit 
Jawbone The brand is Jawbone 
Clipon Design is clip on 
Watch Design is watch 
Wristband Design is wristband 
Cal Function is recording calories only 
Sleep Has additional function of recording sleeping patterns 
GPS Has additional function of recording workout route 
MSG Has additional function of receiving messages 
Price Price of the tracker 
S_garmin The brand is Garmin in the second stage: Garmin*stage 2 
S_nike The brand is Nike in the second stage: Jawbone*stage 2 
S_jawbone The brand is Jawbone in the second stage: Jawbone*stage 2 
S_watch The design is watch in the second stage: watch*stage 2 
S_wristband The design is wristband in the second stage: wristband*stage 2 
S_sleep Has additional sleeping function in the second stage: Sleep*stage 2 
S_gps Has additional GPS function in the second stage: GPS*stage2 
S_msg Has message function in the second stage: MSG*stage 2 
ST_garmin Three-way interaction: Garmin*Treat*Stage2 
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ST_nike Three-way interaction: Nike*Treat*Stage2 
ST_jawbone Three-way interaction: Jawbone*Treat*Stage2 
ST_watch Three-way interaction: watch*Treat*Stage2 
ST_wristband Three-way interaction: Wristband*Treat*Stage2 
ST_sleep Three-way interaction: Sleep*Treat*Stage2 
ST_gps Three-way interaction: GPS*Treat*Stage2 
ST_msg Three-way interaction: msg*Treat*Stage2 
Noneb Choose the “none of these function” 
Assuming the random error term in equation (4.1) is distributed Type I Extreme 
Value (EV), the probability of choosing option j over option k is: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏{𝑗 𝑖𝑠 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛} = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏{𝑉𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝑉𝑖𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘} =
𝑒𝑉𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝑒𝑉𝑖𝑘𝑘∈𝐶
 
(4.3), 
where choice j is chosen over choice k if the overall utility for choice j is greater than the 
utility of choice k. 
One well-understood problem with the logit framework is that it implies that the 
𝜀𝑖𝑗 are independent and identically distributed (IID) across individuals and alternatives. 
The IID assumption is restrictive in that it does not allow for the error components of 
different alternatives to be correlated (Hensher, Rose and Greene 2005). Therefore, I 
relax the iid assumption by using a random-parameter logit (RPL), or mixed logit, model.   
 Importantly, a RPL model allows taste parameters to vary randomly in the 
population. Formally, each marginal attribute value is written as (Hensher, Rose and 
Greene 2005):  
 𝛽𝑖𝑘 = 𝛽 + 𝛿′𝑘𝑧𝑞 + 𝜂𝑖𝑘 (4.4), 
where 𝜂𝑖𝑘 is a random term that is distributed randomly over individuals. The random 
term can assume a range of distributions, depending on the choice environment.  In this 
model, 𝑧𝑞 is observed data specific to the individual with q random variables and, 𝜂𝑖𝑘 
denotes a vector of k random components in the set of utility functions in addition to the J 
random elements in 𝜀𝑖𝑗. The error term can assume different distributional forms such as 
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normal, lognormal and triangular. For my study I choose triangular distribution for Price 
and normal for all other random parameters22. Triangular distribution guarantees a 
positive price estimate therefore a positive WTP, while normal distribution is the most 
common practice for random variables.  For a give value of  𝜂𝑞, the conditional 
probability 𝐿𝑗𝑞 of choosing option j is the following (given the remaining error term is 
IID):  
 𝐿𝑗𝑞(𝛽𝑞|𝑋𝑞 , 𝜂𝑞) = exp(𝛽′𝑞𝑥𝑗𝑞) / ∑ exp(𝛽′𝑞𝑥𝑗𝑞)
𝑗
 
(4.5) 
 
Equation (4.5) is the simple MNL model, but for each sampled individual, there is 
additional information defined by 𝜂𝑞. The unconditional choice probability is the 
expected value of the logit probability over all the possible values of 𝛽𝑞, that is, 
integrated over the values of 𝛽, weighted by the density of 𝛽𝑞. The probability is 
presented as: 
 𝑃𝑖𝑞(𝑋𝑖, 𝑧𝑖) = ∫ 𝐿𝑗𝑞(𝛽𝑞|𝑋𝑞 , 𝜂𝑞)𝑓(𝜂𝑞|𝑧𝑞)𝑑 𝜂𝑞, (4.6), 
where 𝛽𝑞 = 𝛽 + Δ𝑍𝑞 + 𝜂𝑞. Thus, the unconditional probability that individual q will 
choose alternative j given the specific characteristics of their choice set and the 
underlying model parameters is equal to the expected value of the conditional probability 
as it ranges over the possible values of 𝛽𝑞. The random variation in 𝛽𝑞 is induced by the 
random vector 𝜂𝑞.  
                                                        
22 Hensher, Rose and Greene (2005) suggest specifying the parameters associated with each attribute 
(including price) as random (see Hensher, Rose and Greene 2005, pg.618) because inter-alternative error 
correlation could be confounded with unobserved preferences if the latter is not explicitly taken into 
account (Daniels and Hensher 2000, Bhat and Castelar2003). 
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The choice probabilities associated with the RPL will not exhibit the same IIA 
property as the fixed-coefficient logit, and may yield different substitution patterns by 
appropriate specification of 𝑓(𝜂𝑞|𝑧𝑞). Flexible substitution is introduced through the 
random parameters, specifying each element of 𝛽𝑞 associated with an attribute of an 
alternative as having a mean, a standard deviation, and possibly a measure of correlation 
with another random parameter. By allowing marginal attribute valuations to vary across 
sample subjects, I am able to determine how preferences are influenced by exposure to 
the choices of others.  
Among the variables included in the indirect utility function, I allowed the 
marginal utility of income (price parameter) to vary randomly with a triangular 
distribution. A triangular distribution is highly desirable because it binds the parameter 
on (-1,1). Allowing the marginal utility of income to vary randomly is a common 
practice, and reasonable as this parameter governs price-response and price-response is 
driven by behavioral attributes of the household, many of which are unobserved 
(Hensher, Rose and Greene 2005, Banerjee, Martin and Hudson 2006, Lusk and 
Norwood 2009, Tonsor, Olynk, and Wolf 2009).     
Recall that the objective of this study is to reveal individual preferences, and how 
they are revised through peer influences. I measure preference revision through the WTP, 
which is the amount of money a subject is willing to pay for a unit change for a particular 
attribute. In the current model, I define the mean price parameter as 𝛽1, and an attribute 
whose parameter is normally distributed with mean 𝛽2 and standard deviation 𝜎2. 
Willingness to pay is calculated as: 
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 WTP= - 
𝛽2
𝛽1
 (4.7), 
where the WTP for the attribute is distributed normally with mean 
𝛽2
𝛽1
 and standard 
deviation 
𝜎2
𝛽1
 (Hensher, Rose and Greene 2005). Because WTP measures are calculated as 
the ratios of two parameters, they are sensitive to the range of each attribute level used in 
the estimation of both parameters. I then use the individual- and attribute-specific WTP 
calculated above and take difference between the second stage and the first stage WTP 
values to calculate a measure of preference revision: 
Δ𝑊𝑇𝑃𝐽 = 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝐽,𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒2 − 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝐽,𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒1. 
Differences between first- and second-stage valuations may be positive or 
negative, depending on the nature of the information received between the two sessions. 
For current purposes, however, I am more interested in how preferences are moderated 
by social interaction than the direction of change. For this purpose, I estimate using a 
spatial econometric approach that I describe in the next section. 
4.5.2. Spatial Models 
 
Spatial models are used to estimate preferences in a social environment because 
they are non-linear in structure and account for simultaneous interactions among 
individuals through the social weight matrix (Anselin 2002, Yang and Allenby 2005, 
Richards, Hamilton and Allender 2014). Spatial models differ from traditional linear-in-
mean models in that they address the need for a multidimensional relationship between 
consumers through the weight matrix (Lee 2004). Moreover, the natural exclusion 
restrictions implied by the social network structure ensure the separate identification of 
endogenous and contextual peer effects (Lin 2014). In particular, for the linear-in-means 
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model, peers’ outcomes are measured by group mean outcomes, and peers’ 
characteristics are captured by group mean characteristics. Both measurements are group-
specific and constant for all members in the same group. The consequence is that these 
two terms are linearly dependent, and the endogenous effects cannot be separated from 
the contextual effects.  
There are a multitude of different forms of spatial model, but I focus on two types: 
a Spatial Autoregressive Model (SAR, or “spatial lag model” as it is referred to by Anselin 
(2002)) and a Spatial Error Model (SEM). The classic SAR model departs from the Manski 
(1993) model by measuring peer variables as the weighted averages of observed peer 
outcomes and characteristics instead of group expectations. Both peer outcomes and peer 
characteristics are specific to the individual and vary across group members. The SEM 
model instead captures spatial patterns in the error term; therefore, it accounts for the 
unobserved heterogeneity in consumer tastes. SEMs treat spatial correlation primarily as a 
nuisance, similar to how statistical approaches treat temporal serial correlation. This 
approach generally focuses on estimating the parameters for the independent variables of 
interest in the systematic part of the model, and essentially disregards the possibility that 
the observed correlation may reflect something meaningful about the data generation 
process (Ward and Gleditsch 2007). When peer outcomes are caused by an unobserved 
correlated effect, the SEM will capture it by regressing a spatial weight matrix on the 
residuals. 
A SAR-SEM model is a spatial model that incorporates both SAR and SEM 
features. The SAR-SEM model used here similar to the one used by Lin (2014) in that I 
use a spatial weight matrix that represents the actual relationship among members, but 
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differs in that I relax the group-specific effect and instead use a binary variable to 
indicate differences between treatment and control groups. This is critical to my 
approach, because peer recommendations are only introduced in the treatment groups. If 
there indeed is a pure peer effect then the group fixed specific effect will capture it. With 
this assumption, the model is written as:  
 
𝑦𝑖𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝜌 ∑ 𝑤1𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑗ℎ
𝑛
𝑗=1
+ 𝑥𝑖𝑘𝛽 + ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
ℎ𝑖𝑘𝛾 + 𝐺𝛿 + 𝑢𝑖𝑘 
(4.9), 
and:  
 𝑢𝑖𝑘 = 𝜆 ∑ 𝑤2𝑖𝑘 𝑢𝑖𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘, 
(4.10), 
where  𝑦𝑖𝑘 is individual WTP revision for attribute k, Δ𝑊𝑇𝑃𝐽. Variables  𝑥𝑖𝑘 are 
individual characteristics related to the purchase of activity trackers; ℎ𝑖𝑘 are individual 
characteristics about i’s background averaged over the group; 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is the ij element of a 
row-standardized, zero diagonal weight matrix that captures the network structure where i 
and j are different subjects, and G is a fixed-group effect with a binary indicator for 
treatment-group membership. The error terms (eq. 4.10) in the model, 𝑢𝑖𝑘, follow an 
SEM process, which captures the unobserved effects that vary within the group and thus 
cannot be captured by the group fixed effects; and 𝜀𝑖𝑘is an idiosyncratic error term. This 
specification is the most general form of spatial model, termed the SAR-SEM model by 
LeSage (1998), because it captures both direct spatial effects through the SAR term and 
indirect effects, through unobservable elements, in the SEM term.   
In the SAR-SEM social model, outcomes for individuals from the same group are 
correlated in multiple ways. First, the parameter 𝜌 measures the endogenous effect of 
others’ behavior on each agent’s WTP, second, 𝛾 captures the contextual effect, and, 
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third, the group fixed effect is represented by 𝛿, capturing the common factors that affect 
all group members. Finally, the possibility that subjects’ choices are correlated through 
spatially dependent unobservable is captured by 𝜆 in the error term. Intuitively, the 
parameter 𝜌 estimates the presence of a spatial lag effect, or that consumer’s preferences 
are influenced by her peers. The value of 𝜌 is bounded by 0 and 1. A parameter close to 1 
indicates greater influence, and a parameter of 0 means there is no influence at all.  A 
negative value of 𝜌 indicates a consumer is negatively influenced by her peers, whereas a 
positive value of 𝜌 indicates the consumer follows her peers’ decisions. Estimates of 𝛾 
indicate contextual effects, which are the factors related to the common environment such 
as education, race, income, age, and gender.  Group effects are estimated with the 𝛿 
parameter, which is interpreted as the influence of peer recommendations introduced only 
in the treatment groups. In this regard it measures the difference in preferences between 
the control and treatment groups. Finally, after accounting for the peer, contextual, and 
group fixed effects, 𝜆 captures any “left-over” unobserved effects that exist in the data. In 
the rest of this section, I discuss how the peer effects are identified in the SAR-SEM 
model in econometric terms – an identification strategy that relies critically on the nature 
of the spatial weight matrix.  
At the core of any spatial model is a social weight matrix. The structure of the 
social weight matrix, W, is essential to estimating peer effects with this model. A social 
weight matrix is a 𝑛 ×  𝑛 positive matrix where n is the number of members, W, through 
which the ‘‘neighborhood set’’ is specified for each observation.  An observation appears 
both as a row and column, with non-zero matrix elements 𝑤𝑖𝑗 indicating the strength of 
the peer relationship between participants (row) 𝑖 and (column) 𝑗.  By convention, self-
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neighbors are excluded, such that the diagonal elements 𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 0.  Also, the weight matrix 
is typically row-standardized, with weights 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑠 = 𝑤𝑖𝑗/ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑗 .  Row-standardization 
means that pre-multiplying another vector creates an average of the neighboring values in 
the spatial lag operator (Anselin, 1988b).  For this study, I use two set of spatial weight 
matrix: 𝑾𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆 that describes the tie strength, and 𝑾𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 that describes the 
source expertise of network members. 
These two weight matrices essentially represent two different mechanisms 
through which preferences may be revised through social interaction. The W (closeness) 
matrix captures tie strength in which preferences are revised through established social 
distance between individuals. On the other hand, W (reliability) captures “source 
credibility” in that revisions are moderated by the extent of credence individual i lends to 
individual’s j’s comments regarding the product.    
For estimation purposes I define W in terms of a general weight matrix and 
rewrite Eq. (4.9) in matrix notation: 
 𝒀 = 𝜌𝑾𝑦 + 𝑿𝛽 + 𝑾𝑯𝛾 + 𝑮𝛿 + 𝑢 (4.11), 
 
where 𝒀 is a vector of individual differences in WTP regarding a specific attribute,  X is a 
vector of individual characteristics that will influence the purchase of activity trackers, 
which includes purchase frequency, workout frequency, purchase amount in dollars,  and 
whether the subject owns a tracker (Own). I expect that purchase frequency, workout 
frequency and purchase amount in dollars are positively related to WTP because these 
variables measure the extent of physical activity and expenditure on sporting goods that 
should be positively related to the WTP for an activity tracker.  
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The vector H measures characteristics of the reference group, including age, 
income, gender, and whether the subject is white (White) in this vector. To find the 
contextual effect, I pre-multiply the vector H that contains information about each 
subject’s background and environment with the row standardized weight matrix W. The 
vector G represents membership in the treatment group and is noted as “1” for treatment 
groups and “0” for control groups. Table 4.5 shows a list of variables used in this model. 
Table 4.5 Variables included in the SAR  
Variables Meaning 
Individual characteristics  
Purchase_freq Purchase frequency of sporting good 
Purchase $ spent on purchasing sporting goods annually 
Workout Workout frequency 
Tracker Whether the subject owns a tracker 
Contextual effects  
Age Age of the subject 
Gender Gender of the subject 
Income Household income 
White If the subject is white 
Spatial models are rarely estimated in the form given in (4.11), however, due to 
the obvious endogeneity of the lagged peer-effect variable. Instead, reduced-form 
expressions are derived, and estimated. Specifically, the dependent variable Y appears on 
both sides of (4.11). Clearly, this variable is not exogenous, so I re-write the structural 
form of 4.11 in a reduced form in order to solve for Y: 
 𝒀 = (1 − 𝜌𝑾)−1𝑿𝛽 + (1 − 𝜌𝑾)−1𝑾𝒁𝛾 + (1 − 𝜌𝑾)−1𝑮𝛿
+ (1 − 𝜌𝑾)−1𝜆𝑾𝑢 + (1 − 𝜌𝑾)−1𝜖 
(4.12), 
where (1 − 𝜌𝑾)−1 is defined as the “inverse Leontief matrix.” Writing the model in 
reduced form highlights the value of using a spatial approach to estimating models of 
social influence as the inverse Leontief matrix is often described as a “spatial filter”. 
Spatial filtering essentially means that the econometric procedure extracts that part of the 
variation in the endogenous variable that is due solely to relationships with other spatial 
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observations. What is left, therefore, has the spatial effects removed, or “filtered” out. 
More formally, this matrix is a full inverse, which yields an infinite series that involves 
all neighbors: 1 + 𝜌𝑾 + 𝜌2𝑾2 + ⋯ 𝜌𝑛𝑾𝑛.  This means that each neighbor is correlated 
with every other neighbor, but the correlation decays with the order of contiguity (the 
powers of W in the series expansion). Higher powers of the weight matrix (𝑾𝑛) reflect 
neighbor sets in more remote contiguity (nth neighbor). This illustrates the global nature 
of the spatial multiplier effect in the spatial lag model (Anselin 2002). Specifically, if a 
unit change were introduced in a given explanatory variable 𝑋𝑘, the effect on y would 
amount to [1/(1 − 𝜌)𝛽𝑘]. More generally, for any vector of changes in a given 
explanatory variable, Δx𝑘, the resulting spatial pattern of changes in the dependent 
variable is a function of the spatial filter and the change of given explanatory variables: 
 Δ𝑦 = (1 − 𝜌𝑾)−1Δx𝑘𝛽𝑘 (4.13). 
This expression conveys the intuition that changes in preferences in a social environment 
derive from two sources: a spatial component and an explanatory variable component.  
Indeed, the global nature of social interactions is apparent through the reduced 
form. For instance, the spatial lag term 𝜌𝑾 for observation 𝑗 is correlated with its own 
error 𝑢𝑗 , and with all other errors in the system, which accounts for spatial correlation 
among the explanatory variables and peer effects. Thus, the estimate of β (obtained after 
spatially filtering the dependent variable y) is a consistent estimate of the marginal value 
of product attributes (X on Y). This means that after spatially filtering out the network 
effect by multiplying the βs with (1 − 𝜌𝑾)−1, the estimated βs  are truly the individual 
impact of product attributes without confounding social effects, or perpetual affinity 
because it shows how a subject’s personal preference towards activity trackers influence 
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her WTP. Further, the estimate of 𝜌 is a consistent estimate of the peer effect because the 
SAR process accounts for the global nature of peer influence, that is, to which degree a 
subject is influenced by all her peers at once.   
Estimation of the SAR-SEM model is difficult, yet the consequences of ignoring 
spatial dependence in models can be substantial. If a causal relationship of the dependent 
variables among peers does exist, but the model is estimated without the spatial 
autoregressive term, then a significant explanatory variable has been omitted, and the 
estimated coefficients will be biased and inconsistent (Kalnins 2003). On the other hand, 
if there is unobserved correlation among the error terms due to spatial dependence, then a 
SEM is required to obtain unbiased and consistent estimates. In the next section, I address 
how the model is estimated with a two-stage instrumental variable (IV) method. 
Moreover I present the specification tests that evaluate spatial lag dependence, spatial 
error dependence and both.  
4.5.3 Estimation  
 
The estimation problems associated with spatial regression models are distinct for 
the spatial lag and spatial error case (Anselin 2006). Spatial error models are special 
cases in which the error is non-spherical, or violate the fundamental assumptions of OLS 
estimation. In other words, if there exists unobserved correlation effect that causes 
consumers to make similar decision then a spatial error test should detect significant 
spatial dependence in the error term.  On the other hand, the inclusion of a spatially 
lagged dependent variable results in a form of endogeneity. A classic solution to the 
endogeneity problem is to use instrumental variables. Kelejian and Robinson (1993) 
 
  
 
130 
suggest the use of a subset of columns from {X, WX, W2X2,W3X3, . . . } as instruments. 
Specifically, the optimal instruments are: 
 𝑄=𝐼−𝜆 𝑾𝟐 [𝑋, 𝑾𝟏 (𝐼−𝜌 𝑾𝟏)− 𝑾𝟏𝑥𝛽 ] 
 
(4.14), 
where Q (N × q) is a vector of instrumental variables. In the case of peer outcomes, I use 
the lag of all explanatory variables as my instruments. This is a common practice for such 
models (Anselin 2009) and essentially adds to the explanatory power of peers.  For the 
simplicity of notation, I write Equation 4.11 as: 
 𝒀 = 𝒁𝜉 + 𝑢 
 
(4.15), 
where Z = [𝑾1y, X, WH, G] and 𝜉 = [ρ, β, γ, 𝛿]. The generalized spatial two-stage least 
squares estimator developed in Kelejian and Prucha (1998) consists of three steps. The 
first step is a spatial two-stage least squares estimation. The predicted value of Z in a 
regression on the instruments is obtained as: 
 𝑍 ̂ = 𝑸(𝑸′𝑸)−1𝑸′ 𝑾𝒁, 
 
(4.16), 
The instrument 𝑍 ̂ replaces 𝒁 in the second stage, resulting in the spatial two-stage least 
squares estimator: 
 𝜉 𝑆2𝑆𝐿𝑆̂ =  [𝑍 ̂′𝑍 ̂]
−𝟏 𝑍 ̂′𝜉, 
 
(4.17), 
or in full, 
 𝜉 𝑆2𝑆𝐿𝑆̂ = [𝒁′𝑸(𝑸
′𝑸)−𝟏𝑸′𝒁]−1 𝒁′𝑸(𝑸′𝑸)−1𝑸′𝒁𝜉 (4.18). 
With asymptotic covariance matrix given by:  
 𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝜉 𝑆2𝑆𝐿𝑆̂ ] = ?̂?
2[𝒁′𝑸(𝑸′𝑸)−𝟏𝑸′𝒁]−1 (4.19). 
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The solution of the system by nonlinear least squares yields a consistent estimate ?̂? for 
the autoregressive error parameter (Anselin 2006).  
The purpose of spatial econometrics is to determine whether any spatial 
relationship of the variables is merely random or responds to a pattern of spatial 
dependence. Specification testing is necessary to find the spatial patterns in any given 
data set. Each specification test is constructed with a specific alternative in mind, so that 
the test consists of a test of restrictions on the parameters of a model that includes spatial 
dependence, such as a spatial error model or a spatial lag model. The literature on 
specification tests against spatial correlation in cross-sectional regression is by now quite 
extensive (Anselin and Bera, 1998; Anselin, 2001a; Florax and de Graaff, 2004). The 
most commonly used approach under maximum likelihood estimation is Lagrange 
Multiplier (or Rao Score) tests, which are based on the slope of likelihood function, or 
the “score” function. In particular, tests against the presence of spatial correlation are 
very important, as ignoring spatial correlation when it is present may lead to biased and 
inconsistent estimates of the model parameters, or inefficient estimates and biased t-test 
statistics. In the following section, I present the commonly used specification tests to 
detect spatial lag dependence and error dependence, organized as tests against spatial 
autocorrelation, tests based on the Maximum Likelihood principle, and tests against 
multiple sources of misspecification.  
The 𝑛 ×  𝑛 spatial weight matrices W consist of exogenously specified elements 
(that capture the neighbor relations of observations i and j) in order to identify peer 
effects. A Lagrange Multiplier tests the residuals of an ML estimate of the null model that 
includes a single W matrix. For my purposes, the specification is to estimate 𝜌𝑠 for Ws, 
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which is the matrix of peer relationships. The residuals can then be used for a test of 
whether the coefficient Xs of Ws is significant. The null is defined as the classic linear 
regression model. Mathematically, the LM test statistic is Chi-square distributed and is 
written: 
 
𝐿𝑀𝜌 = {
𝑒′𝑊𝑦
𝑒′𝑒
𝑛
}2/𝐷, 
 
(4.20), 
where the first term is the residual sum of squares on X, and the denominator is a scaling 
factor that is based on the weight matrix and estimates of the OLS. While 𝑒 is the OLS 
residuals and the denominator D is: 
 
𝐷 = [
(𝑾𝑿?̂?)
′
[𝐼 − 𝑿(𝑿′𝑿)−𝟏𝑿′](𝑾𝑿?̂?)
?̂?2
] + 𝑡𝑟(𝑾′𝑾 + 𝑾𝑾) 
 
(4.21), 
where the estimates for ?̂? and ?̂?2 are from OLS. The test statistic is asymptotically 
distributed as 𝜒2(1). For this test, the null hypothesis is 𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0, so the alternative is 
an OLS model. Failing to reject the null hypothesis indicates consumers do not depend on 
their peers for opinions, while rejecting the null hypothesis indicates the existence of peer 
effects. Basically, the LM is testing the slope of the log-likelihood function when there 
exists spatial lag against the log-likelihood when there is no spatial lag. If the slope is 
significant, then I reject the null hypothesis of OLS in favor of a spatial lag specification.  
The point of departure for a LM test for spatial error autocorrelation is that it tests 
the unobserved correlation in residuals that might cause consumers to show similar 
preferences. Therefore, instead of regressing consumer outcomes (Y) on peer relations, 
the LM error test investigates whether the unexplained residual displays any sort of 
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spatial correlation. Again, the null hypothesis is an OLS with 𝐻0: 𝜆 = 0. Mathematically, 
the test is written as: 
 
𝐿𝑀𝜆 =
[
𝑒′𝑾𝑒
𝑒′𝑒/𝑛]
2
𝑡𝑟[𝑾′𝑾 + 𝑾𝑾]
, 
 
(4.22), 
where 𝑒 is a 𝑛 × 1 vector of OLS residuals and is asymptotically distributed as 𝜒2(1). 
Failing to reject the null hypothesis indicates peer relationships and the explanatory 
variables explain all social effects, while rejecting the null hypothesis means there are 
unexplained effects that correlate with peer relationships.  
Besides testing for peer effects and unobserved effects separately, Anselin 
(1998b) provides a joint test where the null hypothesis is 𝐻0: 𝜌 = 𝜆 = 0. This LM test is 
not simply a summation of the two statistics above, but takes on a more complicated form 
given by: 
 
𝐿𝑀𝜌𝜆 =
𝑑𝜆
2𝐷 + 𝑑𝜌
2𝑇22 − 2𝑑𝜆𝑑𝜌𝑇12
𝐷𝑇22 − 𝑇12
2  
 
(4.23), 
where 𝑑𝜆 =
𝑒′𝑊𝑒
𝑒′𝑒/𝑛
, 𝑑𝜌 =
𝑒′𝑊𝑦
𝑒′𝑒
𝑛
 and 𝑇𝑖𝑗 = 𝑡𝑟[𝑊𝑖𝑊𝑗 + 𝑊𝑗
′𝑊𝑗]. Intuitively, if both spatial lag 
dependence and spatial error dependence are significant, then the joint test statistic 
should be significant too. I apply each of these tests before choosing the preferred 
specification in interpreting the experimental data below.   
4.6 Results 
In the first part of this section, I present the results of the discrete choice model, 
with which I derive attribute specific WTP and answer the question of which attributes 
significantly influence activity tracker choices.  In the part of this section, I identify 
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specific social effects, namely peer effect, contextual effect, group effect and unobserved 
correlation through a set of spatial models. In addition, I address hypotheses regarding 
peer recommendations, and provide a set of implications for marketing practice, and the 
economics of social learning.   
4.6.1 Multinomial Logit Results 
To start with, I provide estimates from a fixed-coefficient MNL model in order to 
serve as a starting point for interpreting the random parameter logit model. Table 4.6 
reports the MNL estimates obtained with the experimental data. Based on the estimates 
shown in table 4.6, I find that all the variables except for Jawbone are significant. This 
means that the variables included in the model explain the probability of activity tracker 
choices well. Among brands, these estimates show that all brands are significant 
compared to the baseline (Fitbit). Therefore, this estimate is interpreted as showing that 
subjects are more likely to choose Garmin and Nike compared to choosing the Fitibt. 
Considering that the Jawbone coefficient was not found to be significant, this means that 
the brand is not influencing consumers’ decision making. 
 
Table 4.6 Estimated parameters for MNL and RPL. 
 MNL RPL 
Variable Mean t-ratio Mean t-ratio Standard 
Deviation 
t-ratio 
Garmin 0.3739*       2.42   0.3886 *       2.43   0.0155         0.14   
Nike 0.6554* 4.45   0.6154* 3.84   0.4808* 4.36   
Jawbone -0.0272          -0.18   -0.1579          -0.96   0.4720* 4.32   
Watch 1.3910* 10.05   1.3855* 9.11   0.5476* 4.50   
Wristband 1.2080* 9.05   1.2767* 9.24   0.1421          1.28   
Sleep 1.3831* 9.23   1.4845* 9.51   0.0461          0.41   
GPS 1.4860* 9.24   1.6474* 9.55   0.4801* 4.53   
MSG 0.9783* 6.32   1.0075* 6.24   0.2695* 2.50   
Price -0.0115* -11.71   -0.0170* -13.36   0.0170* 13.36   
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S_garmin 0.9020* 3.57   0.9377* 3.65     
S_nike 0.3739         1.29   0.3590          1.19     
S_jawbone 0.5433* 2.14   0.6227* 2.34     
S_watch -0.7648      -3.44   -0.7867* -3.34     
S_wristban
d 
-1.4356       -6.04   -1.5052* -6.21     
S_sleep -1.2693*       -5.15   -1.3634* -5.33     
S_gps -1.5765*      -5.98   -1.7418* -6.29     
S_msg -0.7882*      -3.16   -0.8646* -3.35     
ST_garmin 0.1723          0.62   0.1498         0.53     
ST_nike 0.29596         0.89   0.2831          0.81     
ST_jawbo
ne 
0.4249          1.50   0.3257         1.07     
ST_watch 0.2153          0.92   0.1821          0.71     
ST_wristb
and 
0.1331          0.52   0.0853          0.32     
ST_sleep 0.2552          0.93   0.2469         0.87     
ST_gps 0.2639          0.94   0.3236          1.06     
ST_msg -0.0373         -0.14   -0.0339          -0.12     
None of 
these 
0.8127* -11.71   0.5179* 2.72     
Summary statistics      
Number of 
observations 
1512  1512   
Number of 
participants 
63  63   
LLc mixed logit -2095.8949 -1990.4450   
LR   105.4499   
*significant at 95% level. 
In order to get attribute and individual specific WTP, a Random Parameter Model 
(RPL) is needed to account for the randomness in tastes. To do so I let all variables used 
in the MNL vary randomly according to a known distribution and perform a LR test 
between the RPL and the MNL. Rejecting the MNL in favor of the RPL will indicate that 
consumers preferences are indeed heterogeneous and vary based on the attributes. 
Specification tests for discrete choice models typically involve comparing the estimated 
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model with a null alternative using likelihood ratio (LR) tests. 23 Estimating two models 
and comparing the fit of one model (log-likelihood value, LL) to the fit of the other (LL) 
perform the LR test. Log-likelihood function provided values to assess model fit where 
the bigger the log-likelihood value (LL) is the better. A LR test compares the 
performance of the MNL and RPL models by taking the difference between the goodness 
of fit of two models and compare it to a chi-square distribution:  
𝐿𝑅 = −2(𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑁𝐿 − 𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑃𝐿)~𝜒
2
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠, 
where the LR value greater than a critical value indicates that the RPL performs better 
than the MNL. The log-likelihood (LL) of the MNL model is -2095.8949 whereas the LL 
for the RPL model is -1990.4450. Using the Log-likelihood ratio to test the performance 
of the unrestricted MNL model I find a LR test statistic of 105.4499, which is greater 
than the critical Chi-square statistic with nine degree of freedom of 16.91924. Therefore, 
in comparison to the MNL model, I am able to conclude on the evidence provided that 
the fitted RPL model is preferred.  
4.6.2 RPL Results 
 
As discussed above, the RPL model is able to capture unobserved heterogeneity, 
so should provide a better representation of not only the mean parameter estimates, but 
peer effects as well. Heterogeneity of consumer taste is introduced by allowing variables 
to be randomly distributed according to a triangular distribution. Technically, any and all 
                                                        
23 The log-likelihood ratio test, which follows a χ2 distribution with k degrees of freedom (Wooldridge, 
2002) is −2(𝐿𝐿𝑖  −𝐿𝐿𝑗), where 𝐿𝐿𝑗 is the unrestricted pooled sample log-likelihood value and 𝐿𝐿𝑖  denote the  
log-likelihood values for the constant only model. k is the number of additional variables compared to the 
constant only model.  
24 16.919 is the critical value at 0.95 with 9 degree of freedom, the number of random parameters. The 
degrees of freedom come from the estimation of variances of random parameters.  
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of the parameters estimated in the utility model can be regarded as random parameter 
estimates. Following Hensher, Rose and Greene (2005, pg. 618), I first allow all variables 
to be random according to a triangular distribution, and then remove the variables that are 
not statistically significant according to the Wald statistics and the LR test.  I define the 
marginal utility of income with respect to price in terms of a triangular distribution 
because it binds the parameter dispersion on (-1, 1). Because of this, a triangular 
distribution on price guarantees positive price thus positive WTP estimates. After 
selecting the variables for which unobserved heterogeneity appeared to be the most 
important, I chose Price, Nike, Watch, Wristband, Sleep, GPS and Msg. Among these 
variables, the scale parameters (standard deviation) are statistically significant for Price, 
Nike, Watch, GPS and MSG. These results suggest that the random parameter 
specification is indeed appropriate in these data.  
I estimated the extent of preference revision, and test for the effect of peer 
influence, by comparing marginal attribute valuations between the first and second stages 
of the experiment. I pooled the data from stage 1 and stage 2 together, and estimate the 
stage 2 effects by multiplying each variable by a stage 2 indicator variable.  If the stage 2 
variables are statistically significant, then I can conclude that subjects revise their 
preferences based on interactions with others in their group. If there is significant 
revision, then, the parameter estimate for stage 2 is obtained by adding the parameter 
estimate from stage 1 with the interaction variable. For example, the estimate for Garmin 
in the second stage is: 
𝛽Garmin + 𝛽S_Garmin = 0.3739 + 0.9020 = 1.2817 
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These estimates are shown in Table 4.6. Consumers had a higher parameter estimate for 
all brands after exposure to input from others.  However, the parameter values for design 
(Wristband, Watch) and functions (Sleep, GPS, MSG) were reduced from the first to the 
second stage. The fact that all the estimated marginal values for the tracker attributes 
were statistically significant means that subjects clearly revised their preferences between 
the first and second stages. This notion provides supports to my first hypothesis. More 
specifically, a positive estimate for the Garmin variable (S_garmin) means that, on 
average, respondents tended to prefer the Garmin brand, while a negative estimate of the 
GPS variable (S_gps) means that, during the second stage, respondents were less likely to 
choose a tracker with the GPS function.  
Besides the two-way interactions with stage, I also include a set of three-way 
interactions with both stage and treatment. These interactions indicate the marginal 
effects of attributes specific to the treatment group in the second stage. The RPL results 
show no significant estimates among these interactions, meaning that the RPL does not 
show significant treatment effect on preferences. The fact that Jawbone was not 
significant in the first stage, but was significant in the second stage, means that subjects 
revised their preferences to choose the Jawbone brand between the first and second 
stages. Whether this preference revision was due to information from specific members 
of the group, however, requires an econometric model that is able to separate out specific 
group-member influences.  For this reason, I employ a set of spatial models to study the 
matter.   
The randomness in the RPL allows for estimation of individual tastes. Individual-
specific (conditional) estimates are obtained from the RPL estimates, assuming a 
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triangular distribution for the random parameters. Specifically, individual-specific 
willingness to pay estimates are calculated by dividing the attribute estimate of interest 
by the marginal utility of income estimate. For example, the willingness to pay for 
Garmin trackers is found as: 
𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖 = −
𝛽𝑆_𝐺𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒,𝑖
 
Subject-specific WTP for all attributes are then calculated in the same fashion and 
presented in Table 4.7.  
In general, significant revisions in WTP are found in every attribute but Nike, 
with varying magnitudes. Prior to allowing for any peer influence, subjects have the 
highest WTP for GPS capacities, followed by watch design and sleep capacities. After 
learning about peer’s experiences with activity trackers, and seeing their preferences, the 
sample subjects are significantly less willing to pay for the GPS and wristbands, while 
more willing to pay for all brand attributes. Among the other revisions, one notable result 
is that, before peer influence, the average WTP for wristband design is positive, ($129) 
whereas the WTP for the same design drops (by $152) below zero after peer influence. 
This shows that peer discussion plays a negative role with respect to wristband design. 
For example, subjects may have discussed the disadvantages of a design that prevent 
people from wanting to include this attribute.  
I also expected asymmetric responses to peer recommendations:  Peers may 
provide either positive or negative feedback, each with a different effect on changes in 
WTP.  Brand proved to be a topic of much discussion among subjects. This discussion 
clearly had an impact on subjects’ tendency to revise their valuations as prior to peer 
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recommendations consumers’ preferences depend on both brands and specific attributes 
such as design, function and price. After peer recommendations, however, subjects revise 
their preferences more positively on brands instead of specific attributes. Table 4.7 shows 
that peer recommendations positively enhanced brand knowledge.  All brand attribute 
preferences (Garmin, Nike and Jawbone) are revised higher after peer influence 
compared to the baseline (Fitbit), with Garmin being revised higher by $95, Nike revised 
by $36; and Jawbone revised by $63.  
Table 4.7 Subject-specific Marginal WTP by Attribute  
 Pre-influence  Difference in WTP 
 Mean WTP Std. err  Mean WTP Std. err 
Garmin 39.2900* 25.7862  94.6470* 23.4557 
Nike 63.0608* 53.1249  36.2421 23.5743 
Jawbone -5.9432 46.0103  62.8538* 40.8843 
Watch 155.6978* 134.9679  -79.4125* 51.6551 
Wristband 129.1619* 80.9048  -151.9357* 98.8290 
Sleep 149.5709* 94.4735  -137.622* 89.5187 
GPS 159.9482* 123.1506  -175.8147* 114.3615 
MSG 105.2684* 75.6572  -87.2695* 56.7658 
Note: a single asterisk indicates significance at a 5% level. 
Subjects also exhibited a willingness to change preferences for design. For 
example, the WTP for the watch-style attribute after peer interaction is revised to be 
lower by $79.  In the same way, the WTP for the wristband style after peer 
recommendations is negative, meaning that subjects’ WTP for the wristband attribute 
drop to a point that they are not willing to pay for a tracker with this style. In terms of 
functions, the WTP for all functions are revised lower after peer recommendations. WTP 
for the function of tracking sleeping patterns is revised by $138, the WTP for the GPS 
function is revised by $176 via peer recommendation, and the WTP for the messaging 
function is revised by $87. Clearly, peer communications discouraged subjects from 
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paying for additional functions. In general, peer discussions lead subjects to be more 
brand-conscious, and discouraged subjects from paying for every additional function. 
Comparing the first and second stage RPL estimates and WTP revisions, however, does 
not address the issue of how the definition of space affects preference revision. That is, I 
do not include the spatial weight matrix directly in the RPL comparisons. For this 
purpose, I estimate the extent of preference revision as moderated by each subject’s 
location in the social-spatial network in the next section.  
4.6.3 Results of Spatial Models 
 
Spatial models suffer from an embarrassment of riches in terms of the ways in 
which relationships among network members can be defined25. In this study, I focus on 
two different ways: tie strength and source expertise. In this section, I examine the nature 
of preference revisions under each definition.  To test the second and third hypotheses 
developed above, namely which definition generates larger preference revisions, and how 
credibility is related to attribute preference revisions, I compare the estimate of 𝜌 
obtained from a model that uses tie strength as a measure of social proximity and the 
estimate of 𝜌 from using source expertise as the measure of social proximity. In this way, 
I can examine which mechanism is more likely to have influenced subjects’ preferences 
between the first and second rounds. In Table 4.10, I present two SAR-SEM models in 
which Model 1 uses the tie strength as spatial weight (𝑊1 = 𝑊2 = 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠); 
                                                        
25 Prior research shows many possible ways to define social relationships, including frequency of 
communication (Goldenberg et al. 2009), degree of acquaintance (Godes and Mayzlin 2009 ), respect or 
leadership (Mullen, Johnson, and Salas 1991 ; Grippa and Gloor 2009 ), and trust (Buskens 1998 ; Berrera 
2007 ). In this chapter I follow Richards, Hamilton and Allender (2014) in defining social closeness.  
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and Model 2 uses the source expertise as spatial weight (𝑊1 = 𝑊2 =
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦).   
The Lagrange-multiplier statistic tests the appropriateness of a model with a W 
matrix. In the case of tie strength, the LM value is 0.6919, which is smaller than the 
critical value of 𝜒21 (with 1 degree of freedom), meaning that consumer preferences do 
not depend on peers that are defined through “social closeness”. Moreover, unobserved 
correlation that cannot be explained with the social closeness matrix, as evident by the 
failure to reject the hull hypothesis of a spatial error specification (LM=1.2959<𝜒21). On 
the other hand, the LM statistics for spatial lag (3.0414) and spatial error (3.2679) using 
peers defined by “source credibility” are both significant, rejecting the null hypothesis of 
an OLS in favor of both spatial lag and error specification. This means that source 
credibility is able to explain the causal relationship between consumer preferences and 
peers’ preferences as well as the unobserved correlations.  Based on these tests I conclude 
that consumers indeed depend on their peers (who they perceive as credible) for 
recommendation and that there exist unobserved correlations that cause consumers to 
arrive at the same choices.   
Based on these results, the SAR-SEM model using tie strength does not reject the 
null hypothesis, my results do not support HYPOTHESIS 2 in that preference revisions 
will be greater for strong ties relative to weak ties. On the other hand, the SAR-SEM 
model with the “credibility” definition of social relationship rejects the null hypothesis of 
simple OLS in favor of the maintained SAR-SEM structure. This means that there is 
significant spatial dependence using reliability as weight matrix, providing supports for  
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HYPOTHESIS 3 in that perceived credibility is positively related to revisions in attribute 
preferences. The distinction is important, as it suggests that when facing innovative 
products, consumers do not turn to their friends for recommendations but rather people 
who they perceive as having expertise on the product. This extends the literature on 
proximity by identifying relational mechanisms through which social propinquity leads to 
information exchange. 
 Moreover, regarding weak ties those who are not social acquaintances, but 
possess perceived expertise on the subject of matter, are significant influencers. This 
finding is consistent with Granovetter (1993) in that “weak ties” rather than “friends” in a 
social network can be more influential. That is, people who have close social proximity 
are likely to share similar information, so they are not the best candidates for new product 
promotion. From a marketing perspective, this finding explains why online practices such 
as Yelp and TripAdvisor are successful, because they rely on expertise and experiences 
from strangers to promote their products and services. Since influential individuals are 
not necessarily close friends, this finding highlights a notable difference between 
traditional marketing procedures, where WOM plays an important role, and the more 
current, viral marketing where online recommendations are given by anyone who is 
perceived as credible. My finding is similar to Godes and Mayzlin (2009), who 
demonstrate that it is the less loyal customers instead of the most loyal customers who 
provide influential WOM. In a similar manner, my results suggest that marketers should 
get out of the traditional word-of-mouth marketing where friends recommend friends, and 
instead should target those who are credible representatives of the product.  
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The preferred model contained a number of other explanatory variables, but few 
showed a significant influence, independent of peer effects. The individual characteristics 
that were found to be significant in the preferred Model 2 were purchase frequency and 
BMI. This is intuitive as activity trackers are associated with fitness (within the healthy 
range of BMI) and the WTP is determined by how often an individual is likely to shop 
for sports goods. The sign for Purchase is positive, meaning that people who shop for 
sports goods more frequently are more willing to pay higher price for Jawbone. The sign 
for the BMI is also positive in Model 2, meaning that the higher a subject’s BMI, the 
more likely he/she will choose Jawbone. This finding is intuitive as Jawbone is 
positioned as a lower-end product, with lower prices and fewer innovations.  In other 
words, Jawbone is an introductory tracker, which is preferred by people who are new 
users, and perhaps not dedicated to physical fitness.  Less fit subjects tend to have higher 
BMIs, hence the positive relation between Jawbone and BMI. The finding that BMI is an 
important factor in consumers’ choices of activity tracker is not surprising as the main 
function of an activity tracker is to record physical activities. Besides individual-specific 
characteristics such as BMI, other factors that refer to more general characteristics of the 
sample are also apparent.  
Two contextual effects were found to be significant: age and gender. Age is 
negatively related to the WTP for Jawbone, as subjects who are younger are likely to be 
more fitness aware. Gender is positively related, meaning that males are less likely to pay 
a higher price for a Jawbone. Note that this does not necessarily mean that males are 
more into fitness, and hence more willing to pay for activity trackers than females, but 
that males are more likely to pay for Jawbone. Income, on the other hand, does not show 
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a significant relationship with consumers’ preferences for activity trackers. This notion 
can be explained that for each brand it has a range of trackers that satisfy consumers of 
different income levels, therefore indicators such age and gender that identify with 
certain traits of an activity tracker turn out to be determining factors. Identifying the 
relationship between contextual factors and preference revisions is important because 
contextual factors help marketers target a group of people with similar background. For 
example, in this case, older female college students that are willing to pay more for 
Jawbone trackers. 
In the previous section, I showed that consumer preferences are significantly 
altered in the second stage, which provides support for my first hypothesis in that peer 
recommendations will lead to preference revision for the recommended option if 
individuals regard the attribute in question to be salient to the choice decision. To tie such 
revisions more clearly to peer effects, I also estimate a group fixed effect. The group 
fixed effect examines whether there exists a significant difference in WTP between 
control groups and treatment groups, and is measured by the estimate of  𝛿. Group fixed-
effect was found in Model 2: subjects that were assigned to treatment groups revised their 
WTP for Jawbone by $23.84 after peer influence. This is evidence that WTP can be 
influenced by peer recommendations. Combined with the fact that those influencers are 
not necessarily friends, this finding suggests that intense promotion from people who 
have perceived expertise is effective. Moreover, the group fixed is not significant trough 
revision by source expertise but not by strong ties, showing that the strong ties have no 
influence on peer preferences. For innovative products, people who are considered to 
have expertise on the products serve as more influential agents to promote the products.  
  
 
1
4
6
 
       Table 4.8 Results of Spatial Models.  
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       * Significant at 90% 
       ** Significant at 95 
 
 
Explanatory 
variables 
OLS t ratio Model 1 using Tie 
strength 
z-value Model 2 using 
Source expertise 
z-value 
Purchase -0.0699 -1.93703 -0.0560 -1.4432 0.0308** 1.9893 
Workout 8.7206 1.6808 5.7500 0.9729 7.6060 0.1301 
Tracker 0.0611 0.0444 5.5335 0.3884 9.2621 0.4830 
BMI -1.1913 -1.3878 -1.3750 -1.5180 0.7832* 1.6384 
Contextual effects       
Age 0.1628** 2.5931 0.0039 0.0495 -0.0496* -2.323 
Gender -2.0359* -1.3344 2.8750 1.1848 0.7100* 1.9359 
Income -0.0001 -1.6211 -0.0000 -0.712 -0.0000 0.6147 
Endogenous effect       
𝜌 N.A. NA 0.8125 1.032 0.8505* 3.5559 
Unobserved effect       
𝜆 NA NA 0.6050 0.4367 0.3977 0.5035 
Fixed Group effect       
Treatment -35.9161 -1.4364 -5.00 0.1779 23.8401* 2.7842 
Model Fit       
Log likelihood -314.668     
   p-value  p-value 
LM(lag)   0.6919 0.2549 3.0474* 0.0808 
LM(error)   1.2959 0.5041 3.2679* 0.0706 
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4.7 Conclusion 
Relationships are important ways for consumers to acquire information, because 
the creation of knowledge is a social process. This is especially true when consumers are 
considering the purchase of innovative, new products, as little is known prior to the 
release of truly new products.  Despite the importance of social interaction as a vehicle 
for knowledge acquisition and the extensive literature on peer effects, limited research 
has made an effort to investigate how peers influence the adoption of innovative 
products. This chapter offers evidence as to how consumer preferences are revised 
through peer recommendations in the context of activity trackers.  
In this chapter, I use a two-stage experiment to examine preference revision via 
peer recommendations. I detect factors that are important in consumers’ choices of 
activity trackers. Among which, brand is a general representation of specific attributes 
and consumer recognition embodied in activity trackers. I find that brand-related 
information such as design, function, and price are significant when consumers choose to 
buy activity trackers. However, brand serves as a representation of all traits when 
consumers revise their preference according to peer recommendations. That is, when 
consumers seek information from their peers, they tend to generalize certain attributes, or 
make the connection between brand and other people (peers)’ the discussion of attributes. 
This finding shed lights on how marketers can best use peer networks to promote 
innovative new products. That is, instead of promoting specific attributes of an activity 
tracker, marketers should link the innovative feature to the brand in general. For example, 
Garmin is the top brand in GPS. When promoting Garmin activity trackers, instead of 
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emphasizing on the perks of the GPS function itself, the marketer could link Garmin 
activity trackers with excellent GPS performance compared to other brands.  
Identifying the effect of peer relationships on consumer choice is a matter of both 
experimental design, and econometric estimation. In this study, my experiment is random 
in the sense students who are sampled are based on their preferences for academic 
majors, which should not correlate with their preferences for activity trackers.  My 
econometric model is non-linear while addressing for two different mechanisms of peer 
recommendations. Peer recommendations work through the social proximity among 
members of the network. Such interaction is spatial and simultaneous in nature, which 
calls for spatial models. Spatial models allows for peer recommendations to enter through 
a weight matrix that address interrelationships, and yield true peer effect as a result.  
I find that source credibility is more important in moderating social learning than 
social proximity. This provides evidence that individuals who are perceived to have 
expertise on the product rather than those they are friends with. Consistent with 
Granovetter’s (1973) expectation that weak ties exhibit stronger interpersonal effects than 
do strong ties, I find that consumers do not revise their preferences according to how well 
they know each other, but rather how reliable they perceive their peers to be. Because my 
research products are activity trackers, people who are perceived to be reliable are those 
who dress in gym gear, are physically fit, and have previous experiences with activity 
trackers. These people serve as “hubs” in the network as they are the influencers of 
consumers’ preference revision. In the broader sense of marketing, individuals who are 
perceived to have professional and reliable opinions of the subject of matter should 
introduce new products, rather than close friends and family.  
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Although this study is conducted in the context of activity trackers, my approach 
is applicable when studying other products that are innovative in nature and can be 
recommended via source credibility. Future research can extend this study in a number of 
ways: first, I did not consider information externalities, which could be another 
application of the data. Also, I used a choice-based conjoint experiment, which provided 
many observations from the same individual but suffers from the fact that attribute values 
do not vary over time. Replication with different items that vary in terms of their attribute 
content would help identify the model from this perspective.  
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Innovation is critically important to the agricultural sector. When new ideas are 
invented, diffused, and adopted, the benefits of superior products flow to either 
consumers in terms of preferred new attributes, or producers in terms of lower costs of 
production.  Advantageous innovations, however, do not sell themselves, as there are 
many barriers on the path of diffusion from the lab to the ultimate end-user. Therefore, it 
is critical that we understand the nature of the diffusion process in order to ensure that it 
operates effectively, and efficiently.  In this dissertation, I analyze innovation from the 
initial licensing stage to diffusion among farmers, to consumer preferences in the final 
market.  
 In the first essay, I study the optimal licensing strategies for university-based 
innovations. Passage of the Bayh-Dole Act allowed universities to license federally 
funded inventions created by their faculty, which enabled them to generate much-needed 
revenue from their labs. Doing so, however, raises both economic and legal issues as to 
whether a university should limit exclusive access to the government-funded 
innovations?  Moreover, should patents be licensed using a system of royalties, or with 
fixed licensing fees?  
I address the economic dimension of these questions using an oligopolistic model 
of downstream competition in which two companies compete in price for a quality 
improving innovation. With this model, I argue that the most salient feature of the 
demand for new products is the fundamental asymmetry in the demand for improved 
relative to existing products.   I show that non-exclusive licensing provides the maximum 
revenue to the university, as well as the downstream firms, by aligning the benefits of 
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both. Consumers have differentiated tastes and are willing to pay more for high quality 
products. By licensing non-exclusively, the patent holder “wipes out” low quality 
products, but is able to compensate for the loss of demand with higher margins. 
Moreover, because the consumer market consists of only high quality products, 
university researchers have an incentive to take risks and create bold new products 
because the premium for higher quality is sufficient to compensate for R&D investment. 
Ultimately, my finding imply that Bayh-Dole Act is likely welfare-improving as 
consumers are left with a market uniformly supplied with high-quality products, all firms 
generate higher profits, and universities have a lucrative source of funding. 
Preference for one method of licensing over another is driven entirely by 
differences in their impact on strategic behavior downstream. Namely, I find that if 
downstream firms pay fixed fees, competition is softened between the two competing 
downstream firms. On the other hand, a system of royalties intensifies downstream 
competition. Fixed fees provide the technology transfer office (TTO) an opportunity to 
extract a lump sum of money up front, but yield no control over the output in the 
consumer market.  Royalties, meanwhile, become part of marginal costs, and therefore 
increase with the amount of output. In this way, royalties allow the TTO to control 
demand in the final market, and enhance competition.  
My findings have practical implications, both for settled controversies regarding 
university licensing, and potential future challenges to the Bayh-Dole Act. In one 
prominent example I describe in Chapter 2, the “SweeTango Case”, the essential legal 
question concerns whether growers should be denied access to the research products 
(namely, the SweeTango apples) developed by their own land-grant university? Prior to 
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developing the SweeTango, the owner of the patent, the University of Minnesota, earned 
royalties of $8 million per year through another popular apple variety: the Honeycrisp.26 
By licensing exclusively to a single group of growers, the university was trying to 
achieve similar success with SweeTango. However, my results show that it is in the best 
interest of the university to license non-exclusively rather than limiting the access to its 
new variety.  Not only does non-exclusive licensing maximizes social welfare – 
consistent with the arguments of the plaintiff in this case, the growers denied access to 
SweeTango -- but it generates the most profit for the university. Patent licensing, in 
general, allows universities, researchers, and downstream firms all to benefit from 
innovation.  A robust licensing strategy provides incentives for universities to conduct 
marketable research, and commercialize new products for valuable end-use, which is 
exactly the purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act.   
After they are licensed, innovations must be adopted to be of economic 
importance. Observed adoption patterns exhibit two curious patterns: First, even clearly 
viable innovations are typically only adopted after a substantial lag and, second, adoption 
in a geographic region tends to show a marked “clustering” pattern, or nodes of adopters 
that are far from randomly distributed. In this dissertation, I explain each of these patterns 
as a result not of a market failure, but rather as a rational response to economic 
incentives. 
Particularly in developing countries, adoption occurs only with a considerable lag. 
Previous research identifies a lack of information as the primary barrier to rapid adoption 
                                                        
26 Read the news at: http://news.yahoo.com/apnewsbreak-settlement-sweetango-apple-lawsuit-
203025186.html 
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of beneficial inventions. In developing countries, farmers often have insufficient 
information due to limited access to extension services, leading to low adoption rates and 
delays in adoption. In the absence of formal extension services, farmers typically learn 
from their neighbors. Information provided by early adopters may either speed up or slow 
down the diffusion process. When there are no or few early adopters, farmers may delay 
adoption in anticipation of information from others’ experiences, which is termed a 
“strategic delay” as the farmer waits to adopt as a rational strategy to maximize the 
benefit of new information.   
Learning from neighbors is also one plausible explanation for the observed 
clusters of adopters and non-adopters in my sample of Mozambique maize farmers. 
Learning from neighbors requires that one farmer first experiments with the innovation, 
has a good or bad experience, and then others draw their own conclusions based on their 
observations, or conversations with the adopter.  Learning from others normally happens 
with one or few “leaders” adopt the new variety. After the early adopters demonstrate the 
success of the variety, others will follow on the assumption that their experience will be 
similar. Learning from neighbors may be as simple as mimicry, or it may be true learning 
or other adaptive behavior. Either way, clusters of adopters form.    
I formally test the importance of learning using a farm-level data set of maize 
variety adoption in Mozambique. My econometric model allows for the spatial nature of 
social interactions. In particular, the model captures several potential forms of 
interpersonal relationship among farmers, and their impact on variety adoption. I find that 
clusters are indeed formed by farmers following each other's decisions, presumably 
through either direct communication, observation of some other indirect form of 
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imitation. When a farmer adopts the new variety, others imperfectly observe how well it 
performs.  Depending on how closely farmers communicate, and the nature of the new 
variety, non-adopters may derive differing degrees of information about the performance 
of the new variety. They then decide whether it is likely to be profitable for the next 
planting season. When there are few adopters in a network, farmers will strategically 
postpone adoption in order to acquire more information, leading to clusters of non-
adopters.  
Despite the fact that direct communication and indirect observation regarding new 
varieties help convey information about their likely attractiveness, which helps speed 
adoption, gaining information from others can also lead farmers to delay adoption in 
anticipation of more information. If few farmers have adopted, the delay effect dominates 
and more social interaction can actually slow adoption. Such strategic delay is well 
documented in other contexts, but mine is the first evidence in an explicitly spatial model 
of social interaction. A spatial model is necessary to test the strategic delay hypothesis 
because the underlying mechanism is implicitly spatial: Communication and observation 
take place between neighbors much more readily than between those who are distant.  
On a deeper level, I find that clustering is driven not only by the geographic 
proximity of neighbors, but the specific structure of the social-spatial network. I measure 
the structure of a farmer’s network in three ways, resulting in three different spatial 
weight matrices: (1) a nearest-neighbor matrix, in which the elements assume values of 1 
for farmers who are nearest neighbors to each other, and 0 otherwise, (2) a four-neighbor 
extension in which the spatial matrix is populated by 1s only for those who share 
boundaries, and (3) a geographic distance in which the distance between pairs of farmers 
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is measured using Euclidean space. Geographical distance is found to be insignificant, so 
I conclude that a simplistic measure of proximity is not an appropriate measure of 
network structure. Instead, farmers depend on their immediate neighbors and extended 
neighbors (who share boundaries) for information that leads to adoption decisions.. 
Immediate and extended neighbors serve as the most accessible information source in 
developing countries due to imitated access to official extension services. However, 
learning from neighbors is not constrained by geographic distance because farmers go 
beyond immediate neighbors for new information. Clearly, learning is critical to 
adoption. In fact, I find that a number of other sources of information are statistically 
important. For example, I find that education and extension programs are drivers of new 
variety adoption.  When provided, extension increases farmers’ knowledge of the 
unfamiliar variety, therefore, reduces the risks of adopting. Economies of scale also 
proxy the ability to obtain more, and better, information. Because information-acquisition 
is largely a fixed cost, larger farmers have a greater incentive to obtain more information 
on a cost-benefit basis. Scale also helps to reduce the risk of adopting because larger 
farms produce output for commercial sale rather than home-consumption, so have a more 
robust supply-chain.  
Once new products are licensed, and adopted by producers, their ultimate success 
is determined in the end-consumer market. New products, especially expensive and 
innovative products such as fitness trackers, represent a risky purchase to consumers who 
are not familiar with the relative merits of various attributes. Therefore, consumers 
typically rely on peers for help in decision-making. However, true peer effects – the 
direct effect of agents changing their behavior after observing from, learning from, or 
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mimicking others -- are difficult to identify econometrically because they represent only 
one reason why people in a social network tend to behave similarly.   
The empirical example in the third essay helps address the identification problem, 
both conceptually and empirically.  First, I show how random assignment in a lab 
experiment can be used to identify true peer effects. By introducing peer information into 
only the treatment groups, I find significant changes in the willingness to pay regarding 
specific tracker attributes. Second, I show how spatial models can help identify peer 
effects. Identification requires variation in peer-exposure across individual subjects. 
Spatial models generate the necessary variation because spatial-weight matrices describe 
each pairwise relationship between sample members. Third, I exploit the richness of 
spatial econometrics to test the relative importance of different types of relationships 
among consumers on their adoption decisions. Spatial-weight matrices not only capture 
each pairwise relationship, but can describe different types of relationship within dyads, 
whether two subjects are friends, one is expert and the other uninformed, or one is 
passive and the other aggressive.   
Specifically, I differentiate between alternative definitions of space in order to 
identify the precise mechanism through which peer effects operate. Namely, I introduce 
tie strength and source credibility in order to measure the importance of different types of 
peer influence. Traditional marketing focuses on word-of-mouth among family and 
friends (strong ties). However, I find that people that are perceived as having credible 
opinions of trackers serve as the opinion leaders. In other words, when consumers face 
the choice of an innovative product, they are more likely to adopt opinions from those 
who are “experts” in this field rather than people with whom they maintain close 
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relationships. For example, Yelp and TripAdvisor are examples of business models that 
utilize source expertise. With either, consumers typically rely on reviews from others 
when they are looking for a new product or service. Anyone can provide a review, 
however, those that are considered more credible are more trusted, and more effective. 
Online marketing tools rely on viral marketing, which relaxes the constraints faced by 
traditional word-of-mouth in providing a more efficient means of exchanging 
information. 
My findings form an important contribution to the existing literature by 
addressing the dynamic aspect of each stage of innovation diffusion. Although innovation 
consists of three independent operations: the invention stage, the initial distribution of 
new product, and the mass adoption by consumers,  I address all three stages with a focus 
on the interactive nature among players. Licensing consists of a game between upstream 
patent holder and the downstream firms, and is only socially optimal when the patent 
holder recognizes the strategic interdependence of downstream buyers. Adoption of an 
innovation by growers, or manufacturers more generally, relies on experience and 
learning from others, which is also highlights the interdependence of otherwise-
independent agents. Finally, diffusion among downstream consumers also involves 
interaction among end-users who differ in terms of the amount of information they may 
possess, their intensity of demand for the product, and their inherent willingness to adopt. 
Therefore, although each stage of the process may be functionally independent, the 
processes involved are similar, and should be recognized as such. 
My findings go beyond agriculture, and likely apply to product development and 
diffusion in many other contexts. For example, a company called Activate Networks 
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applies technology license from Harvard University to draw connections between 
physicians with patients in common, then uses those ties to accelerate the adoption of 
newly introduced drugs. In terms of diffusion, they are seeking to identify the credible 
opinion leaders, then use the network effect to amplify the company’s own promotional 
performances.  In fact, the healthcare industry is one in which innovation is a constant, 
and yet adoption is seldom immediate.  Responding to the high demand for the 
commercialization of university-sourced inventions, technology transfer offices and 
third-party organizations have taken on the role of licensing university-based innovations.  
Many major universities such as Johns Hopkins, University of Maryland, and Arizona 
State University have established separate departments solely for the purpose of 
technology commercialization. Other “outside” technology transfer organization such as 
BioHealth Innovation also serve to evaluate market-relevant bio heath intellectual 
properties (IP), connect the IP with funding, and assist in marketing. My research 
provides a guideline for these offices and organizations that are looking to optimize 
university profit, all while maximizing social welfare derived by new drugs.   
Similar to the adoption of agricultural innovations, the diffusion of new drugs 
among consumers often focuses on interpersonal communication within a social group. In 
promoting new drugs, direct marketing is not the optimal marketing strategy for two 
reasons: (1) there is a limitation to how successful a pharmaceutical company can be in 
encouraging members of a social group (for example, doctors) to adopt a new product or 
practice; and (2) there is no way that they can be seen as credible by everyone or address 
the individual concerns of each person. My research shows that consumers depend on 
opinion leaders who are perceived as credible, which suggests that alterative marketing 
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strategies such as WebMD and ASK.COM as potential ventures. Like Yelp, WebMD is a 
consumer-rated website that offers professional medical opinions, with its usefulness 
rated by users. After the discussion of each symptom, a recommended treatment is 
provided. When consumers rate particular recommendations as more credible and useful, 
new users are more likely to adopt the same medication. At the same time, they are more 
likely to leave positive feedback so that more people will adopt. Indeed, bringing network 
analysis to the study of diffusion processes addresses the observation that if you can 
persuade someone to adopt a new product, and then promote it to others, they will have a 
global impact on adoption within the group a whole. 
Each stage of the research presented here is not without limitations. In the first 
essay, my results regarding licensing are based on the assumed duopoly-Bertrand 
framework. If conduct in the downstream market is something other than Bertrand, I may 
have found different conclusions. Future research may want to increase the number of 
downstream firms under other oligopolistic scenarios, or even perfect competition. In the 
second essay, although Mozambique is representative of the adoption case in developing 
countries, there may be differences between cash crops and staple foods produced in 
other countries. Cash crops are planted for profitability rather than own-consumption, so 
the adoption decision may involve considerations other than the ones discussed here. In 
the third essay, my consumer preference experiment can be extended to analyze other 
innovative products. Future research may use an auction instead of a choice experiment, 
as auctions may be more effective in eliciting true willingness to pay relative to a 
hypothetical choice experiment. 
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APPENDIX A 
CACULATING INNOVATOR’S PROFIT 
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In this appendix, I derive the expressions for the inverse demand functions, first- and 
second-order derivatives for the innovator's profit function, optimal royalties, and 
innovator profits under exclusive royalty, and two-part tariff licensing schemes. 
To get the inverse demand function for firm 𝑖, we take derivative of the utility 
function with respect to 𝑞𝑖. 
𝑝1 =
𝑑𝑈(𝑞1,𝑞2)
𝑑𝑞1
= 𝑐(𝑠1) − 𝑞1 − 𝑏𝑞2, 
for inverse demand of firm 1, and: 
𝑝2 =
𝑑𝑈(𝑞1, 𝑞2)
𝑑𝑞2
= 𝑐(𝑠2) − 𝑞2 − 𝜆𝑏𝑞1 
or inverse demand of firm 2. 
To get the expression of the optimal prices for firm 1 and 2, we take derivative of the 
prices with respect to each profit function and set them to 0. 
∂𝜋2
𝑅𝐸
∂𝑝2
=
1 − 4𝑝2𝜆
2 + 2𝑟𝜆2 − 𝑏𝜆3 + 2𝑏𝑝1𝜆
3
2𝜆2 − 2𝑏2𝜆3
= 0 
 
∂𝜋1
𝑅𝐸
∂𝑝1
=
𝑏 + (−1 + 4𝑝1)𝜆
2 − 2𝑏𝑝2𝜆
2
2𝜆2(−1 + 𝑏2𝜆)
= 0 
Solving the above functions together, optimal price for firm 2 can be expressed as a 
function of b, r and 𝜆:  
𝑝2 = −
2 − 𝑏2𝜆 + 4𝑟𝜆2 − 𝑏𝜆3
2𝜆2(−4 + 𝑏2𝜆)
 
Substitute the above expression of 𝑝2 into the demand function to get 𝑞2, then we get the 
expression of the innovator's profit as a function of b, r and 𝜆.  
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𝜋3
𝑅𝐸 = 𝑟𝑞2 − 𝑐3 = −
−2𝑟2𝜆2(−2 + 𝑏2𝜆) + 2(4 − 5𝑏2𝜆 + 𝑏4𝜆2) + 𝑟(−2 + 𝑏2𝜆 + 𝑏𝜆3)
2𝜆2(4 − 5𝑏2𝜆 + 𝑏4𝜆2)
 
Solving for the first order condition of the above function with respect to r and set it to 0: 
∂𝜋3
𝑅𝐸
∂𝑟
=
2 − 8𝑟𝜆2 − 𝑏𝜆3 + 𝑏2𝜆(−1 + 4𝑟𝜆2)
2𝜆2(4 − 5𝑏2𝜆 + 𝑏4𝜆2)
= 0 
I get the optimal r 
𝑟𝑅𝐸 =
−2 + 𝑏2𝜆 + 𝑏𝜆3
4𝜆2(−2 + 𝑏2𝜆)
 
Substitute the expression for r back to the profit function 𝜋3
𝑅𝐸  to get the profit as a 
function of sole 𝑏 and 𝜆. 
𝜋3
𝑅𝐸
=
−16𝑏6𝜆5 + 𝑏4𝜆2(112𝜆2 − 1) − 2𝑏3𝜆4 − 𝑏2𝜆(𝜆5 + 224𝜆2 − 4) + 4𝑏𝜆3 + 128𝜆2 − 4
16𝜆4(𝑏2𝜆 − 4)(𝑏2𝜆 − 2)(𝑏2𝜆 − 1)
 
After solving for the optimal fee and royalty, the innovator's profit under exclusive two-
part tariff and non-exclusive two-part tariff licensing, both as a function of 𝑏 and 𝜆 are 
given by: 
 
𝜋3
𝑇𝐸 = 𝐹𝑇𝐸 + 𝑟𝑇𝐸𝑞2
𝑇𝐸 −
1
𝜆2
=
−4𝑏9𝜆5 + 12𝑏8𝜆5 + 𝑏7𝜆2(𝜆5 + 36𝜆2 − 1)
(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏2𝜆 − 6)(𝑏2𝜆 − 2)(𝑏2𝜆 − 1)
+ 
 
−𝑏6𝜆2(𝜆5 + 16𝜆3 + 110𝜆2 − 3) + 𝑏5(−10𝜆6 + 6𝜆4 − 80𝜆3 + 4𝜆)
4(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏2𝜆 − 6)(𝑏2𝜆 − 2)(𝑏2𝜆 − 1)
+ 
4𝑏4𝜆(3𝜆5 + 36𝜆3 + 61𝜆2 − 𝜆 − 3) + 4𝑏3(5𝜆5 − 2𝜆4 − 3𝜆3 + 12𝜆2 − 1)
(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏2𝜆 − 6)(𝑏2𝜆 − 2)(𝑏2𝜆 − 1)
+ 
−4𝑏2(𝜆6 + 5𝜆5 + 80𝜆3 + 36𝜆2 − 4𝜆 − 3) − 4𝑏𝜆3(3𝜆 − 4) + 4(3𝜆4 + 48𝜆2 − 4)
(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏2𝜆 − 6)(𝑏2𝜆 − 2)(𝑏2𝜆 − 1)
 
 
for profit under exclusive two-part tariff licensing. 
𝜋3
𝑇𝑁 = 2𝐹𝑇𝑁 + 𝑟𝑇𝑁(𝑞1
𝑇𝑁 + 𝑞2
𝑇𝑁) −
1
𝜆2
= 
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2𝑏13𝜆8 + 2𝑏12𝜆7(3𝜆 + 2) + 𝑏11𝜆4(𝜆6 + 18𝜆3 + 6𝜆2 − 1)
2(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏𝜆 − 3)(𝑏𝜆 + 1)(𝑏2𝜆 − 6)2(𝑏2𝜆 − 2)(𝑏2𝜆 − 1)
+ 
−𝑏10𝜆4(𝜆6 + 2𝜆5 + 8𝜆4 + 90𝜆3 + 78𝜆2 − 3)
2(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏𝜆 − 3)(𝑏𝜆 + 1)(𝑏2𝜆 − 6)2(𝑏2𝜆 − 2)(𝑏2𝜆 − 1)
+ 
𝑏9𝜆3(−13𝜆6 − 3𝜆5 + 16𝜆4 + 32𝜆3 − 90𝜆2 + 2𝜆 + 15)
2(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏𝜆 − 3)(𝑏𝜆 + 1)(𝑏2𝜆 − 6)2(𝑏2𝜆 − 2)(𝑏2𝜆 − 1)
+ 
𝑏8𝜆3(15𝜆6 + 33𝜆5 + 120𝜆4 + 472𝜆3 + 566𝜆2 − 10𝜆 − 49)
2(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏𝜆 − 3)(𝑏𝜆 + 1)(𝑏2𝜆 − 6)2(𝑏2𝜆 − 2)(𝑏2𝜆 − 1)
+ 
𝑏7𝜆2(46𝜆6 + 45𝜆5 − 252𝜆4 − 632𝜆3 + 444𝜆2 + 4𝜆 − 80)
2(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏𝜆 − 3)(𝑏𝜆 + 1)(𝑏2𝜆 − 6)2(𝑏2𝜆 − 2)(𝑏2𝜆 − 1)
+ 
−𝑏6𝜆2(80𝜆6 + 197𝜆5 + 592𝜆4 + 1136𝜆3 + 1864𝜆2 − 84𝜆 − 256)
2(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏𝜆 − 3)(𝑏𝜆 + 1)(𝑏2𝜆 − 6)2(𝑏2𝜆 − 2)(𝑏2𝜆 − 1)
+ 
4𝑏5𝜆(7𝜆6 − 53𝜆5 + 302𝜆4 + 373𝜆3 − 202𝜆2 − 10𝜆 + 39)
2(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏𝜆 − 3)(𝑏𝜆 + 1)(𝑏2𝜆 − 6)2(𝑏2𝜆 − 2)(𝑏2𝜆 − 1)
+ 
4𝑏4𝜆(2𝜆7 + 33𝜆6 + 126𝜆5 + 256𝜆4 + 540𝜆3 + 664𝜆2 − 86𝜆 − 121)
2(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏𝜆 − 3)(𝑏𝜆 + 1)(𝑏2𝜆 − 6)2(𝑏2𝜆 − 2)(𝑏2𝜆 − 1)
+ 
−4𝑏3(4𝜆7 + 48𝜆6 − 91𝜆5 + 540𝜆4 + 234𝜆3 − 124𝜆2 − 12𝜆 + 24)
2(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏𝜆 − 3)(𝑏𝜆 + 1)(𝑏2𝜆 − 6)2(𝑏2𝜆 − 2)(𝑏2𝜆 − 1)
+ 
−4𝑏2(24𝜆6 + 135𝜆5 + 128𝜆4 + 792𝜆3 + 316𝜆2 − 156𝜆 − 72)
2(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏𝜆 − 3)(𝑏𝜆 + 1)(𝑏2𝜆 − 6)2(𝑏2𝜆 − 2)(𝑏2𝜆 − 1)
+ 
8𝑏𝜆(18𝜆4 − 27𝜆3 + 156𝜆2 − 8) + 24(9𝜆4 + 72𝜆2 − 16)
2(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏𝜆 − 3)(𝑏𝜆 + 1)(𝑏2𝜆 − 6)2(𝑏2𝜆 − 2)(𝑏2𝜆 − 1)
 
 
for profit under non-exclusive two-part tariff licensing. 
I also derive expressions for downstream profits under exclusive and non-
exclusive two-part tariff licensing. In each case, I show that the resulting maximum profit 
is less than that available in the benchmark, Nash sub-game equilibrium in the second-
stage of the licensing game, so licensing will not occur. Maximizing innovator profit with 
respect to the royalty and the fixed fee, and substituting the resulting expressions back 
into the downstream profit functions leads to equilibrium profits for each firm. In the 
exclusive licensing case, the profit for firm 2 is found from the equilibrium as the second-
stage game to be: 
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𝜋2
𝑇𝐸 = (𝑝2
𝑇𝐸 − 𝑟𝑇𝐸)𝑞2
𝑇𝐸 − 𝐹𝑇𝐸 = 
𝑏9(−𝜆8) + 𝑏8𝜆8 + 𝑏7𝜆2(15𝜆5 − 2) + 𝑏6(−15𝜆7 − 4𝜆4 + 6𝜆2)
4(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏2𝜆 − 6)2(𝑏2𝜆 − 2)(𝑏2𝜆 − 1)
+ 
𝑏5(−76𝜆6 + 12𝜆4 + 8𝜆) + 8𝑏4𝜆(10𝜆5 + 𝜆2 − 𝜆 − 3)
4(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏2𝜆 − 6)2(𝑏2𝜆 − 2)(𝑏2𝜆 − 1)
+ 
4𝑏3(33𝜆5 − 4𝜆4 − 6𝜆3 − 2) − 4𝑏2(2𝜆6 + 33𝜆5 − 8𝜆 − 6)
4(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏2𝜆 − 6)2(𝑏2𝜆 − 2)(𝑏2𝜆 − 1)
+ 
8𝑏𝜆3(9𝜆 − 4) + 8(9𝜆 − 4)
4(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏2𝜆 − 6)2(𝑏2𝜆 − 2)(𝑏2𝜆 − 1)
< 𝜋𝑁𝐿 
while firm 1 does not license by the definition of the exclusive contract. 
In the non-exclusive case, the maximum profit for both firms under two-part tariff 
licensing is: 
𝜋1
𝑇𝑁 = 𝜋2
𝑇𝑁
=
−𝑏12𝜆11 + 24𝑏𝜆(9𝜆4 − 27𝜆3 + 12𝜆2 − 4)) + 72(9𝜆4 − 8)
4(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏𝜆 − 3)2(𝑏𝜆 + 1)(𝑏2𝜆 − 6)2(𝑏2𝜆 − 2)(𝑏2𝜆 − 1)
+ 
𝑏2(−432𝜆6 − 14045 + 96𝜆4 + 160𝜆2 + 816𝜆 + 432)
4(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏𝜆 − 3)2(𝑏𝜆 + 1)(𝑏2𝜆 − 6)2(𝑏2𝜆 − 2)(𝑏2𝜆 − 1)
+ 
𝑏6𝜆2(−268𝜆6 − 379𝜆5 − 24𝜆4 − 4𝜆3 + 4𝜆2 + 172𝜆 + 300)
4(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏𝜆 − 3)2(𝑏𝜆 + 1)(𝑏2𝜆 − 6)2(𝑏2𝜆 − 2)(𝑏2𝜆 − 1)
+ 
𝑏10𝜆4(10𝜆6 − 3𝜆5 − 2𝜆 + 3) − 𝑏8𝜆3(𝜆6 − 54𝜆5 − 12𝜆4 − 20𝜆3 + 26𝜆 + 51)
4(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏𝜆 − 3)2(𝑏𝜆 + 1)(𝑏2𝜆 − 6)2(𝑏2𝜆 − 2)(𝑏2𝜆 − 1)
+ 
𝑏9𝜆3(−15𝜆7 − 72𝜆6 − 9𝜆5 − 4𝜆4 + 6𝜆2 + 10𝜆 + 5) + 𝑏11𝜆4(𝜆7 + 5𝜆6 − 1)
4(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏𝜆 − 3)2(𝑏𝜆 + 1)(𝑏2𝜆 − 6)2(𝑏2𝜆 − 2)(𝑏2𝜆 − 1)
+ 
4𝑏4𝜆(10𝜆7 + 147𝜆6 + 287𝜆5 − 12𝜆4 − 18𝜆3 − 22𝜆2 − 122𝜆 − 159)
4(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏𝜆 − 3)2(𝑏𝜆 + 1)(𝑏2𝜆 − 6)2(𝑏2𝜆 − 2)(𝑏2𝜆 − 1)
+ 
4𝑏3(12𝜆7 − 9𝜆6 + 257𝜆5 − 36𝜆4 − 62𝜆3 + 24𝜆2 + 18𝜆 − 36)
4(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏𝜆 − 3)2(𝑏𝜆 + 1)(𝑏2𝜆 − 6)2(𝑏2𝜆 − 2)(𝑏2𝜆 − 1)
+ 
𝑏7𝜆2(80𝜆7 + 335𝜆6 + 135𝜆5 − 52𝜆4 − 20𝜆3 − 24𝜆2 − 22𝜆 − 92)
4(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏𝜆 − 3)2(𝑏𝜆 + 1)(𝑏2𝜆 − 6)2(𝑏2𝜆 − 2)(𝑏2𝜆 − 1)
+ 
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4𝑏5𝜆(2𝜆8 + 33𝜆7 + 105𝜆6 + 151𝜆5 − 30𝜆4 − 41𝜆3 + 8𝜆 − 51)
4(𝑏 − 2)2(𝑏 + 1)𝜆4(𝑏𝜆 − 3)2(𝑏𝜆 + 1)(𝑏2𝜆 − 6)2(𝑏2𝜆 − 2)(𝑏2𝜆 − 1)
< 𝜋𝑁𝐿 
 
so again licensing will not occur and the potential innovator profit remains just that, 
potential profit that will not be realized. 
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APPENDIX B 
BAYESIAN UPDATING 
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To illustrate how farmer update his prior belief on an uncertain input based on Bayes’ 
rule, Let us consider Bayesian estimation of the mean of a univariate Gaussian with 
known variance. 
Let D = (𝑥1, . . . , 𝑥𝑛)  be the data. The likelihood is: 
𝑝(𝐷|𝜇, 𝜎2) = ∏ 𝑝(𝑥𝑖|𝜇, 𝜎
2) = (2𝜋𝜎2)−𝑛/2
𝑛
𝑖=1
exp (−
1
2𝜎2
∑(𝑥𝑖 − 𝜇)
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
) 
Mean and variance are: 
?̅? =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
𝑠2 = ∑(𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?)
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
the exponent term is: 
 
∑(𝑥𝑖 − 𝜇)
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
= ∑[(𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?) − (𝜇 − ?̅?)]
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
= ∑(𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?)
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ ∑(𝜇 − ?̅?)2 −
𝑛
𝑖=1
2 ∑(𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?)(𝜇 − ?̅?) = 𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑠2
+ 𝑛(𝜇 − ?̅?)227 
Therefore 
𝑝(𝐷|𝜇, 𝜎2) = (2𝜋)−
𝑛
2 𝜎−𝑛exp (−
1
2𝜎2
𝑛(𝜇 − ?̅?)2 + 𝑛𝑠2)
∝  
1
𝜎2
𝑛
2
𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−
𝑛
2𝜎2
(𝜇 − ?̅?)2) exp (−
𝑛𝑠2
2𝜎2
)  
Because 𝜎2 is constant 
                                                        
27 ∑(𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?)(𝜇 − ?̅?) = (𝜇 − ?̅?)(∑ 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑛?̅?) = (𝜇 − ?̅?)(𝑛?̅? − 𝑛?̅?) = 0 
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𝑝(𝐷|𝜇, 𝜎2) ∝  𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−
𝑛
2𝜎2
(𝜇 − ?̅?)2) ∝ 𝑁(?̅?|𝜇,
𝜎2
𝑛
) 
Assume the 𝑝(𝜇)~ 𝑁(𝜇|𝜇0, 𝜎
2
0)28, which is the prior belief. The posterior belief after 
observing D = (𝑥1, . . . , 𝑥𝑛) , 𝑝(𝜇|𝐷) is: 
𝑝(𝜇|𝐷)  ∝  𝑝(𝐷|𝜇, 𝜎2) 𝑝(𝜇|𝜇0, 𝜎0
2)29 
∝  𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−
1
2𝜎2
(𝑥𝑖 − 𝜇)
2) 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−
1
2𝜎02
(𝜇 − 𝜇0)
2) 
=exp [−
1
2𝜎2
(𝑥𝑖 − 𝜇)
2 −
1
2𝜎02
(𝜇 − 𝜇0)
2] 
=exp [−
𝜇2
2
(
1
𝜎02
+
𝑛
𝜎2
) + 𝜇 (
𝜇0
𝜎02
+
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝜎2
) − (
𝜇0
2
2𝜎0
2 +
∑ 𝑥𝑖
2
𝑖
2𝜎2
)] 
By definition, the posterior distribution is expressed as: 
exp [−
1
2𝜎𝑛
2 (𝜇 − 𝜇𝑛)
2] = exp [−
1
2𝜎𝑛
2 (𝜇
2 − 2μ𝜇𝑛 + 𝜇𝑛
2)]. 
Matching the coefficients of 𝜇2, we find 𝜎𝑛
2 to be: 
1
𝜎𝑛
2 =
1
𝜎02
+
𝑛
𝜎2
, 
and that: 
𝜎𝑛
2 =
1
𝑛
𝜎2
+
1
𝜎0
2
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
28 𝜎0
2 is the variance of the prior, while 𝜎2 is the variance of the observation noise. 
29 This is Bayes rule.   
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APPENDIX C. 
EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS 
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C1. Survey used for treatment groups.  
Modeling Consumer Preferences for Innovative Products  
 
You are being asked to take part in a study of consumer preferences regarding activity 
trackers.  Please read this form carefully and ask any questions.  You must be 18 years and 
older to participate. 
 
What we will ask you to do: We will ask you to complete a set of questions regarding your 
workout habits, preferences for activity tracker attributes, and some demographic 
information such as age and gender.  You will also be asked to talk about your choices 
during the experiment.  The entire process should take about 30 minutes.  
 
Risks: No additional risks other than those encountered in day-to-day life.  
 
Compensation: You will receive $20 in cash before the experiment, upon our receipt of 
your signature.  
 
Confidentiality: ALL answers but the tracker choices are confidential and anonymous. 
 
Taking part is voluntary: Taking part in this study is completely voluntary.  You may skip 
any questions that you do not want to answer.  You are free to withdraw at any time. 
 
If you have questions: The researchers conducting this study are Dr. Timothy Richards and 
Di Fang. Please ask any questions you have now. If you have questions later, you may 
contact Dr. Timothy Richards at trichards@asu.edu or Di Fang at dfang3@asu.edu or at 480-
252-5931.  
 
This research has been reviewed and approved by the Social Behavioral IRB. You may talk 
to them at (480) 965-6788 or by email at research.integrity@asu.edu. 
 
 
Statement of Consent: I have read the above information, and have received answers to 
any questions I asked. I consent to take part in the study. 
 
 
Your Signature ___________________________________ Date ________________________ 
 
Your Name (printed) __________________________________________________________ 
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Questionnaire Group No. _2_____   Member No.  ______ 
 
This is the first part of the survey. We would like to start with a few questions related to your 
workout frequency and sports related purchases. This is an anonymous survey and your name 
is not linked to the responses. 
 
For the following questions, check or fill in the answers which best describe you. 
 
 
1. How often do you workout, both inside and outside the gym?  
 
Everyday At least once 
every week 
Once every 
other week 
Once a 
month 
Once a few months 
or less often 
 
 
    
 
2. How often, on average, do you purchase sports related products (sports gear, 
apparel, etc.)?  
 
At least once a 
week 
Once a month Once every 
three months 
Once every six 
months 
Once a year or 
less often 
 
 
    
 
 
3. How much money do you spend on buying sports related goods every year?  
 
Less than $100 _____ 
$100-$299  _____ 
$300-$499 _____ 
$500-$999  _____ 
$1,000 and more_____ 
 
4. Do you currently own an activity tracker? 
 
Yes_____       
No _____ 
 
Please stop here and wait for further information.   
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Questionnaire Group No. __2____   Member No.  ______ 
 
Choice Survey 
 
This is the second part of the survey.  We would like to illustrate what an activity tracker is and 
its attributes.  You will be asked to choose among different trackers.  Your choices may not be 
anonymous but your name is not linked to the responses.  We list some common activity tracker 
attributes below, and your choices will be made from among some combination of these 
attributes.    
 
Brand Fitbit 
Jawbone 
Nike 
Garmin 
Design  
 
 
 
 
Clip on 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wristband 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Watch 
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
 
   
Function Recording basic calories--Cal 
Recording calories and sleep patterns—Cal+Sleep 
Recording calories and text/email messages—Cal+Msg 
Recording calories and GPS locations—Cal+GPS 
Price $49.99 
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$99.99 
$129.99 
$199.99 
 
Sample Choice: 
 
 A B C D E 
Brand Garmin Jawbone Nike Fitbit None of 
These  Design Clip on Watch Wristband Clip on 
Function Cal+Sleep Cal+GPS Cal+Msg Cal+Msg 
Price $99.99 $199.99 $129.99 $49.99 
Choice       
 
IMPORTANT       
 CHOOSE one of the options per table. Or you may choose None of These. 
 Assume that the options in each table are the only ones available. 
 Do not compare options across tables. 
 
You might see a few options that are counter-intuitive (e.g., a lower price but a higher 
quality in your personal opinion).  Be assured that this is not an error but part of the design 
of the survey.  Simply choose the option that you prefer most. 
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Questionnaire Group No. _2_____  Member No.  ______ 
  Choice Sets 1 
 
Item# 1 A B C D E 
Brand Garmin Jawbone Nike Fitbit None of 
These  Design Clip on Clip on Wristband Clip on 
Function Cal+GPS Cal+GPS Cal+Msg Cal+Msg 
Price $49.99 $199.99 $129.99 $49.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 2 A B C D E  
Brand Garmin Fitbit Nike Jawbone None of 
These Design Clip on Wristband Wristband Clip on 
Function Cal+Sleep Cal+Sleep Cal+Sleep Cal+Msg 
Price $199.99 $199.99 $129.99 $49.99 
Choice      
 
 
Item# 3 A B C D E  
Brand Jawbone Jawbone Garmin Fitbit None of 
These Design Clip on Watch Watch Watch 
Function Cal Cal Cal Cal+Msg 
Price $49.99 $99.99 $129.99 $129.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 4 A B C D E  
Brand Fitbit Nike Nike Fitbit None of 
These Design Clip on Wristband Clip on Clip on 
Function Cal+GPS Cal Cal+Msg Cal+Sleep 
Price $99.99 $49.99 $99.99 $49.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 5 A B C D E  
Brand Fitbit Fitbit Garmin Jawbone None of 
These Design Clip on Clip on Watch Wristband 
Function Cal+Sleep Cal+Msg Cal+Msg Cal+Msg 
Price $99.99 $199.99 $99.99 $49.99 
Choice      
 
 
 
Item# 6 A B C D E  
Brand Fitbit Jawbone Jawbone Garmin None of 
These Design Watch Clip on Wristband Watch 
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Function Cal Cal+Msg Cal+GPS Cal+Msg 
Price $99.99 $99.99 $49.99 $49.99 
Choice      
 
Questionnaire Group No. __2____   Member No.  ______ 
 
Item# 7 A B C D E  
Brand Garmin Garmin Jawbone Jawbone None of 
These Design Wristband Clip on Clip on Clip on 
Function Cal+Sleep Cal+Msg Cal+Sleep Cal+Sleep 
Price $199.99 $129.99 $129.99 $199.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 8 A B C D E  
Brand Garmin Jawbone Jawbone Garmin None of 
These Design Wristband Wristband Watch Watch 
Function Cal Cal+Msg Cal+Sleep Cal+GPS 
Price $199.99 $199.99 $49.99 $199.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 9 A B C D E  
Brand Nike Jawbone Fitbit Garmin None of 
These Design Wristband Clip on Wristband Wristband 
Function Cal+GPS Cal+GPS Cal+Msg Cal+GPS 
Price $199.99 $129.99 $99.99 $129.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 10 A B C D E  
Brand Garmin Garmin Nike Nike None of 
These Design Clip on Watch Clip on Watch 
Function Cal+Sleep Cal Cal+Sleep Cal 
Price $129.99 $49.99 $49.99 $129.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 11 A B C D E  
Brand Jawbone Fitbit Nike Garmin None of 
These Design Wristband Wristband Watch Clip on  
Function Cal Cal+GPS Cal+GPS Cal 
Price $129.99 $129.99 $99.99 $99.99 
Choice      
 
 
Item# 12 A B C D E  
Brand Nike Garmin Jawbone Nike 
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Design Clip on Wristband Watch Wristband None of 
These Function Cal Cal Cal+GPS Cal+GPS 
Price $199.99 $99.99 $199.99 $49.99 
Choice      
 
If you’ve reached here please stop and wait for further information.   
Questionnaire Group No. __2____   Member No.  ______ 
 
5. Please indicate below how well you know the other participants. 
1 = have never met  
2 = met once  
3 = somewhat acquainted  
4 = well acquainted  
5 = know him/her well  
For example if you know participant #1 well, then put number 5 next to #1 (as #1_5_); if 
you have never met participant #1 then put 1 next to #1(as #1_1_).  
#1___                                    
#2___ 
#3___ 
#4___ 
#5___ 
#6___ 
#7___ 
#8___ 
#9___ 
#10___ 
#11___ 
#12___ 
#13___ 
#14___ 
#15___ 
#16___ 
#17___ 
#18___ 
#19___ 
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#20___ 
 
 
 
Let’s talk about your choices! 
 
Questionnaire Group No. ____2__   Member No.  ______ 
Choice experiments 2 
 
Item# 1 A B C D E  
Brand Garmin Garmin Jawbone Jawbone None of 
These Design Wristband Clip on Clip on Clip on 
Function Cal+Sleep Cal+Msg Cal+Sleep Cal+Sleep 
Price $199.99 $129.99 $129.99 $199.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 2 A B C D E  
Brand Garmin Jawbone Jawbone Garmin None of 
These Design Wristband Wristband Watch Watch 
Function Cal Cal+Msg Cal+Sleep Cal+GPS 
Price $199.99 $199.99 $49.99 $199.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 3 A B C D E  
Brand Nike Jawbone Fitbit Garmin None of 
These Design Wristband Clip on Wristband Wristband 
Function Cal+GPS Cal+GPS Cal+Msg Cal+GPS 
Price $199.99 $129.99 $99.99 $129.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 4 A B C D E  
Brand Garmin Garmin Nike Nike None of 
These Design Clip on Watch Clip on Watch 
Function Cal+Sleep Cal Cal+Sleep Cal 
Price $129.99 $49.99 $49.99 $129.99 
Choice      
 
 
 
 
 
Item# 5 A B C D E  
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Brand Jawbone Fitbit Nike Garmin None of 
These Design Wristband Wristband Watch Clip on  
Function Cal Cal+GPS Cal+GPS Cal 
Price $129.99 $129.99 $99.99 $99.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 6 A B C D E  
Brand Nike Garmin Jawbone Nike None of 
These Design Clip on Wristband Watch Wristband 
Function Cal Cal Cal+GPS Cal+GPS 
Price $199.99 $99.99 $199.99 $49.99 
Choice      
 
 
Questionnaire Group No. ____2_   Member No.  ______ 
 
Item# 7 A B C D E 
Brand Garmin Jawbone Nike Fitbit None of 
These Design Clip on Clip on Wristband Clip on 
Function Cal+GPS Cal+GPS Cal+Msg Cal+Msg 
Price $49.99 $199.99 $129.99 $49.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 8 A B C D E  
Brand Garmin Fitbit Nike Jawbone None of 
These Design Clip on Wristband Wristband Clip on 
Function Cal+Sleep Cal+Sleep Cal+Sleep Cal+Msg 
Price $199.99 $199.99 $129.99 $49.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 9 A B C D E  
Brand Jawbone Jawbone Garmin Fitbit None of 
These Design Clip on Watch Watch Watch 
Function Cal Cal Cal Cal+Msg 
Price $49.99 $99.99 $129.99 $129.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 10 A B C D E  
Brand Fitbit Nike Nike Fitbit Not 
Interested  Design Clip on Wristband Clip on Clip on 
Function Cal+GPS Cal Cal+Msg Cal+Sleep 
Price $99.99 $49.99 $99.99 $49.99 
Choice      
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Item# 11 A B C D E  
Brand Fitbit Fitbit Garmin Jawbone None of 
These Design Clip on Clip on Watch Wristband 
Function Cal+Sleep Cal+Msg Cal+Msg Cal+Msg 
Price $99.99 $199.99 $99.99 $49.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 12 A B C D E  
Brand Fitbit Jawbone Jawbone Garmin None of 
These Design Watch Clip on Wristband Watch 
Function Cal Cal+Msg Cal+GPS Cal+Msg 
Price $99.99 $99.99 $49.99 $49.99 
Choice      
 
 
Questionnaire Group No. _2_____   Member No.  ______ 
 
6. Please indicate below how you rate the credibility of the opinions offered by other 
people in your group.  
1 = not credible  
2 = a small amount of credibility  
3 = indifferent  
4 = somewhat credible 
5 = very credible 
For example you value participant #1’s opinion very much then put 5 next to #1 (as #1_5_); 
if you do not have respect for #1’s opinion then put 1 next to #1 (as #1_1_). 
#1___                                    
#2___ 
#3___ 
#4___ 
#5___ 
#6___ 
#7___ 
#8___ 
#9___ 
#10___ 
#11___ 
#12___ 
#13___ 
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#14___ 
#15___ 
#16___ 
#17___ 
#18___ 
#19___ 
#20___ 
 
 
 
 
 
Questionnaire Group No. __2____   Member No.  ______ 
 
This is the final part of the survey. I would like to ask you a few questions about yourself. As 
mentioned in the beginning, this is an anonymous survey and your name is not linked to the 
responses. Please remember that you can skip as many questions as you want or 
withdraw at anytime.  
 
7. How old are you?  
 
  years 
 
8. Please indicate your gender    
 
Male (   )   Female (   )  
 
9. Please indicate which ethnic group you belong to? 
 
White  _____                  Hispanic   ____              Native American  ____  
African American   _____       Asian/Pacific Islander _____      Other ______________ 
 
10.  What year are you in your program? 
 
First year  _______   
Second year  _______             
Third year  _______         
Fourth year and more_______            
Graduate student_______    
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Other______          
 
11. Please indicate your weight and height – make your best guess. 
Weight indicate lb ___________ Height indicate inches _______ 
 
12. Please indicate your approximate annual household income before taxes: 
 
Less than $10,000 ______                $60,000 to $69,999   ______ 
$10,000 to $19,999 ______  $70,000 to $79,999   ______ 
$20,000 to $29,999 ______   $80,000 to $89,999   ______ 
$30,000 to $39,999 ______  $90,000 to $99,999   ______ 
$40,000 to $49,999 ______  $100, 000 to $149,999 ______ 
$50,000 to $59,999  ______  $150,000 or more   ______ 
 
Thank you very much for your participation!  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C2. Survey for control groups.  
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Modeling Consumer Preferences for Innovative Products  
 
You are being asked to take part in a study of consumer preferences regarding activity 
trackers.  Please read this form carefully and ask any questions.  You must be 18 years 
and older to participate. 
 
What we will ask you to do: We will ask you to complete a set of questions regarding 
your workout habits, preferences for activity tracker attributes, and some demographic 
information such as age and gender. You will read a short article from New York Times. 
The entire process should take about 30 minutes.  
 
Risks: No additional risks other than those encountered in day-to-day life.  
 
Compensation: You will receive $20 in cash before the experiment, upon our receipt of 
your signature.  
 
Confidentiality: ALL answers are confidential and anonymous. 
 
Taking part is voluntary: Taking part in this study is completely voluntary.  You may 
skip any questions that you do not want to answer.  You are free to withdraw at any time. 
 
If you have questions: The researchers conducting this study are Dr. Timothy Richards 
and Di Fang. Please ask any questions you have now. If you have questions later, you 
may contact Dr. Timothy Richards at trichards@asu.edu or Di Fang at dfang3@asu.edu 
or at 480-252-5931.  
 
This research has been reviewed and approved by the Social Behavioral IRB. You may 
talk to them at (480) 965-6788 or by email at research.integrity@asu.edu. 
 
 
Statement of Consent: I have read the above information, and have received answers to 
any questions I asked. I consent to take part in the study. 
 
 
Your Signature ___________________________________ Date 
________________________ 
 
Your Name (printed) 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Questionnaire Group No. __5___   Member No.  ______ 
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This is the first part of the survey. We would like to start with a few questions related to 
your workout frequency and sports related purchases. This is an anonymous survey and 
your name is not linked to the responses. 
 
For the following questions, check or fill in the answers which best describe you. 
 
 
1. How often do you workout, both inside and outside the gym?  
 
Everyday At least once 
every week 
Once every 
other week 
Once a 
month 
Once a few months 
or less often 
 
 
    
 
2. How often, on average, do you purchase sports related products (sports gear, 
apparel, etc.)?  
 
At least once 
a week 
Once a month Once every 
three months 
Once every 
six months 
Once a year 
or less often 
 
 
    
 
 
3. How much money do you spend on buying sports related goods every year?  
 
Less than $100 _____ 
$100-$299  _____ 
$300-$499 _____ 
$500-$999  _____ 
$1,000 and more_____ 
 
4. Do you currently own an activity tracker? 
 
Yes_____       
No _____ 
  
  
 
191 
Questionnaire Group No. ___5___   Member No.  _____ 
 
Choice Survey 
 
This is the second part of the survey.  We would like to illustrate what an activity tracker is 
and its attributes.  You will be asked to choose among different trackers.  Your choices 
may not be anonymous but your name is not linked to the responses.  We list some 
common activity tracker attributes below, and your choices will be made from among 
some combination of these attributes.    
 
Brand Fitbit 
Jawbone 
Nike 
Garmin 
Design  
 
 
 
 
Clip on 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wristband 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Watch 
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
 
   
Function Recording basic calories--Cal 
Recording calories and sleep patterns—Cal+Sleep 
Recording calories and text/email messages—Cal+Msg 
Recording calories and GPS locations—Cal+GPS 
Price $49.99 
$99.99 
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$129.99 
$199.99 
 
Sample Choice: 
 
 A B C D E 
Brand Garmin Jawbone Nike Fitbit None of 
These  Design Clip on Watch Wristband Clip on 
Function Cal+Sleep Cal+GPS Cal+Msg Cal+Msg 
Price $99.99 $199.99 $129.99 $49.99 
Choice  ✔    
 
IMPORTANT       
 CHOOSE one of the options per table. Or you may choose None of These. 
 Assume that the options in each table are the only ones available. 
 Do not compare options across tables. 
 
You might see a few options that are counter-intuitive (e.g., a lower price but a higher 
quality in your personal opinion).  Be assured that this is not an error but part of the 
design of the survey.  Simply choose the option that you prefer most. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Questionnaire Group No. __5____  Member No.  ______ 
  Choice Sets 1 
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Item# 1 A B C D E 
Brand Garmin Jawbone Nike Fitbit None of 
These  Design Clip on Clip on Wristband Clip on 
Function Cal+GPS Cal+GPS Cal+Msg Cal+Msg 
Price $49.99 $199.99 $129.99 $49.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 2 A B C D E  
Brand Garmin Fitbit Nike Jawbone None of 
These Design Clip on Wristband Wristband Clip on 
Function Cal+Sleep Cal+Sleep Cal+Sleep Cal+Msg 
Price $199.99 $199.99 $129.99 $49.99 
Choice      
 
 
Item# 3 A B C D E  
Brand Jawbone Jawbone Garmin Fitbit None of 
These Design Clip on Watch Watch Watch 
Function Cal Cal Cal Cal+Msg 
Price $49.99 $99.99 $129.99 $129.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 4 A B C D E  
Brand Fitbit Nike Nike Fitbit None of 
These     Design Clip on Wristband Clip on Clip on 
Function Cal+GPS Cal Cal+Msg Cal+Sleep 
Price $99.99 $49.99 $99.99 $49.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 5 A B C D E  
Brand Fitbit Fitbit Garmin Jawbone None of 
These Design Clip on Clip on Watch Wristband 
Function Cal+Sleep Cal+Msg Cal+Msg Cal+Msg 
Price $99.99 $199.99 $99.99 $49.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 6 A B C D E  
Brand Fitbit Jawbone Jawbone Garmin None of 
These Design Watch Clip on Wristband Watch 
Function Cal Cal+Msg Cal+GPS Cal+Msg 
Price $99.99 $99.99 $49.99 $49.99 
Choice      
 
Questionnaire Group No. __5____   Member No.  ______ 
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Item# 7 A B C D E  
Brand Garmin Garmin Jawbone Jawbone None of 
These Design Wristband Clip on Clip on Clip on 
Function Cal+Sleep Cal+Msg Cal+Sleep Cal+Sleep 
Price $199.99 $129.99 $129.99 $199.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 8 A B C D E  
Brand Garmin Jawbone Jawbone Garmin None of 
These Design Wristband Wristband Watch Watch 
Function Cal Cal+Msg Cal+Sleep Cal+GPS 
Price $199.99 $199.99 $49.99 $199.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 9 A B C D E  
Brand Nike Jawbone Fitbit Garmin None of 
These Design Wristband Clip on Wristband Wristband 
Function Cal+GPS Cal+GPS Cal+Msg Cal+GPS 
Price $199.99 $129.99 $99.99 $129.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 10 A B C D E  
Brand Garmin Garmin Nike Nike None of 
These Design Clip on Watch Clip on Watch 
Function Cal+Sleep Cal Cal+Sleep Cal 
Price $129.99 $49.99 $49.99 $129.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 11 A B C D E  
Brand Jawbone Fitbit Nike Garmin None of 
These Design Wristband Wristband Watch Clip on  
Function Cal Cal+GPS Cal+GPS Cal 
Price $129.99 $129.99 $99.99 $99.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 12 A B C D E  
Brand Nike Garmin Jawbone Nike None of 
These Design Clip on Wristband Watch Wristband 
Function Cal Cal Cal+GPS Cal+GPS 
Price $199.99 $99.99 $199.99 $49.99 
Choice      
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5. Please indicate below how well you know the other participants. 
1 = have never met  
2 = met once  
3 = somewhat acquainted  
4 = well acquainted  
5 = know him/her well  
For example if you know participant #1 well, then put number 5 next to #1 (as #1_5_); if 
you have never met participant #1 then put 1 next to #1(as #1_1_).  
#1___                                    
#2___ 
#3___ 
#4___ 
#5___ 
#6___ 
#7___ 
#8___ 
#9___ 
#10___ 
#11___ 
#12___ 
#13___ 
#14___ 
#15___ 
#16___ 
#17___ 
#18___ 
#19___ 
#20___ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please read the following article from New York Times 
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China Acts to Stem Slide in Home Prices 
MARCH 30, 2015 
 
SHANGHAI — China on Monday courted home buyers with a bigger tax break as it cut 
down-payment requirements for the second time in six months, stepping up a fight 
against sliding house prices that is imperiling the Chinese economy. 
The People’s Bank of China, the central bank, said on its website that commercial banks 
could now lower their minimum down-payment requirement for buyers of second homes, 
and with outstanding mortgages, to 40 percent from 60 percent. 
The Ministry of Finance, in a separate statement, said that individuals selling houses were 
exempt from business taxes if they had owned the house for more than two years. 
Analysts said sellers were previously exempted from taxes only if they owned the houses 
for at least five years. 
The policy sweeteners, which were more generous than what the market had expected, 
confirmed rumors swirling in China on Monday that the authorities were increasing 
support for the flagging real estate sector. Real estate share indexes rallied sharply in 
Shanghai on rumors of the change. The Shanghai composite’s property index closed up 
more than 7 percent, its best day since 2009, while the broader index closed 2.6 percent 
higher. 
That China is now trying to lift its property market is an about-face in policy. As recently 
as early 2014, the authorities were waging a four-year campaign to tame an exuberant 
market, which pushed home prices to records. 
Some analysts doubted that the measures announced Monday would lead to a turnaround. 
“The new measures are definitely helpful, but the impact won’t be significant,” said Ada 
Wong, a vice president at the China Aoyuan Property Group, a developer based in 
Guangzhou. “This is because most of the speculative buyers have been eliminated. The 
market has become more rational, so sales won’t increase a lot.” 
Zhu Haibin, an economist at JPMorgan Chase, said, “We expect the housing market 
correction will continue, but at a relatively modest pace through the course of this year. 
In our view, real estate investment growth will likely further decelerate from 10.5 percent 
in 2014 to about 6 percent in 2015, which will continue to drag on economic growth.” 
The housing market has increasingly weighed on the economy. Prices fell at a record 
pace in February, denting activity in industries like cement, steel and glass making. 
Real estate accounts for about 15 percent of the Chinese economic activity and 
economists have warned that persistent weakness in housing could endanger 
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Beijing’s target of 7 percent growth this year. 
Investors had speculated that China would cut down payments for buyers of second 
homes with outstanding home loans to 50 percent. Yet while the move was more 
generous than many had expected, it was not clear that banks would pass on the discounts 
to buyers. 
Even before the latest relaxation, some banks were demanding down payments of as 
much as 70 percent, higher than a government-set minimum of 60 percent. 
In its statement, the central bank urged financial institutions to “support home purchases” 
with a combination of commercial lending and money from the national provident fund. 
The provident fund is a government-managed program in which all of China’s employers 
and employees contribute to a pool of money from which employees then borrow to buy 
homes. 
The central bank said the down payment for second-home loans by borrowers from the 
housing provident fund was now set at 30 percent, provided borrowers had no 
outstanding mortgages. First-time buyers using the provident fund need make a down 
payment of only 20 percent, the bank said, with all changes taking immediate effect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please continue with the survey, thank you so much for your patience! 
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Questionnaire Group No. ____5__   Member No.  _____ 
Choice experiments 2 
 
Item# 1 A B C D E  
Brand Garmin Garmin Jawbone Jawbone None of 
These Design Wristband Clip on Clip on Clip on 
Function Cal+Sleep Cal+Msg Cal+Sleep Cal+Sleep 
Price $199.99 $129.99 $129.99 $199.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 2 A B C D E  
Brand Garmin Jawbone Jawbone Garmin None of 
These Design Wristband Wristband Watch Watch 
Function Cal Cal+Msg Cal+Sleep Cal+GPS 
Price $199.99 $199.99 $49.99 $199.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 3 A B C D E  
Brand Nike Jawbone Fitbit Garmin None of 
These Design Wristband Clip on Wristband Wristband 
Function Cal+GPS Cal+GPS Cal+Msg Cal+GPS 
Price $199.99 $129.99 $99.99 $129.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 4 A B C D E  
Brand Garmin Garmin Nike Nike None of 
These Design Clip on Watch Clip on Watch 
Function Cal+Sleep Cal Cal+Sleep Cal 
Price $129.99 $49.99 $49.99 $129.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 5 A B C D E  
Brand Jawbone Fitbit Nike Garmin None of 
These Design Wristband Wristband Watch Clip on  
Function Cal Cal+GPS Cal+GPS Cal 
Price $129.99 $129.99 $99.99 $99.99 
Choice      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Item# 6 A B C D E  
Brand Nike Garmin Jawbone Nike 
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Design Clip on Wristband Watch Wristband None of 
These Function Cal Cal Cal+GPS Cal+GPS 
Price $199.99 $99.99 $199.99 $49.99 
Choice      
 
 
 
Questionnaire Group No. ____5_   Member No.  _____ 
 
Item# 7 A B C D E 
Brand Garmin Jawbone Nike Fitbit None of 
These Design Clip on Clip on Wristband Clip on 
Function Cal+GPS Cal+GPS Cal+Msg Cal+Msg 
Price $49.99 $199.99 $129.99 $49.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 8 A B C D E  
Brand Garmin Fitbit Nike Jawbone None of 
These Design Clip on Wristband Wristband Clip on 
Function Cal+Sleep Cal+Sleep Cal+Sleep Cal+Msg 
Price $199.99 $199.99 $129.99 $49.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 9 A B C D E  
Brand Jawbone Jawbone Garmin Fitbit None of 
These Design Clip on Watch Watch Watch 
Function Cal Cal Cal Cal+Msg 
Price $49.99 $99.99 $129.99 $129.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 10 A B C D E  
Brand Fitbit Nike Nike Fitbit Not 
Interested  Design Clip on Wristband Clip on Clip on 
Function Cal+GPS Cal Cal+Msg Cal+Sleep 
Price $99.99 $49.99 $99.99 $49.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 11 A B C D E  
Brand Fitbit Fitbit Garmin Jawbone None of 
These Design Clip on Clip on Watch Wristband 
Function Cal+Sleep Cal+Msg Cal+Msg Cal+Msg 
Price $99.99 $199.99 $99.99 $49.99 
Choice      
 
Item# 12 A B C D E  
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Brand Fitbit Jawbone Jawbone Garmin None of 
These Design Watch Clip on Wristband Watch 
Function Cal Cal+Msg Cal+GPS Cal+Msg 
Price $99.99 $99.99 $49.99 $49.99 
Choice      
 
 
 
Questionnaire Group No. __5___   Member No.  ______ 
 
This is the final part of the survey. I would like to ask you a few questions about 
yourself. As mentioned in the beginning, this is an anonymous survey and your name is 
not linked to the responses. Please remember that you can skip as many questions as 
you want or withdraw at anytime.  
 
7. How old are you?  
 
  years 
 
8. Please indicate your gender    
 
Male (   )   Female (   )  
 
9. Please indicate which ethnic group you belong to? 
 
White  _____                  Hispanic   ____              Native American  ____  
African American   _____       Asian/Pacific Islander _____      Other ______________ 
 
10.  What year are you in your program? 
 
First year  _______   
Second year  _______             
Third year  _______         
Fourth year and more_______            
Graduate student_______    
Other______          
 
11. Please indicate your weight and height – make your best guess. 
Weight indicate lb ___________ Height indicate inches _______ 
 
12. Please indicate your approximate annual household income before taxes: 
 
Less than $10,000 ______   $60,000 to $69,999   ______ 
$10,000 to $19,999 ______   $70,000 to $79,999  
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 ______ 
$20,000 to $29,999 ______   $80,000 to $89,999   ______ 
$30,000 to $39,999 ______  $90,000 to $99,999   ______ 
$40,000 to $49,999 ______  $100, 000 to $149,999 ______ 
$50,000 to $59,999  ______  $150,000 or more   ______ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for your participation!  
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C2. Recruiting Scripts using Qualtrics 
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C3. IRB Approval Letter 
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